The misunderstood victory of the far-right in France

Following the second round of elections held in France over the weekend, it has begun to be stated that the far-right suffered a major defeat. This cacophony reminded me of the line Yılmaz says to İlkkan in the series Gibi: “I’ve never listened to you, but I’m sure you’re wrong anyway.”

There is something that I and other academics who draw connections between economic policies and democracy have always emphasized: If prosperity and property are not redistributed, a new age of extremism is inevitable. Whether today or tomorrow...

Because one must never forget that the effort to maintain the system and the status quo is only a temporary solution. When discussing the rise of the “extreme,” if we do not get to the root of the issue—namely, the entrenched economic inequalities and the exclusions that reinforce them—we are merely leaving the “extreme” to lie fallow.

I have never listened to those who ignore this dimension of the issue and interpret election results with a knowledge of European politics that is barely better than village coffeehouse dialogues, but I am sure they are wrong anyway...

Let’s come to the French elections...

First, it must be stated that the far-right in France did not suffer a major defeat or anything of the sort. Actors who united upon the emergence of the possibility of a crushing victory for the far-right in France prevented this victory, with the help of the electoral system. So, how?

According to the French electoral system, in cases where no candidate reaches 50% in an electoral district, any candidate who exceeds 12.5% can compete in the second round. Therefore, we can see elections with 3-4 candidates in districts. Thanks to this electoral system, the centrist parties opposing the far-right and the left-wing alliance decided to support the strongest candidate against the National Rally—that is, the far-right—by withdrawing their own candidates in districts where they were weaker.

As a result, a picture emerged of a parliament split into three between the Left Alliance, Macron’s alliance, and the far-right, with none of them securing an absolute majority. This is such a division that while 289 seats are required for an absolute majority, the Left Alliance, which won the most seats, could only secure 180.

This means the following: None of the three blocs has the power to form a government. Moreover, unlike in Germany, there is no tradition in France of forming a grand coalition between social democrats and the center-right...

In this situation, there are two paths visible before Macron: i) Forming a coalition with the social democrats and greens—who are within the Left Alliance (which itself consists of Greens, social democrats, the radical left, and communists) and with whom his own centrist alliance does not differ much on EU, Russia-Ukraine, Israel-Palestine, social, and economic policies. For this, Macron would need to split the Left Alliance. ii) In the event that the government crisis lasts a long time, using the authority granted to him by the constitution to task a person from high-level bureaucracy or civil society with forming a technocratic government.

We will see how sustainable the first situation is, even if it is established out of fear of the far-right in a country where such a tradition does not exist... In the second case, until a second parliamentary dissolution—which would have to wait until July 2025—the government of a country struggling with burning issues will only deal with routine matters, will be unable to take action, and will not be able to pass any critical legislation...

For a country with the worst public finances among EU countries, with more than 3 trillion Euros in public debt, it should not be difficult to predict that such a government crisis itself could drive voters away from centrist political actors and toward extremism in the next elections... Indeed, when we consider that the National Rally received the most votes in this election from rural areas, the unemployed, and those with a high school education or less, the relationship between the economy and voting behavior, and what such a government crisis could lead to, becomes clearer.

Moreover, when one realizes that the imagined “defeat of the far-right” that has been recounted since election day is actually not much of a defeat at all, the dimensions of this risk become even more striking. The far-right, which is claimed to have suffered a defeat, received 10 million votes in France and, despite having 4 parties from the left and 3 from the center against it, increased its number of deputies from 89 in the previous term to nearly 150.

While I think this in itself shows that the picture is not at all as hopeful as it is being portrayed, another risk is the support the far-right National Rally will receive from the treasury from now on. In France, the state provides 1.60 Euros in support for every vote received, and also pays 37 thousand Euros annually for every seat won. This means the following: Over the next 5 years, this party will have a budget of around 110 million Euros coming solely from the state coffers. This is a very significant amount for the party to reach audiences it could not reach before and to conduct a more effective campaign.

This is the process that is being tried to be sold to us as the “defeat of the far-right.” The National Rally is the most aware of this process. With this awareness, they have two goals ahead of them: i) To capture several medium and large-scale cities in the 2026 local elections, ii) To win the 2027 Presidential elections...