Who Will Have the Final Say in the PKK Opening-1

At the meeting of the “PKK commission” established in Parliament the other day, Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmuş emphasized that the new process, dubbed a “terror-free Turkey,” is a “state policy,” stating, “The purpose of this commission is to increase social consensus in Turkey... Our job is not to measure how many weapons are being laid down and where, but to turn this issue, which is a state policy, into a national policy and to be its follower.”

He explained the “state policy” as follows:

“This process is a matter that is adopted by all units of the state, primarily by our President, and accepted as a national responsibility.”

Kurtulmuş also noted that “they are trying to carry out the process with a model unique to Turkey” and that “extraordinary progress has been made in a short period of 9 months.”

Before Kurtulmuş, MHP Secretary General İsmet Büyükataman had also stated that the “terror-free Turkey strategy is an Ankara-centered goal that does not allow imperialism to pass,” adding, “The owner of the issue is the Turkish state mind.”

Kurtulmuş’s remark that “The purpose of the commission is to increase social consensus in Turkey” reminded one, for some reason, of the long conversations held in the Bekaa Valley back in April 1993 between Hasan Cemal, the “big brother” of previous openings, and the terrorist leader, where they agreed that “it is a dream to achieve peace without convincing and preparing the Turkish public opinion!”

Let us come to the issue of “state policy.”

For months, it has been said that “the MIT will play a major role in the process,” that “it will follow every step of the PKK’s disarmament and report it to Erdoğan,” and that “it will proceed in stages according to MIT reports”; in other words, that the MIT will have the “final say.”

In fact, MIT President İbrahim Kalın himself announced that the “terror-free Turkey process is a move for Turkey to get rid of another major shackle,” and spoke of “this change moving to the next stage with the participation and contribution of society, the mind, individuals, intellectuals, artists, and opinion leaders.”

Within the scope of that role, Kalın met with the Barzanis, political parties in the Parliament, and Speaker Numan Kurtulmuş. He provided information to the commission in a closed session that cannot be disclosed for 10 years. So, what was told to the political party leaders and the commission?

While DEM Co-Chair Tuncer Bakırhan said, “Our meeting with the MIT is confidential. I will not say what we talked about, but they informed us; it went positively and well,”

İYİ Party Chairman Müsavat Dervişoğlu stated, “We did not learn anything we did not already know.” The TİP also provided information after the secret session in the commission, stating, “No information that has not been brought to the public agenda until today was shared at the meeting.”

Well, what was the terrorist leader in İmralı saying before all this? This:

“We are conducting the business here with the state. It has nothing to do with the AKP and the People’s Alliance.”

Since Parliament Speaker Kurtulmuş says for the process that it is “a matter adopted by all units of the state,” let us also draw attention to these words of AKP Spokesperson Ömer Çelik in May:

“It is one of the points where our President has reacted most harshly in his political life. If an approach within the military bureaucracy had not said, 'We are against this process.' Our President had said at that time, 'No one is a state within a state.' Despite our political power being threatened in its entirety, our President has carried this out.”

The reason we underline these words of Çelik is not to make the assessment that “So, the TSK now supports the process too,” but to remind that “state mind” was also used for all previous openings!

In short, there are so many things we have forgotten about the past that we want to explain them in outline to follow the new process.

The Rescue of the Terrorist Leader

With the trial of the terrorist leader, who was brought to Turkey on February 16, 1999, discussions on amnesty for the PKK began.

MHP Leader Devlet Bahçeli, a partner in the government of the time, warned that it was impossible for a person sentenced to the heaviest penalty in any state of law in the world to be accepted as a political interlocutor, stating that this would mean rewarding someone who had designs on our people and our homeland, and warned, “No one should be in an understanding that would create the impression that terrorism has reached its goal, even indirectly. Furthermore, no one has the right to present such a historical mistake by decorating it with concepts like democracy and human rights.”

When it was requested that the execution file of the terrorist leader not be sent to the Parliament and be kept at the Prime Ministry, and the condition of abolishing the death penalty for EU membership was set, he said, “It is unthinkable for our nation and our party to allow a mortgage to be placed on the free will of the TBMM,” and “Our view and stance as the MHP on the issue is clear. Turkish justice has given the necessary punishment to the murderer, and from now on, whatever the laws command, they must be done.”

On January 12, 2000, government partners Bülent Ecevit, Devlet Bahçeli, and Mesut Yılmaz held a summit. And from the 7-hour summit, the decision emerged to keep the terrorist leader’s file at the Prime Ministry.

In his statement regarding this, Bahçeli pointed to our “international commitments” and announced that if the decision in question, “taken with respect for the law,” were used by the terrorist organization and its supporters against the country, the nation, and the state, the “postponement process would be cut short and the execution process would be initiated immediately.”

So, why and how did Bahçeli, who came to power in 1999 with the promise of “executing Öcalan” and who had given the message just one day before this summit in Osmaniye that “the execution of the terrorist leader would take place,” change his mind?

The claim that was talked about, written, and drawn in those days and in the following years was that this “state decision,” in which the TSK and the MGK were not involved, was taken as a result of Bahçeli giving up on sending the execution file to the Parliament after a page in the report brought to the Prime Ministry by the then-MIT Undersecretary Şenkal Atasagun was shown to Bahçeli by Ecevit. Indeed, the influential and authorized Deputy Prime Minister of the period, Hüsamettin Özkan, also announced in the following process that “they convinced Devlet Bahçeli thanks to MIT reports.”

MIT’s Next Step

Just 10 months after the summit at the Prime Ministry, the following happened:

MIT Undersecretary Şenkal Atasagun and his Deputy Mikdat Alpay, who met with the Ankara representatives of the newspapers, announced that they “saw benefit in the state broadcasting in Kurdish” and even in “Öcalan not being hanged and being used in line with Turkey’s interests,” and that “they had reported these views to the government.”

The reason and goal of this statement, made with the permission of Prime Minister Ecevit and the support of Mesut Yılmaz, were interpreted as follows:

“In the Ankara lobbies, the opinion prevails that the statements being made by the MIT will be more effective in convincing the MHP. It is commented that the expectation that an institution like the MIT showing such an opening and stating that some steps, especially Kurdish TV, are necessary, will prepare a more suitable ground for overcoming the MHP’s hesitations may have played a role in the messages being given through the mouths of Atasagun and Alpay. It is also being voiced that since even the MIT is not against it, it would be easier to conclude that the steps intended to be taken would be in line with the state’s interests, and for this reason, it may have been preferred that the messages be given not by the government, but by the state’s security institutions. Especially considering the MHP’s opposition and rigid stance on issues such as the abolition of the death penalty and Kurdish TV broadcasting, it can be said that the comments made against the question of ‘why the MIT is speaking’ are logical. Let’s see if the fact that these demands are brought to the agenda by the MIT and expressed as being shared by the General Staff will lead to a change in the MHP’s stance?”

And shortly after this, sleeves were rolled up for Kurdish TV and the abolition of the death penalty within the scope of “EU harmonization packages”!

We will continue...

Müyesser YILDIZ

August 29, 2025