Europe and Turkey: A 'preferred party' debate

Is Turkey the primary pillar of the EU or of imperialist states worldwide, led by the US, in our region? It is doubtful. Is the AKP the "preferred party" of EU monopolies or US giants in Turkey? Not really. So, who is the "preferred party" of capital in Turkey? Is it the AKP?

Is there even such a thing?

Can capital have a "preferred party" on a national or international scale? One it cannot give up, one it calls its "favorite," and one it would practically throw itself over?

Let us look at our neighbors.

Was anyone surprised by Bulgaria? Brussels lost the ground it gained in Budapest in Sofia. Viktor Orban, labeled as "pro-Russian," handed over power to the "pro-EU" Peter Magyar. The opposite happened in Bulgaria on Sunday night, and Rumen Radev, labeled as pro-Russian, emerged from the ballot box.

The calculations of Europe, which is doing everything to ensure the continuation of the Ukraine war, have come to nothing. It lost in Bulgaria the ground it gained in Hungary. We do not know how much it lost.

ARE ALL THE EGGS IN ONE BASKET?

Let us look at Turkey. Hungary and Turkey seem to have a common denominator: the capitalist regime is dominant in both. Bulgaria is the same. Therefore, by looking at the election results in Hungary and Bulgaria, we can underline one issue: the ruling class never puts all its eggs in one basket. It does not "lock itself" into a single party and a coalition led by it, nor does it ignore other possibilities.

The concept of the "preferred party of capital" is actually an old debate. Depending on the requirements of the era, capital can support certain parties, bureaucracies, cultural institutions, and even military coups. In that case, we can speak not of the preferred party of capital, or even of imperialism, but of its preferred cadres. These "preferred" cadres are distributed across various parties and institutions. They are utilized in accordance with the needs of the current situation and social crisis. Because the cadres are ready...

Looking at it this way, it is possible to understand the AKP's anxiety. It is normal. It can be easily discarded, and the people it has tormented could suddenly start holding it accountable. It is understood that this is what will happen. Living conditions have deteriorated so much that a change of government is inevitable. Even comparing food prices and rents in euros between Germany and Turkey signals that a tsunami is on the way. But when?

Just as EU capitals, the US's confused president and his staff—in short, the "great powers"—do not lock themselves into a single party, the ruling classes in Turkey do not cling to just one party. When the situation worsens, the cadres of capital begin to push existing structures for a political solution. Capital can even work to bring political institutions it once opposed to power in the country. This could be a military coup, or it could be "left-wing" party governments (like the Ecevit or Erdal İnönü governments)... In the case of a coup or a so-called "left-wing" government before a coup, capital may risk losing prestige rather than losing everything, and may even swallow material losses.

This is not only the case in Turkey, but also in the Europe of Germany.

Big capital does not intervene in politics through a single "preferred party." It tries to build a system through its loyal cadres and, if it has built one, to protect it. Those cadres are spread across various parties and institutions. They are all preparing for the table to be overturned, waiting on alert.

Therefore, just as there is no such thing as the preferred man, preferred party, or preferred state of imperialisms, preferred parties do not take on tasks in dependent countries either.

THE FEAT OF THE RIGHT ON THE LEFT

Let us ask, knowing the answer: Is there a "preferred party" in Turkey that is the darling of imperial capitals? Is there a single "basket" or party and its leader where all the eggs will be stacked?

One might immediately think of the AKP and its leader. Before 1980, the Justice Party would have come to mind. Such an address is misleading. Imperialist centers, Turkish capital, monopolies, etc., are quite satisfied with the AKP. But the AKP and its leader are not indispensable...

As we said, it is actually an old debate. Approaching September 12, the "right on the left" or the right that had infiltrated the left (the democrats) declared the Justice Party the "preferred party" and the MHP the hitman in the name of fighting against the MHP, which was responsible for the murders of the era. The left of that era did not want to think that capital would sprinkle a multi-cadre structure into various institutions, activate them in a crisis, and easily discard its former favorite. Perhaps partly due to this influence, it became easier for the left to be destroyed and alienated from the people with the September 12 coup.

It was not difficult at all for a government that included the "preferred party" of capital (the Justice Party) and its hitmen (the MHP) to gain the support of the masses. The "democrats" of the era produced excuses to avoid confronting capital directly and to win over some of its segments, and they took the coup in their weakest spots. But this was not only the case in Turkey. The real plan had been exhibited in Europe. Because it was like that there, it was like that here too.

There is no "preferred party" or anything like that. In other words, the AKP is not the preferred party of capital. Capital can easily give up on it. It is understood that even the CHP-DEM line is sure of this. That is why they are broadcasting messages in the name of politics saying, "We will provide better service."

The Islamist government is in great anxiety. It is making a great effort not to be discarded, to be treated as a preferred party, and it is aware that if the crisis deepens further, it will be declared the scapegoat. It is not for nothing that it provides extraordinary facilities to foreign capital. The message is, "If you finish us off, if you collapse us, your capital here will also go down the drain!" Let us call it a secret message.

Let us end with a comparison.

Those who know point out that Viktor Orban did not harass Peter Magyar, who grew up by his side, too much during the election process. Indeed, we did not see much of the obstacles, party bans, etc., that we see in Turkey in Hungary. There is also the fact that Orban easily accepted the election result. Is it because of his democratic nature? It means Orban knew he was not a "preferred party." An Orban who thinks he can take back power from Peter Magyar will do so with the help of his cadres within the state.

Are they thinking of someone close to them against the AKP and its leader in Turkey? We understood that the Orban-Magyar duo will not be the shadow of Erdoğan-Ahmet Davutoğlu, but who will take over power from Erdoğan? Is it İmamoğlu or Yavaş? Is it Özel?

There is no preferred party of capital. There are no indispensable preferred institutions either. But there are preferred cadres, and they are spread throughout the social fabric.

There is no guarantee that Brussels, under pressure from Berlin, will not give up on the AKP if the crisis deepens further. This is the case even though the AKP is being used as a guard, with millions of refugees ready to overflow into Europe locked in Turkey.