Is there a political and ideological difference within the CHP?

It is painful but true, and we must ask: In the turmoil within the CHP, where the administration is divided into two unequal parts and the century-old party is being neutralized through the intervention of the AKP's "Reis," was the difference in perspective between the "appointed" Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and the "elected" Özgür Özel exploited?

The answer seems easy, but with a bold look, we can summarize it as follows: It is impossible to establish a partnership between Kılıçdaroğlu and his protégé Özgür Özel, or more accurately between these two teams, because there is no political or ideological difference between them.

Kılıçdaroğlu and Özel, or rather their teams, cannot walk together because there is no political or ideological difference between them. Their perspectives on the governance of the country and the policies to be followed are the same. If not the same, they are very similar with only minor differences.

Are they not?

Then let someone come forward and list one by one which economic, political, moral, or foreign policy differences—and "fundamental differences" at that—the teams in the CHP's top management have, so that we may learn. They could start with the fundamental differences in their views on NATO, for example.

There are none.

As we said, this is why they cannot agree. The Reis Party's move against Kılıçdaroğlu is, of course, an unparalleled illegality. But is this something unheard of in this realm?

This realm? We are talking about capitalist Turkey and its rulers.

We can make a comparison: In socialism, worldviews differ from one another. The "factions" of a socialist government sometimes form different views on the administration of the country for the welfare of the people, ground them, and theoretical distinctions emerge regarding the economy, education, morality, culture, and foreign policy. They become unlike each other; they may even accuse one another of becoming bourgeois or being agents of the bourgeoisie. These sometimes become the cause of very harsh conflicts. We know this from history.

In capitalism or the "free enterprise" regime, however, groups vying for power clash with each other to maximize their profits and seize the reins of power. The words "people," "nation," etc., are never absent from their lips. But we know they are involved in a mafia-style settling of scores.

Some truths must be stated openly. The truth is bitter, but if you want to neutralize those truths, you must face them despite their bitterness.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE ISLAMIST GOVERNMENT

How can we describe the history of a government in a country that is still called a republic for some reason, but should actually be defined as an "Islamist and (ballot-box) monarchy"?

We can probably describe it by starting from the foundation upon which it rises.

Did this government of the AKP and its Reis last so long because the Islamists received a tremendous lesson in politics in mosques, congregations, sects, and among the poor, and because they know the people much better than the left?

Can we not say that it received some help?

From circles thought to be on the left, for example? Especially from the liberal wings...

We must clearly analyze the foundation upon which an Islamist government lasting a quarter of a century, a monarchy maintained through ballot-box games and acting as if it were a republic (a "one-man republic"), rises.

The old-timers used to call this the "concrete analysis of the concrete situation."

We have to say some things.

Is the "republic" that has clearly turned into a kind of monarchy in the hands of the Islamists over a quarter of a century really just the product of the AKP?

Does the CHP and the DEM in its new term—what some circles call the "Kurdish politics" aggregate—have no share in this "success," at least at the level of their administrations?

If it were not for the mentality and organizational form dominant in the CHP, the DEM, and their allies, could the institutions of secularism and the republic have been liquidated so easily? A socialist challenge defending the direct interests of the working class and the laboring masses could have rendered all these games of the last quarter-century void.

"THOSE OUTSIDE THE STAGE"

The CHP and the DEM (plus their "leftist" supporters) have been the main vitamin store for the last quarter-century branded by the AKP. They criticized it in name only and went down in history as "critical sycophants." The AKP administration benefited from this very well.

They accustomed Turkish society to this: There is no way out; we will either continue like this or we will sink!

This is the point to which insistence on a regime that is public-less, unplanned, hostile to equality, religious, and pro-NATO—what is called a free-market economy—will bring Turkey: To an end.

What should happen?

One must appear before the people with a program based on the complete rejection of this stage. It is essential to draw a line between oneself and all the actors on the stage, to neutralize them, and not to resemble them.

We are talking about the denial of the circle.

Only "those outside the stage" can prevent this destruction and fragmentation.

Otherwise, you will beg for a remedy from NATO, the EU, and even the US after the ballot-box blow Trump will receive in November. The warnings that the protective shield over Erdoğan could be lifted with the House of Representatives and partial Senate elections to be held in November are not in vain.

Will the US protective shield over the AKP and its Reis hold in Turkey?

One: Those who do not show the will to end this political and economic stage through external intervention, which is the cause of the people's deep suffering, are, in the eyes of the people, the well-off actors of this stage.

Two: There is no fundamental difference of opinion among the CHP cadres.

Three: It is more accurate to look for the mark of Germany's Europe rather than American energy in the support for the (ballot-box) monarchy in Turkey. Just like in Ukraine. Do we not see there, too, that the US has withdrawn its hand and that the four most unpopular leaders in Europe have taken over the warmongering and continuation of the war? Zelensky, Macron, Starmer, and Merz. None of them have any mass support left.

What about the mass support in Turkey and the programs offered to that support? None.

It was only announced that a detailed program would be published at the Republicans Congress held in Ankara on Sunday.

So, "those outside the stage" are not standing idle. It is our only chance. Perhaps it is our last chance.