'Coup Plotter' General: 'Our commanders sold us out for a few houses and a few million dollars'

Former Brigadier General Gökhan Şahin Sönmezateş, the only individual in the July 15 coup attempt trials to confess, “I am a coup plotter, but I am not a FETÖ member,” claimed that the plan was not to arrest and prosecute hundreds or thousands of people as seen in current municipal operations, but only Erdoğan and 8-10 other individuals. Sönmezateş alleged that this planning was carried out by the Chief of General Staff and the four force commanders, but that they withdrew after being invited to the Palace one by one 3-4 months before July 15. “After these meetings, they all suddenly became wealthy. They acquired houses and money. It is a stroke of luck that our country is not being governed by these men today. They sold us out for a few houses and a few million dollars,” he said. Sönmezateş also noted his surprise that he was not killed despite going to capture the country's President and failing.

Making his defense against the opinion on the merits in the General Staff 'Headquarters' Case, which is being retried at the Sincan Prison Campus courtroom by the Ankara 17th High Criminal Court following the Supreme Court of Appeals' partial reversal decision, Gökhan Şahin Sönmezateş reiterated that he was not a “FETÖ member” and emphasized that the issue was not this, but the facts regarding the day of July 15 and the period before and after it.

“Planning Began in September 2015”

Sönmezateş began his defense as follows:

“If we are talking about FETÖ, Fethullah Gülen is dead; there is no FETÖ left in Turkey. So why does everyone in a tight spot—those being tried for bribery, corruption, fraud, and even mafia ties—say ‘FETÖ’? I am an ordinary person; I know I will remain in prison until I die. I also accept that I have lost everything. I accept that my speeches will cause harm to my family, my children, my friends, and even my lawyer. I have no fear, nor do I have a need to lie. I served at every level of the state before July 15, and I have been in prison for 10 years. My shame is the indifference we showed while thousands of people were subjected to torture before us. It existed before us, but we only heard about it when it was done to us. When my turn came, and even when my daughters were subjected to torture, I apologize for objecting to these.”

While stating that what he objected to in the trials was being punished for what he did not do rather than for the act he committed, Sönmezateş made the following claims regarding the July 15 planning:

“I am speaking clearly and plainly; the task given to me by my commanders was to take Erdoğan, who had seized the security and justice mechanisms and used them for his own benefit, and who was known for corruption. That is all I did. I believe that the critical levels of the state know the answer to the question, ‘Who planned July 15, who are the main culprits?’ I kept silent because I gave them my word, but while I was in prison in Muğla, three MİT personnel came; they had questions, and they got their answers. A week before that, my daughters had been strip-searched. I said, ‘You did this, and now you want help from me?’ The answer given was, ‘We didn’t do it.’ If we return to that question; Hulusi Akar’s position on July 15 has been discussed extensively, but it would be a mistake to discuss the issue solely through him. From the very beginning, the four force commanders were involved and at the helm. Force commanders are usually arrogant, but Land Forces Commander Salih Zeki Çolak had no arrogance at all. He was like Hulusi Akar’s shadow; he did whatever he was told. There was an unspoken struggle between Abidin Ünal and Hulusi Akar. Both were professional toward each other, but they dug each other’s graves behind closed doors. Abidin Ünal’s biggest dream was to be Air Force Commander, and then the first aviator Chief of General Staff. This was his weakness. If he had become Chief of General Staff, he would have wanted the Presidency as well. Gendarmerie General Commander Galip Mendi was an honest soldier and commander. 8-10 months before July 15, in September 2015, the Air Force Commander and the Naval Forces Commander had reached a consensus among themselves regarding the coup. But Hulusi Akar was indecisive. His biggest hesitation was Galip Mendi. Because their worldviews and their attitudes toward Balyoz-Ergenekon were different. Galip Mendi was the most consistent and upright among them. He would not betray anyone, nor would he act duplicitously. During that process, learning from Balyoz-Ergenekon, no planning seminars were held. They always met face-to-face in secure environments and worked with a narrow staff of officers. In short, I am saying that they were weighing each other, probing downward, and acting in concert regarding stopping Erdoğan. In any case, for a coup to happen, it was essential for the Chief of General Staff and the four force commanders to be united, and this had been achieved before July 15.”

“Yes, There Was a Council, But It Was Not 38 People”

Gökhan Şahin Sönmezateş also explained the following regarding the so-called Peace at Home Council:

“Was there a council or a Peace at Home Council on July 15? Yes, there was; but it was not a 38-person council as written in the indictments. The council in the planning, just like in the September 12 coup, consisted solely of the Chief of General Staff and the four force commanders. Is Hulusi Akar’s name not written in a message in the evidence file? Akın Öztürk or Sönmezateş is not written. The 38-person list was scribbled down and reorganized by Hulusi Akar and his supporters to hide the real council. When looking at the behavior of Hulusi Akar and the four force commanders that night, it is seen that they did not support the coup. The others are 100 percent, but it is not like that for Hulusi Akar; they all said, as if they had agreed on a story, that they did not understand it was a coup, that they understood it late. Let’s go back 8-10 months; they held secret meetings, but a lot seems to have changed in the last 3-4 months. They were all invited to the Palace one by one, separately, and meetings were held. Most likely, they were asked whether they were part of the coup plan and they withdrew. What I know is that after these meetings, they all suddenly became wealthy. They acquired houses and money. Let the assets of these force commanders be examined along with their first-degree relatives. Hulusi Akar became the owner of several properties in the last 1 year. Abidin Ünal, who had no money left because he bought a house 1 year before July 15, bought a new house in April-May. He had a million-dollar account. Zekai Aksakallı is the same. Why were they handcuffed on July 15? While they were setting out for the coup and motivating us, they got rich. We, the subordinates, no longer had any trust in them. They had secretly made a deal with the enemy to leave us in the lurch for a few houses and a few million dollars. In addition to these commanders, I filed a petition for the assets of Ahmet Zeki Üçok and Cihat Yaycı to be investigated; but it was not accepted. If I had slandered them, they would have taken me to court; they did not. Let them go ahead and do it; let’s get the MASAK reports of all of them for the last 15 years. Let’s look at their attitudes that night. If July 15 failed, they would say, ‘Look, we are not part of it,’ and that is what happened. If it had been successful, they would have said, ‘Yes, children, where were we? Let’s fix the country.’ It is a stroke of luck that our country is not being governed by these men today. They sold us out for a few houses and a few million dollars.”

Where Did He Point for the Coup?

Noting that the TSK (Turkish Armed Forces) cannot stage a coup from now on, Sönmezateş said, “Because today, generals cannot even make coup jokes in their conversations among themselves. Moreover, with MİT and Palace agents among the generals, it is impossible for there not to be infiltration. The most important legs of a coup are MİT and the Gendarmerie. However, these are no longer under the control of the TSK either. So who can stage a coup? If the Minister of Interior and MİT act together, no one can stop them.”

While reiterating his claim that the Balyoz, Ergenekon, and military espionage plots were real, Sönmezateş also said:

“Their trials were also conducted on Erdoğan’s orders, just like the current Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality trials. The Action Plan for Combating Reactionism was also true. Dursun Çiçek did the task given to him, just like me. When all signs showed that this document was leaked by Şirin Ünal, Ünal was retired; however, when he immediately entered the protection of the AKP and became a deputy, the Ergenekon and Balyoz team could not touch him. Military espionage, Yaşar Güler made everyone watch these, what kind of high are we still living in? They say, ‘After July 15, the TSK was cleansed of FETÖ; Ataturkist, Kemalist officers returned’... As if I were not a soldier of Mustafa Kemal. Well, did these Ataturkist officers, generals, and admirals raise their voices when the lieutenants at the Military Academy were dismissed?”

“Only Erdoğan and 8-10 People Were to Be Taken”

Continuing his claims regarding July 15 in the continuation of his defense, Sönmezateş stated that the operation preparation of the then-Izmir Deputy Chief Public Prosecutor Okan Bato had nothing to do with the determination of this date, and spoke as follows:

“The date of July 15 was known in advance. The issue was not the date but the day; it was going to be a Friday. Because the weekend would intervene, the markets would be minimally affected, and the initial shock would be easily overcome. This was a kind of police operation. We, the TSK, were going to do what they did not. Because it was very small; it was Erdoğan and 8-10 people. It was not going to be hundreds or thousands of people taken like in the municipal operations.”

In the continuation of these words, Sönmezateş said, “The money issue should not be underestimated. Bribery, corruption, rotten management; there is no minister without a million dollars, no general in a critical position,” and when he listed many names, the Presiding Judge warned him, “You are talking about people outside the case. Derogatory, accusatory, ‘Let them take me to court,’ etc... These are outside the case, we do not have such a trial procedure. Be careful from now on.”

After Sönmezateş replied, “I got into this business because of this corruption. I am in prison, I am paying the price. But because of your warning and my respect for you, I am skipping some things,” he told what he knew about the defendants he described as “cosmopolitan.”

“If Akar Is Not a Coup Plotter, Why Were We Given the Instruction ‘Don’t Talk’?”

Reminding that it is thought that only Akın Öztürk is inside at the rank of General of the Army due to July 15, whereas 2nd Army Commander Adem Huduti was also arrested and punished, Sönmezateş continued as follows:

“According to intelligence documents; Adem Huduti is a social democrat, Akın Öztürk is a nationalist. I wish there were an option like swearing in Turkish courts. I swear on my two children; Akın Öztürk and Adem Huduti are neither FETÖ members nor coup plotters. Their being inside is the shame and disgrace of Hulusi Akar, Yaşar Güler, and other generals. Both MİT and the Palace know them. Not a single penny of theirs appears in MASAK. Bring a document proving they are FETÖ members, and I will take back everything I said. After July 15, Yaşar Güler worked very hard to save these names. İlhan Talu was almost getting out. They delayed it for 4 hours. Meanwhile, a phone that did not belong to him was attributed to him and sent to the prosecutor’s office, and he ended up in prison. 1 year later, it was accepted that that document was made by mistake, but it was too late. Why are İlhan Talu, Satı Bahadır Köse, and Osman Ünlü inside; I have no answer. They say, ‘If they had gone on television that night, the decisions could have changed.’ No, that is not true. The first statement on TRT that night was made by Osman Ünlü. They say, ‘I wish they had talked to the ministers.’ Osman Ünlü met with the Minister of National Defense and the General Director of Security many times. Because he was known for his closeness to the AKP-MHP. ‘If he hadn’t gone to the military unit’; he went, but Metin Gürak also went to all military units, what is the difference? Support Forces Commander Cengiz Aydın is not from any sect; he is a social democrat. He is someone who did whatever order was given to him that night, collected all the evidence, and delivered it to the prosecutor’s office. Yes, I participated in the coup, I am not a FETÖ member, but they are neither coup plotters nor FETÖ members. We are all in the same prison together. I am not trying to clear these people’s names. Their sentences have already been upheld. What I say will not be of any use. If there were the death penalty, they would have been executed. I am not making an organizational defense either; I am just determining my place before history.”

Sönmezateş said the following about Mehmet Dişli, who is accused of having Hulusi Akar arrested:

“We did not trust him, and we did not share anything. He is one of the types against the coup. For us, he was a character like this; his brother is very close to Erdoğan, they are an AKP family through and through, and they are a wealthy family. When sugar factories were privatized, his family bought 30 percent of them. While the child of any civil servant dismissed by saying ByLock etc. is executed, his brother was rewarded. If you ask who Hulusi Akar’s man, close associate, and confidant is, 99 percent of the defendants here will say ‘Dişli.’ Has he shared anything until today? No. When the news came that Ümit Dündar was appointed as Deputy Chief of General Staff, the team at Akıncı stopped what they were doing and tried to put Hulusi Akar back in his seat. First and foremost, Mehmet Dişli and Barış Avıalan. And they succeeded. When I was in prison in Marmaris, they came to me too; the instruction that nothing would be talked about regarding Hulusi Akar went to everyone. He is not a coup plotter anyway, why was such an order needed? What Dişli calls ‘the transformation of the TSK’ is the point the TSK reached after July 15, and it is Dişli’s work. I did not approve of it then, and I do not approve of it today. We told him, but because he was head-to-head with Hulusi Akar, he did not listen to us.”

Sönmezateş also defended Mehmet Partigöç, whose name is under the coup declaration, with the words, “I swear on my daughters, he was one of those against the coup. He was outside the coup. Partigöç has a personality, a capacity; he is a former Special Forces Command member. That night, he protected Hulusi Akar’s office and headquarters. In his statements, he also tried to send a message to his former comrades-in-arms, ‘I was not involved in this business.’ You will ask Levent Göktaş about him. He was his best man; if he says, ‘Partigöç is a FETÖ member, a traitor,’ I will accept it.”

Stating that he saw the former Chief Aide-de-Camp to the President, Ali Yazıcı, for the first time in the Marmaris case where they were tried together, that he had no communication with him before, that they already followed a strategy of not trusting anyone working at the Palace, and that while he says today, “I am the person who went to arrest the President,” Yazıcı says, “I am still loyal to our President,” and that he never worked with Kubilay Selçuk and Hakan Evrim, Sönmezateş said for those of lower rank, “The responsibility of the young people here is zero. Just as the gendarmes on duty in the courtroom are responsible for the court’s decision, so are these young people.”

“Why Didn’t You Kill Me?”

Gökhan Şahin Sönmezateş ended the first day’s part of his defense with these accounts regarding what happened in Marmaris:

“The subject I am mainly accused of and the place where I actively served is Marmaris. However, your panel never listened to Marmaris. I was accused of and sentenced for things I did not do in the indictment. If you are going to arrest the President of a country and you fail, what will you say? Because I was surprised, I asked at the Counter-Terrorism Department, ‘Why didn’t you kill me?’ I had no news of what was happening in Ankara and Istanbul, and they had no news of me. Even though I told the truth, even those here did not believe it. My task was to take Erdoğan wherever he was with 3 helicopters. I didn’t even know where he was. If I had succeeded, it was to take a photo of him with the money to hold him accountable for the 450 million dollars of unjust wealth, to arrest him, and to hand him over to the court. But we were accused of assassinating Erdoğan. There was no question of an assassination. We were kept waiting for hours in Çiğli. We set off for Marmaris around 03:20. When we arrived around 04:30, we fell into the middle of the place where nearly 150 police special operations were positioned. We were under full fire. We had no business with the police; we did not accept the conflict, we withdrew. I was in Izmir on July 16. I watched what was happening on TV; I knew what would happen to me. Life was normal in Izmir; I had the opportunity to escape in this safe environment. I did not escape; I returned to Ankara by car. I spoke with Abidin Ünal by phone. When he came here, I asked him if we had spoken, and when he said, ‘I don’t remember, we might have spoken,’ he escaped from my hands. If he had said ‘No,’ I would have shown how a general of the army could be disgraced. I tried to speak with Hulusi Akar, I could not reach him. I swear on my honor, my dignity, and my two daughters that neither I nor my team killed those two policemen. They were killed at 12:30. We went at 04:30. There are three Gendarmerie Sikorsky helicopters that took off from Antalya that night. 42 witnesses said that those who came were dressed in black, wearing gas masks, and fully equipped. We, on the other hand, were neither dressed in black nor did we have gas masks.”