New allegations regarding the Uludere tragedy!...

14 years ago, on December 28, 2011, a major tragedy occurred on the Uludere border; 34 civilians engaged in smuggling were killed after being mistaken for PKK terrorists. For exactly 14 years, the cause of that tragedy and the identities of those responsible have been questioned.

Indeed, during the commemoration ceremony held last week, DEM Party Co-Chair Tülay Hatimoğulları called out, saying, "If it was a false tip, we want it revealed who provided that false tip. If it was an accurate tip, we want those who gave the order for the planes to take off and the order to strike to be revealed and put on trial."

CHP's Sezgin Tanrıkulu recalled Erdoğan's statement after the incident, in which he said, "These deaths, those who committed this crime will not be lost in the dark corridors of Ankara," and alleged, "14 years have passed. In the end, they collectively lost it in the dark corridors of Ankara. Because they themselves were the political figures responsible. By collaborating with the judiciary, they unfortunately left this massacre unpunished."

Union of Turkish Bar Associations President Erinç Sağkan emphasized the following in summary:

"It can be said that time is a good medicine for healing bleeding wounds. However, we know very well that it is not enough on its own. To heal bleeding wounds, you must first grant people their right to reach the truth... There is a judicial process ongoing at the Constitutional Court... We hope that the judicial system in Turkey will turn back from this mistake at some point. And all those responsible for this matter will be brought before the court without exception and will be held accountable according to their responsibilities... For 14 years, we have been trying to pull this file out of those dark corridors with lanterns in our hands. But we will pull it out in the end. We have to pull it out. There is an obligation to be accountable to these families and to all citizens of this country."

CHP Chairman Özgür Özel also noted in his post that "this massacre, whose perpetrators are still being protected, stands as a shame in Turkey's recent history."

THE WORDS OF ERDOĞAN AND BAHÇELİ

First, let us summarize the main points of what happened following this incident, which took place during a period when both the PKK opening and the plots against the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) were in full swing.

The first statement came from the TSK (Turkish Armed Forces), which stated:

“Given that the region is frequently used by terrorists and that movement toward our border was detected at night, it was assessed that the area needed to be engaged by Air Force aircraft, and the target was fired upon between 21:37 and 22:24.”

Two days later, then-Prime Minister Erdoğan thanked the Chief of General Staff and the command echelon for their sensitivity regarding the matter, “despite the media.” In the following days, he explained that investigations and inquiries into the incident were being conducted with sensitivity, that measures were being taken to prevent similar incidents in the region, that the AKP cadres were “a team that has put their lives on the line to bring light to the darkest period of the Republican era,” and that similar tragic events occur all over the world, before adding the following:

“We have been fighting terrorism for 30 years... Even though both our Chief of General Staff and I, as well as our relevant colleagues, have stated from the beginning that there was a mistake here regarding Uludere, they still kept saying, ‘If only the Prime Minister had said, “A mistake was made.”’ How many times should I have said it? Should we have put it on automatic? I’m sorry, but we do not have time to lose by constantly acting in the direction of your desires. We have a lot of work to do.”

“I apologized on behalf of Dersim that day. If necessary, I will apologize for the Uludere incident.”

In another statement, Erdoğan noted that he did not make the decision for the operation himself and that he learned about the incident immediately after the operation.

While the debates continued, the American newspaper The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) claimed that the intelligence prior to the incident came from US UAVs, and that Turkey chose to attack instead of obtaining closer imagery. Upon this, Erdoğan argued that the news in question was produced to pressure Obama before the elections and stated that domestic intelligence sources were used in the incident, while then-President Abdullah Gül, who was on his way to the US, announced that they were aware of the WSJ report beforehand. It also emerged that Ankara had not responded to the WSJ’s questions on the subject for 3 weeks.

The following also took place:

Selahattin Demirtaş, who was the Chairman of the BDP at the time, claimed that "Erdoğan personally gave the order to strike"... A delegation from the BDP went to the US, where interesting meetings and statements were made... President Gül defended these contacts made by the BDP delegation.

The Chief of General Staff at the time, General Necdet Özel, was also hosted in a very "special" manner in the US... It was reported that discussions focused on Syria and Iran were held during the visit, and that Özel stated, "The decision belongs to the political will."

Mesut Barzani officially scolded the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time, Feridun Sinirlioğlu, saying, "The Uludere incident could create a breaking point; it must be clarified immediately."... A while later, he not only said, "Give me an account of Uludere," but also sent 40,000 dollars to the families of those who lost their lives.

And, of course, there were those who linked Uludere to the "Ergenekonists." At that time, I was in Silivri due to the Odatv conspiracy; pointing to the PKK resolution process, I wrote the following:

"Does it make sense to you; the military would have an intent or error, and the government would remain silent?!.. Wouldn't gallows have been erected without waiting for Mümtazer Türköne's 'greased stake'? There are two possibilities for this silence: either protecting 'my General Staff' or another new 'maturation'!.."

Let us also recall the approach of MHP Leader Devlet Bahçeli. While emphasizing that "the turning of funeral ceremonies into a PKK show and the draping of the organization's rags over the coffins partially clarified the murky aspects behind the incident," Bahçeli also directed some questions to the government and spoke as follows:

“The Turkish nation urgently awaits and demands to hear the answers to be provided by the AKP government... The MHP will follow this matter to the end and will resolutely do what is necessary to ensure that nothing remains under a veil of suspicion or secrecy... These recent events have clearly proven what the AKP has turned the Turkish state into and how it has disrupted its standards and settings. Naturally, the incident must be investigated by the government from multiple angles, and the facts must be brought to light as soon as possible. This is our wish, our expectation, and our demand. Among the statements made to date, other than the official statement issued by the General Staff immediately following the incident, no satisfactory or detailed government explanation has yet been provided. Aside from Prime Minister Erdoğan's off-the-cuff remarks and a few words from AKP representatives and ministers who visited the region, no satisfying explanation has been seen yet.

Finally, let us look at the investigation process. The Diyarbakır Chief Public Prosecutor's Office, which initiated the investigation, issued a decision of non-jurisdiction, and the file was transferred to the General Staff Military Prosecutor's Office. On January 7, 2014, the Military Prosecutor's Office issued a decision of 'non-prosecution' for the five unit commanders responsible for the region, while noting that 'the approval for the airstrike that caused the deaths of the villagers was given by Chief of General Staff General Necdet Özel, Deputy Chief of General Staff General Hulusi Akar, and General Staff Intelligence Chief General Yaşar Güler, within the framework of the cross-border operation authority granted to the TSK (Turkish Armed Forces) in accordance with the decisions of the TBMM (Grand National Assembly of Turkey) and the Council of Ministers.'

ALLEGATIONS BY JULY 15 DEFENDANTS

We are coming to this point: years later, various allegations regarding the Uludere incident were also brought up during the July 15 coup trials.

For example, former Staff Colonel Mustafa Barış Avıalan, who was tried as a member of the so-called Peace at Home Council in the General Staff Main Case and passed away in prison, claimed that the provision 'The commander is responsible for everything his unit does or fails to do,' which had been in the directive as a customary rule of the TSK since the time of Mete Han, was canceled following the Uludere incident as a result of a study commissioned by the then-Deputy Chief of General Staff Hulusi Akar. He stated, 'If even one thing I have told is a lie, Hulusi Akar's lawyer is here; if he is not, let the team behind him convey this to him and let them file a lawsuit against me.'

After Avıalan, former General Akın Öztürk, who was identified as the 'number 1' of July 15, while making his defense on August 4-5 during the retrial of the General Staff Main Case following the Supreme Court's partial reversal decision, recalled that a criminal complaint had also been filed against him regarding the killing of 34 villagers in Uludere after his arrest, and said the following:

'Between 2011 and 2013, I was serving as the İzmir Air Training Command with the rank of lieutenant general. I did not have any armed units under my command, and this incident, which occurred on December 28, 2011, was not within my area of duty or responsibility. I know who gave the order, but I will say it when the time comes, not now. It is recorded in the logs. I also know who from the Air Force Command objected to that bombing.'

Former Staff Colonel Cemil Turhan, the then-General Staff General-Admiral Branch Manager whose name appeared on the July 15 coup declaration, also made the following allegation in his defense in October:

“Hulusi Akar and Yaşar Güler will eventually be tried for two reasons: the Uludere case and the torture center they established after July 15. The biggest loser in this process is Hulusi Akar.”

LATEST ALLEGATION: ''HIS NAME WAS REMOVED FROM THE DOCUMENTS''

I learned that the Uludere incident was most recently brought to the agenda by former Lieutenant Colonel Savaş Kabaklı, the Chief of Staff of the Mamak 28th Mechanized Infantry Brigade during the July 15 period, who made his defense at the hearing on November 14. Since I could not watch that hearing, I waited for the SEGBİS records to be released.

According to the transcripts finalized on December 10, let us summarize the allegations voiced by Savaş Kabaklı:

“In July 2011, before the approaching Supreme Military Council meeting, an unexpected move occurred when the 27th Chief of General Staff Işık Koşener resigned along with the force commanders, even though he had only completed his first year in office, marking one of the most significant turning points that would change the course of history. As a result, Necdet Özel took the seat as the 28th Chief of General Staff. Despite the promises made by the government within the scope of the Oslo Accords, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) under the command of Necdet Özel changed its concept in the fight against terrorism. Between September 2011 and December 29, it carried out a superhuman struggle that dealt an unprecedented blow to the terrorist organization, neutralizing thousands of militants and pushing the organization to the point of near-total destruction. However, the political authority, having found its new partner in Oslo, needed to intervene in the situation urgently and save its most important supporter on the path to the presidency from this difficult situation. Since air operations emerged as the most important actor in breaking the resistance of the terrorist organization, they had to be stopped first. Something had to be done to cast a heavy shadow over the air operations—which the organization insistently wanted to be blocked—making their legitimacy questionable and stopping them in a way that they would never be tried again. December 28, 2011, became the turning point for this. The tragic incident, which went down in the records as the Uludere-Roboski case, was cooked up by the country's intelligence agency itself through reports that could be summarized as 'Bahoz Erdal, the leader of the Syrian branch of the terrorist organization, will enter Turkey via Uludere disguised as a smuggler,' and was dropped into the lap of the TSK command staff like a primed bomb. Of course, after the incident, the MİT claimed that it had not sent such a message. However, I personally processed the message itself during my time serving in the Intelligence Department at the Second Army Headquarters in Malatya, and I even registered the document. The MİT report exists, and it is at the A1 level. A1 level means that both the source and the content of the intelligence are one hundred percent reliable. So many birds were killed with one stone in this operation that it will be better understood when the roles and positions assumed by the decision-making commanders of that day during and after the July 15 process are taken into account. I would like to recall the details. When the tip-off from the MİT was forwarded to the then-Chief of General Staff Intelligence Yaşar Güler, he had the tip-off sent to his subordinate, the then-Head of the Intelligence Analysis Department, Brigadier General Ali Rıza Kuğu. When the image analysis conducted at the Armed Forces Command Operations Center at the headquarters confirmed that the tip-off was correct and that a group appearing to be smugglers was preparing to cross the border, Yaşar Güler and Ali Rıza Kuğu rushed to the office of the then-Deputy Chief of General Staff, General Hulusi Akar, in the excitement of being able to enjoy the title of the heroic commanders who neutralized Bahoz Erdal, and convinced their commander of the accuracy of their analysis. Then, Chief of General Staff General Necdet Özel was called, and the situation was reported to him, and his order was requested. Once General Necdet Özel was convinced and his approval was obtained, the 'strike' order was given. Hulusi Akar's position here is very important. Thus, the order for the grave operation, which was legally closed with the assessment that 'it was concluded that the pilot made an unavoidable mistake,' was given. Meanwhile, after the incident, the Diyarbakır Chief Public Prosecutor's Office, which opened an investigation, requested the documents regarding the content of the event. I prepared these documents myself. After preparing 3 blue folders full of documents and sealing them as top secret, I presented them to the command floor before sending them to the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office. By order—I am underlining this—the name of Hulusi Akar was completely removed from the documents prepared regarding the event called the Roboski massacre. I was given an order, and I removed it. The documents were sent to the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office by order as if Hulusi Akar had never been involved in the incident. After this tragic incident, in which many young patriots lost their lives for nothing and which led to a severe rift between the local people and the state, an interesting event occurred when the threat that the grave picture that emerged could be held to account began to hang over the heads of the aforementioned commanders like the Sword of Damocles. Brigadier General Ali Rıza Kuğu, fearing that he would be sacrificed, would dare to threaten his commanders by shouting at the top of his lungs in Deputy Chief Hulusi Akar's office, making the corridors echo, saying, 'If I burn, I will burn you too.' This probably happened after he heard that Hulusi Akar's name had been removed from the file. Following this event, after the air operations were cut off as if with a knife, the 'solution process' was initiated—which was later admitted and confessed by the entire public and even members of the political government to have been wrongly constructed in every aspect, causing the country to return from the brink of an abyss and resulting in heavy costs in the following years—and a lifeline was extended to the terrorist organization.”

Kabaklı also explained how the operational ban imposed on the TSK after Uludere gave a 'kiss of life' in the plains to the terrorists whose backs were broken in the mountains, through the trench wars experienced in Sur, Cizre, and Nusaybin, saying, “When the governors rejected our operational requests, we started to collect signatures from the governors and accumulate documents under the order of General Necdet Özel. After a while, the governors woke up and realized that we were collecting the signatures we had obtained. This time, they started to reject our operational requests verbally. Upon this, we started to prepare minutes. Currently, these are archived in various centers to be kept indefinitely.”

However, after a point, the Presiding Judge intervened and reacted to Savaş Kabaklı as follows:

"You know very well that the defense you have made so far has nothing to do with our case. You are making a completely political defense. You are mixing in state institutions and governors. If you have anything you want to say about them, file your petitions with the relevant authorities. This case is not the subject of my case... What we expect from you is a defense regarding what happened on the night of the coup, your actions, and the reversal decision you are charged with... Your personal opinions or information are confidential, they are yours, but if that information does not concern me, I do not want you to disclose it here. You can disclose this information to the relevant places... If you speak outside the scope of the case, I will have to intervene; I do not want you to speak in this manner... I am not judging the Roboski massacre. You are accusing the Governor, the MIT, and this and that regarding the Roboski massacre. Currently, these do not concern me; they are not the subject of my case. Am I supposed to listen to every topic here?"

These warnings from the Presiding Judge sparked controversy... The hearing was frequently adjourned... Ultimately, the Judge gave Savaş Kabaklı until 5:00 PM that day to finish his 217-page defense.

Kabaklı concluded his defense, which had been planned for two days, that same day with the words: "I wanted to explain what happened between 2011 and 2016 in order for July 15 to be understood."