'If I were a coup plotter, I would have sent the message with Hulusi Akar's name on it'

Former Staff Colonel Cemil Turhan, who served as the General-Admiral Branch Manager of the General Staff at the time and is alleged to have drafted and sent the coup declaration and assignment list to military units on July 15, stated, “If I had seen these messages, I would have first sent the one with Hulusi Akar’s name on it. If I were the person preparing this message, I would have definitely written the names of Yaşar Güler and Hulusi Akar, and even all the force commanders, in the signature section to create the perception that the coup was being carried out within the chain of command.” Claiming that Akar and Güler would eventually be tried for both the Uludere incident and July 15, Turhan said that the biggest loser of this process was Hulusi Akar.

Testifying for about three days this week in the General Staff 'Case of the Century' (Genelkurmay Çatı Davası), which is being retried at the Sincan Prison courthouse following the Supreme Court of Appeals' reversal decision, Cemil Turhan first provided information almost name-by-name regarding the July 15 martyrs and veterans, emphasizing that the majority of them were shot by police fire, pump-action shotguns, or hunting rifles, yet soldiers were held responsible for all of them.

Leaving Turhan's quite remarkable findings on this subject for another article, let us convey what he said about the coup declaration.

Stating that the sole justification for his 137 aggravated life sentences, in addition to the 108 aggravated life sentences, 3 life sentences, and thousands of years of imprisonment to be handed down for the 108 martyrs and thousands of wounded, is the allegation of “drafting the martial law declaration, which is called the instruction to start the coup attempt,” and that he is therefore accused of being a leader of a terrorist organization, Turhan noted the following:

“Is drafting a document, that is, acting as a clerk, sufficient on its own for being an organization leader? Here, the court clerk’s name and signature are on every type of correspondence and hearing transcript of the court. Can you say, ‘The clerk is the manager of the court’? You cannot. Even if you accept for a moment that I drafted the martial law directive, does this make me an organization leader? My Personnel Chief İlhan Talu, with whom I worked in the same unit, my Department Head Partigöç, myself, and the other branch manager Mustafa Barış Avıalan were included in the so-called Peace at Home Council. Pasha İlhan was later removed. If my superior is a manager, how can I be a manager at the same time? Is there not an abnormality here? On the other hand, according to the Headquarters Signature Authority Directive, the name of the project officer, not the branch manager, should be in the drafting section of the document. My name was added here at the last minute. The font size of my name is different from the rest of the document. This situation shows that my name was written here intentionally.”

“Fake, Just as Fuat Uğur Wrote”

While reporting that their requests to have experts examine whether the messages in question were written in a military format, whether they were plans or directives, and whether they could have been prepared by someone working in the assignment unit were rejected, Turhan also said:

“If this had been done; it would have been seen that the signature sections would not consist only of the drafter, the authorizing officer, and the Peace at Home Council President sections, but that there should also be initial and coordination sections; that according to the Directive, such a document should have been signed by Chief of General Staff Gen. Hulusi Akar; that the name of the Second Chief Yaşar Güler should have been in the authorizing section, and the name of the project officer, not the branch manager, in the drafting section; that the document should have been opened for coordination by all J-chiefs by opening a coordination section; that the file number starting with ‘YSK: 1920’ was not in accordance with the directive; and that since electronic signatures are not used in the TSK (Turkish Armed Forces), the document would have to have a wet signature to be legally valid. These documents do not have a military character. They were prepared by people without headquarters experience, with a completely civilian logic. This document could not have been prepared by a soldier with headquarters experience, let alone a staff officer.”

Turhan continued as follows:

“Many people have stated that the biggest hesitation experienced in the units regarding this message stemmed from the fact that the message was published with the name of a brigadier general. If I were the person who prepared this message, I would have definitely written the names of Yaşar Güler and Hulusi Akar, and even all the force commanders, in the signature section. Because it is assessed that the purpose of this message was to give TSK personnel the perception that the coup was carried out within the chain of command and to ensure that the maximum number of personnel supported the coup. The inclusion of the names of the Chief of General Staff and force commanders in this message would have eliminated all hesitation regarding the message. I have the capacity to know and interpret this reality. Oh, and there is also the message with Hulusi Akar written on it. If I had seen these messages, I would have first pulled this message with Hulusi Akar’s name on it. These messages are fictional documents prepared to deceive and draw into the coup those personnel who were unaware of the events and serving in their own barracks, at a time when it was impossible for them to understand whether they were fake or not. Just like in the article Fuat Uğur wrote 3-4 months before the coup.”

Allegation of Remote Access to Computers

While emphasizing that the investigation into the coup messages revealed that they were not prepared on any of the 25 computers in his own branch and that electronic signatures are not used in the General Staff, Cemil Turhan recalled that in the Internet Memorandum (İnternet Andıcı) case where Dursun Çiçek was tried, the Gendarmerie and Police Criminal departments gave a report stating, “This signature belongs to the branch manager,” but Çiçek was released after his lawyer proved that this signature could be created with an electronic device, and said, “I have neither a wet signature nor any trace or evidence of this on my computer. Despite this, how can the court claim that I prepared these documents? Why is the same law not applied for me?”

Regarding the sending of the messages to the units, Turhan made the following claim:

“How and by whom these were sent has not been technically revealed. These messages could not be detected in the mailbox of the MEDAS computer from which the coup messages were allegedly sent. Even if it were accepted for a moment that the messages were sent from this computer, that computer does not have the authority to read CDs or flash drives. Then how were these messages loaded onto the MEDAS computer? This issue has not been touched upon at all, not even a comment has been made. Since nothing can be loaded onto the MEDAS computer with a CD or flash drive, the messages could have reached this computer in two ways. First; they could have been sent as an email via a computer connected to the TSK network. This matter was investigated and it was seen that the messages were not sent as email. Then only one possibility remains; that these messages were placed by gaining remote access from another computer connected to the TSK network. However, this matter has not been investigated.”

Was Erdoğan Also Included in O.K.’s Coup Tip-off?

After stating that the allegation that the coup attempt was known in advance by Erdoğan, Hakan Fidan, Hulusi Akar, and Yaşar Güler, but that they knowingly and willingly did not intervene to prevent it, must be uncovered, and that the first person who should be heard for this purpose is O.K., who gave the coup tip-off, Cemil Turhan voiced the following interesting claim:

“I have doubts about Yaşar Güler regarding two issues. First, are Chief of General Staff Hulusi Akar and Gendarmerie General Commander Galip Mendi aware of the presentation made to him by Gendarmerie Intelligence on July 15? I don’t think they are even aware that such a presentation was made. Especially making such a presentation outside the hierarchy, without Galip Mendi’s knowledge, is contrary to the traditions of the TSK. My second claim is this: Hakan Fidan, Hulusi Akar, and Yaşar Güler know the exact content of the tip-off O.K. made to the MIT (National Intelligence Organization) on the afternoon of July 15. I believe that this tip-off was about the helicopter that would take off from Ankara Güvercinlik to pick up the MIT Undersecretary, the helicopter that would take off from İzmir to pick up the President, and a coup attempt involving FETÖ members. Namely; on July 15, the Chief of General Staff requested the Personnel Information Cards of two people while the MIT Undersecretary was with him. One of them is Major Deniz Aldemir, and the other is Colonel Murat Dağlı. Deniz Aldemir is the pilot of the helicopter that would take off from Güvercinlik to pick up the MIT Undersecretary. I assess that the request for this person’s personnel card was within the scope of the tip-off received regarding the MIT Undersecretary. The second person, Murat Dağlı, is the Commander of the Army Aviation Regiment in İzmir. He has nothing to do with Ankara. He also has nothing to do with picking up the MIT Undersecretary. He is the Regiment Commander who joined the Regiment in İzmir a week or ten days ago. He is also the pilot of the helicopter that went from İzmir to Marmaris on July 15 to pick up the President. The Chief of General Staff requesting Murat Dağlı’s personnel card around 20:00 that evening also shows that the content of the incoming tip-off was about the helicopter that would take off from İzmir to pick up the President. Again, the MIT Undersecretary calling the President’s chief of protection and asking, ‘Muhsin, do you have enough protection?’ shows that a tip-off regarding the President had been received. Under normal conditions, if such news reached the Chief of General Staff, the Headquarters would, to use a colloquial term, go up in smoke; everyone would rush to do something, everyone would call someone, life would stop. The Chief of General Staff, the Second Chief, could not even sit in their chairs, let alone read documents. This situation is an indication that Akar, Fidan, and Güler knew about the coup in advance, and therefore the news was not abnormal and everything was under control. Akar claims that thanks to the measures he took by closing the airspace and stopping flights, the coup was brought forward and failed. I don’t know if his claim is true or not; but his duty is not to ensure that the coup is brought forward from its planned time, but to prevent the coup and identify those responsible. Those who ask the non-commissioned officer, the first lieutenant, the captain here, ‘Why didn’t you understand the coup when you saw the Special Forces?’, unfortunately, could not ask Hulusi Pasha, ‘MIT Undersecretary, the President will be picked up; how did you not understand the coup?’ Or rather, they did not ask, because they know very well that Akar knew about the coup in advance and was only playing the role he was supposed to play.”

“Everyone Called Akar a FETÖ Member, But Akın Öztürk Became Number 1”

Cemil Turhan’s final claims about Akar, Fidan, and Güler were as follows:

“One of those meant in the news titled ‘40 parallel pashas in the Headquarters’ published in Akşam Newspaper in 2014 was Hulusi Akar. Before July 15, the person about whom there were the most FETÖ rumors was Akar. Those tried in Balyoz and Ergenekon called Akar a FETÖ member for years. Even Zeki Üçok did not call Akın Öztürk a FETÖ member, but now Pasha Akın has become the number 1 of the coup. Secret witness code Abdullah said that information about Akar was given to Erdoğan. Well, was Akar warned or was a measure taken? If you have a different agenda than the Chief of General Staff, if you are preparing a plot against officers and generals within the TSK who are opposed to you and will not pledge allegiance to you, you do not take a measure against that Chief of General Staff, you even reward him and make him Minister of Defense. Likewise, as a President who received the news of the coup from your brother-in-law, you make the MIT Undersecretary the MIT President, and then the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Hulusi Akar and Yaşar Güler will eventually be tried for two issues; the Uludere case and the torture center they established after July 15. The biggest loser of this process is Hulusi Akar.”

Müyesser YILDIZ

October 10, 2025