Judicial coup: A lesson from the Turkish right to the German right?

Could Ankara be giving lessons on governance to Berlin?

Or let us ask it this way: Should those in power in Berlin, in a Germany that is a "strategic partner" to Turkey, approach the far-right AfD (Alternative for Germany)—currently the country's largest party—with an attitude similar to the judicial violence the AKP state applies to the CHP and DEM, including towards Prime Minister Friedrich Merz and his close team, including the SPD?

Can the AfD, which has significantly widened the gap even with its close relatives, the Christian Democrats (CDU and CSU), in public opinion polls and has recently approached the 30 percent band, be neutralized in this way?

Is it possible?

Are we exaggerating?

Not really. Did the reactionary and "foreign policy ministers" of the two countries, Hakan Fidan and Johann Wadephul, not embrace in Berlin at the beginning of the week? Did they not try to warm up the strategic partnership again after 12 years? Is it possible that they did not weigh each other up or pick up a few things from one another? How else does a strategic partnership work?

Anyway...

Again: AKP Turkey should be considered to have shown the European reactionaries how to eliminate their rivals through the judiciary without involving the military too much, through its operations against the CHP and DEM. Truth be told, this is a quite serious contribution to reactionary literature.

We see that the coup is being carried out not with the military (there are reasons for this) but with the judiciary (though by a small cadre). Looking at an opposition that thinks it can spread its influence while in the lap of parliamentarism and forgetting the street, one should not be too surprised that they are achieving results. Everything is out in the open.

Therefore, it would not be correct to look for the masters of this success only in the AKP. More importantly, the intra-system opposition—we could also call them "Her Majesty's loyal opposition"—has a major say in this success. In his final statements while his mind was still clear, our teacher Yalçın Küçük had not almost shouted for years about how dangerous this Kılıçdaroğlu was, had he? He was even calling him a "Fethullahist" and so on. He must have been thinking the same things about Kılıçdaroğlu's right-hand man Özgür Özel and many other management staff.

Was he proven right?

Anyway, that is not the issue.

Let us now look at it entirely from the outside, sitting crooked but speaking straight, and ask: Has the CHP management understood what it has sown and reaped with its actions before receiving the nullity coup, by numbing the street just like Kılıçdaroğlu, with rallies that have completely lost their steam, etc.?

Did it deserve better, fairer treatment?

None of the statements by Özel and his men railing against the "Reis" could be taken seriously; we did not take them seriously, and we do not. Because, especially since the books, articles, and videos of Dr. Fatih Yaşlı, we know very well: These people say the opposite of what they do, and do the opposite of what they say. We are talking about the Reis and his "opposition who know their place."

This is the scene.

We now understand better why not a single person among those who call themselves social democrats in this disgraceful scene has brought up Oskar Lafontaine (or Jean-Luc Mélenchon), or attempted to engage in politics by making references to those people or communicating with them in some way. Will they remember now as they attempt to form a new party? We cannot know.

Let us put aside the latest initiatives of the Islamist government in Ankara, which could be read as lecture notes for European reactionaries; was there a "dissident management" in place that did not deserve the nullity decision? Were the "newcomers" in the CHP not making people miss the one(s) who left?

We are asking these questions by looking at it entirely from the outside. The nullity decision, I suppose, was expected by everyone except the Özgür Özel team. If the disintegration begins, no one will be surprised. The same goes for an early and snap election...

Let us reiterate in passing that the Islamist cadres know this business (politics) well as cunning individuals who grew up in the system, but unfortunately, they have managed to become the government thanks to such rivals. In every "humanist" circle infected by liberal banality, such a collapse should not be met with surprise.

Past tense: It is said that Demirel predicted for the TİP and Behice Boran in 1970-71 that if they took on the Kurdish issue, they would receive a coup from the outside, and if they did not, from the inside. We do not know how true this is now; the sources are not at hand. But it is true: As of 2026, Turkey's establishment opposition is in exactly this situation, albeit a bit in reverse. If they accept this decision, they will receive a coup from the inside; if they do not, from the outside. The CHP and DEM and their vassals... Unfortunately...

Anticommunism is like that. It leaves everyone helpless in the face of tyranny.

We are in a new scene. Let us say that those who do not show the courage to step outside the system, who do not take their place on the stage with the threat of a socialist government, have to tolerate being played with so barbarically.

They say, "One does not kick a man when he is down." Very well. But explaining why the one who fell has fallen and how he is being kicked is surely not forbidden.

We must say this: Turkey's government and the reasonable opposition circles that are in the position of its toy are either unaware of anything or they are all playing together.

A judicial coup is like that. But it is another fact that it accelerates history...