Epics were written about our contributions to the overthrow of the Assad administration by Colani, the leader of HTS—which the UN and even Turkey still consider a terrorist organization—and it was said, “We stood on the right side of history.” Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan could not stop talking about the “leadership qualities” of Colani, whom he has known since his time as Undersecretary of the MIT.
We were so close to Colani that the first person to go to the Umayyad Mosque after the “revolution” was MIT President İbrahim Kalın. In fact, Colani himself acted as Kalın’s driver. Afterward, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan went to Syria and drank tea with Colani while watching the Damascus view from Mount Qasioun.
In the ensuing process, Colani became Ahmed al-Shara and assumed the Presidency of Syria.
For us, the first and most important issue was the termination of the PKK/YPG/PYD, which appeared as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Syria, and the elimination of the “terroristan.”
After MHP Leader Bahçeli’s Imralı overture and the terrorist leader’s call, what was expected was for the terrorists there to lay down their arms and leave the country.
But the SDF, taking the Barzanis behind them, wanted to become a partner in the Syrian administration by saying “autonomy, decentralization.”
Ultimately, on March 10, Ahmed al-Shara sat at the table with the so-called general of the SDF, terrorist leader Mazlum Kobani, and signed an 8-point agreement. It was the US that mediated and even took Kobani to Damascus by helicopter.
The agreement, which contained general expressions, was nothing more than a roadmap aimed primarily at preventing Turkey’s possible operations and stalling for time.
Furthermore, as Turkey’s last Ambassador to Damascus, Ömer Önhon, also emphasized; with this agreement, the SDF and Mazlum Kobani were accepted as the representatives of all Kurds in Syria, and their legitimacy was registered.
However, the pro-government media presented this as a “victory” as well, claiming that the terrorist organization had “surrendered.”
There must have been a problem, because three days after the agreement, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Minister of National Defense Yaşar Güler, and MIT President İbrahim Kalın went to Damascus and met with Shara.
Indeed, after the meeting, first the Ministry of National Defense sources announced that “as Turkey, our expectations and reservations regarding what needs to be done on the ground regarding the consensus reached by the new Syrian government with the SDF have been conveyed to our interlocutors.”
Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan also confirmed that there was “no clear statement in the agreement that the SDF would lay down its arms or dismantle its military structure” and summarized the situation as follows:
“We discussed all these questions around the table with President Shara and his colleagues... We brought up these concerns... This is what I meant when I said ‘future landmines’... We held the necessary meetings there, we gave the necessary advice... I mean, even if they are our brothers, they are ultimately another sovereign state, they have a certain internal functioning, we can only give them the advice we think is best.”
We also understand from the following that this agreement did not and will not end the PKK/YPG:
The so-called Rojava autonomous administration and the Syrian government decided to establish a joint training mechanism...
Again, with an agreement made between the SDF and Damascus regarding “Aleppo-Afrin,” a decision was made to preserve the existing statuses in terms of security, administration, culture, and political activities in these areas.
Look, it was reported that Foreign Minister Fidan, who went to France yesterday, was expected to convey to his French counterpart Jean-Noel Barrot the “expectation that the presence of the terrorist organization PKK/YPG in northern Syria be ended and that support be given to the fight against DAESH.”
Doesn’t this alone show that the PKK/YPG problem has not been solved and that, like the saying “a drowning man clutches at a straw,” we are hoping for help from France, which is among the biggest supporters of the terrorist organization?
What Happened to the Maritime Jurisdiction Agreement?
Let’s move on to the second important issue between us and Syria, especially regarding the security of the Eastern Mediterranean.
It was the last week of December; Minister of Transport and Infrastructure Abdulkadir Uraloğlu announced that Turkey would sign a maritime jurisdiction agreement with the new administration in Syria and said, “When the day comes, our relevant institutions will take a position there regarding the protection of our interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Blue Homeland... Regarding oil and hydrocarbon exploration there, we would share or expand all kinds of authority as two countries, taking international law into account.”
Of course, Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration immediately jumped up. While Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister Konstantinos Kombos stated that they were struggling to prevent such an agreement, he said they had requested help from the EU and Israel.
While our experts and media were attempting to interpret how such an agreement would affect the balances in the Eastern Mediterranean, Greek Foreign Minister Yorgos Gerapetritis went to Damascus on February 9 and met with Ahmed Shara and Foreign Minister Shaibani. In the meetings, Gerapetritis expressed that the institutions in Syria should be shaped on the basis of the rule of law and drew attention to the importance of commitment to international law and the law of the sea.
Ten days after Gerapetritis, Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister Konstantinos Kombos was in Damascus. He was accepted by Ahmed Shara as the Foreign Minister of the “Republic of Cyprus,” meaning he recognized the Greek Cypriot side, which Turkey does not recognize.
Upon this, even I reacted by saying, “Since we are so close to Colani; shouldn’t it be ensured that he immediately meets with TRNC Foreign Minister Tahsin Ertuğruloğlu and be asked to recognize the TRNC?!”, but Ankara did not say a single word to its “dear brother” Shara.
Then what happened?
The Foreign Affairs Council, which brings together the Foreign Ministers of EU member countries, decided to lift some sanctions on Syria, while adding the following to the text at the request of Athens and the Greek Cypriot side:
“Ending the interference of foreign actors that destabilize the country... Respecting the sovereign rights of EU members within the framework of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and international law in maritime jurisdiction contracts that Syria will sign with third countries...”
Only Condemning Israel
Let’s briefly recall the Syria-Israel relations.
Trump’s nominee for Ambassador to Ankara, Tom Barrack, whom he expects to do “extraordinary work,” said at the confirmation hearing in the Senate that the overthrow of Assad opened a new space for the US, Turkey, and Israel, and that the removal of a figure close to Iran was a “good development” for all three countries.
Yes; Israel has come almost to Damascus. It threatens Turkey every day. But the Shara administration does not go beyond condemning Israel, and it does not give a single line of response to its aggression toward Turkey.
While It Was Said “He Will Pray in the Umayyad Mosque”
Let’s briefly put the Erdoğan-Shara relationship on the table.
The media claimed that shortly after the “revolution,” Erdoğan would go to Syria within 15 days and meet with HTS leader Colani. It was recounted that a team from the General Directorate of State Airports Authority and Turkish Airlines (THY) went to Damascus to conduct inspections and also made checks at Aleppo International Airport.
Beyond the media; the Acting Chargé d’Affaires of the Damascus Embassy, Burhan Köroğlu, himself announced that Erdoğan planned to visit Damascus, that Erdoğan was thinking of coming to Damascus after Hakan Fidan, and that this visit would be an important stage in relations with Syria.
After a while, it was reported that Shara would make his first visit to Turkey to “thank” Erdoğan. But Shara went to Saudi Arabia first, and then came to Turkey; Erdoğan also addressed him as “my dear brother.”
Following this visit by Shara, it was once again discussed when Erdoğan would go to Damascus and it was said “before Ramadan”; it was also claimed that he would pray in the Umayyad Mosque.
That didn’t happen either.
This Happened
The reason we are telling all this is; Erdoğan’s holiday greeting traffic, in the language of the pro-government media, is “holiday diplomacy.”
According to the statements made by the Presidential Communications Directorate; Erdoğan met and exchanged holiday greetings with the following leaders on the eve and the first day of the holiday, respectively:
Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani - Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas - Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi - Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian - Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev - King Abdullah II of Jordan - President of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan - TRNC President Ersin Tatar - Senegalese President Bassirou Diomaye Diakhar Faye - National Leader of Turkmenistan and Chairman of the People’s Council Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov - Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune - Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto - Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev - Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev - Sultan of Oman Haitham bin Tariq bin Taymur Al Said - Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim - Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif - Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov.
Meanwhile, French President Macron also called Erdoğan and celebrated the Eid al-Fitr.
But, as can be seen, neither Erdoğan called Syrian President Shara, nor did Shara call Erdoğan.
I wonder why?
Or did “dear brother” Shara deceive us too, or did black cats get between them?!
Müyesser YILDIZ
April 3, 2025
Most Read
Striking picture for Özgür Özel's 'New Party'
Özgür Özel gives a dated response regarding the number of resignations
Forest fire in Antalya brought under control
The PKK opening and Özgür Özel’s path!..
How did the newspapers view Özgür Özel's farewell to the CHP?
He killed his wife by slitting her throat: Their children witnessed the moments
What did the CHP do?
Özel’s new party move in the world press
The New CHP, against CEHAPE
Fire at TUSAŞ engine factory in Eskişehir under control