Narin's murder, feudalism, and the law of silence

Narin’s murder has deeply hurt all of Turkey, and it will continue to do so. I hope we do not continue to experience tragic events like this. 

There is a necessity to learn lessons from this incident. Could it be that the culture stemming from the region's feudal order plays a role among the root causes of this tragic event? 

What is the Origin of Feudalism?

Can we ignore the fact that our current problems in the Southeastern Anatolia and Eastern Anatolia regions are linked to feudalism?

Let us begin with an observation.

Feudalism and its culture stem from the imbalance in land distribution. For example, in Diyarbakır, more than 41 percent of the land is under the control of 3 percent of the families. In Şanlıurfa, nearly 30 percent of the nearly 10 million decares of land belongs to 1.5 percent of the families.

Does the solution not lie in Land Reform?

I had stated that the economic structure in the region creates unemployment, poverty, and feudal culture. This structure is fed by landlessness, insufficient land, and the lack of industry and service sectors in the region. In the Southeast Region, landlords and tribal leaders dominate almost all the land in the region. Some landlords, occasionally fearing or being wary of rhetoric regarding land reform, take two paths.

First; some landlords divide their land among their families or turn them into capitalist mega-agricultural enterprises.

Second is this; the landlords and tribal leaders have established or have had cooperatives established. They have placed themselves or have been placed at the head of them. Thus, a model of cooperativism has emerged that is not observed in any other region of the world. In an article I wrote years ago, I named this “Aga-Koop” (Landlord-Coop). Poor peasants are, on paper, equal(!) partners in the cooperative called Aga-Koop. However, they continue to live hand-to-mouth just as they did before.

Implementing Land Reform would not only positively affect agricultural production but would also prevent the drama of seasonal workers and, to some extent, cut off the human resources of the separatist terrorist movement.

Does the Feudal Structure in the Land Order Not Also Create the Seasonal Worker Drama?

In this country, we have a problem like seasonal workers, which those living in comfort in the cities either do not know about or choose to ignore.

Every year, seasonal workers are brought from the Southeastern Anatolia Region, primarily from Urfa, Mardin, and Diyarbakır, to be employed in jobs such as greenhouse vegetable and citrus harvesting in Adana; cherry picking in Afyon; hazelnut harvesting in Düzce; cherry picking and cutting tomatoes for drying in İzmir; sugar beet hoeing in Konya-Aksaray; hazelnut harvesting in Ordu; vegetable harvesting in Samsun; cotton picking in Urfa; and sugar beet hoeing in Yozgat-Nevşehir.

Seasonal agricultural worker families leave home in March, April, and May, and mostly return to their homes in September, October, and November.

The most important reason for migration is “economic difficulties,” in other words, landlessness or having very little land.

The rate of those who previously owned any land among those who migrated to the city is extremely low. Only 7 percent of the families have agricultural land in their villages, and the average size of these lands is smaller than 10 decares.

And Isn't Feudal Culture the Result of the Land Order?

The feudal structure, as is known, is a system that emerges based on land ownership and personal loyalty in the social hierarchy. In this hierarchy, there are landlords who own land, tribal leaders, cult sheikhs, and ethnic and religious politicians and political approaches that feed off them, all of which are on Turkey's agenda.

The feudal structure maintains serfdom, prevents equal citizenship, and also creates inward-looking units for those living in villages or hamlets. In other words, “closed” lives have also given birth to a kind of mafia organization.

Did this situation not emerge in the village where Narin was murdered? Are those who speak of the silence of the villagers and even a former member of parliament mistaken? Is there any difference between this and the “Law of Silence” known as “Omerta” in the mafia order?

Is this tragic event an individual incident?

Let us recall the film Bedrana, which was made years ago.

Bedrana is a 1974 film adapted from Bekir Yıldız’s story titled “Sahipsizler” (The Ownerless). The film is the story of a man who hesitates when faced with an action that traditions force upon him after his wife, whom he married by eloping, has her honor “soiled” by a shepherd.

In fact, the main subject that the film inspires is the incompatibility between the laws of the feudal order and official laws, and the consequences of the frightening pressure of traditions on feudal society. And in this order, a woman is seen more as a sacred commodity that is owned rather than an individual. And for this reason, when she is “soiled” and loses her sanctity, she is evaluated as a “thing” that must be destroyed.

Bekir Yıldız expressed the backwardness of the feudal order with his story more than 50 years ago. However, the dominant order remained far from changing the land order. Do feudal landlords, tribal leaders, and cult sheikhs not continue their existence today?

Shall I give an example of this? Did the junta that carried out the September 12 Military Coup not host the feudal landlords of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia in Ankara and put them on television to get a vote of confidence before the Constitutional referendum?

Can the following be said as a conclusion?

The feudal structure in the region also creates a feudal culture as a result of unemployment and poverty. Unemployment and poverty are fed by landlessness, insufficient land, and the lack of industry and service sectors in the region.

It should not be forgotten. Does the separatist terrorist movement not also use these negatives?