The real question: Not 'where are we going', but 'what will we do' and with what plan?

The Republic is over. It has been this way for a long time. The final curtain rose at the end of 2002. We are now at the end of the play.

The public has an objection to this. Fair enough. That is to say, the situation in Turkey is different: Turkish reactionism cannot quite manage what the Hitlers, Mussolinis, Francos, and Pinochets managed to do. Alongside the state, it cannot quite fully seize the public. In the streets, in workplaces, in cultural life, etc... It attacks, but it doesn't work.

Despite the support of anti-communist left-liberals, it does not have the power. It cannot quite bury the republican regime it killed. The public does not allow it.

We can summarize it in other words and perhaps like this:

Islamist politics, also called the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, seized the state by taking under its wing the "left-liberals" who sell hatred of the republic as leftism. To put it more precisely, Islamists, in line with two anti-communist hysterias, managed to seize the state in some form by taking support from the plebeian violence of Turkists and the intellectual violence of (Kurdish-inclusive) left-liberals. (And the AKP is not very sure of itself on that matter either, if we consider the "lieutenants' incident".)

It can be said that they have made some progress.

Perhaps, keeping this progress in mind, due to the policy of seizing the state down to its finest cells, monographs and such will be written about a shrewd "Reis" who has no intellectual talent other than a simple cult cunning, and who, in the words of our teacher Yalçın Küçük, has "no ability to learn at all." Yet, it has no importance beyond a cult cunning.

Like in the joke: Temel could not manage to stick his fork into an olive at breakfast. He tried many times, he couldn't do it. But when his wife managed to stick the fork into the olive on the first touch, he objected, saying, "I tired it out, that's why you caught it like that."

Jokes aside, the truth is this: The AKP is like the center-forward in the final of an 80-year effort. It was Turkish capital that carried the ball into the penalty area; all that was left for the AKP and its leader was to send the ball into the net.

STATE, SOCIETY AND CENTRAL PLAN

But back to the Islamists: They may have seized the state with the help of their allies, but because the republican yeast took hold, they could not fully seize society. They did not see an active resistance, yet they confessed their helplessness in this area from time to time.

However, they were aware of one thing: They understood that the resistance of a dormant society has no importance unless it is voiced in the street, in the workplace, in school, and unless it turns into a concrete resistance. They left things to take their course.

They were only very afraid in June 2013.

And indeed, from then on, and starting exactly there, they established a regime of tyranny of terrible proportions, shifting gears three years later.

Their difference from old fascisms was that they brought judicial violence to the fore, not military violence. (Why, I wonder? This is a topic that needs to be studied on its own.)

Leftist sensibility was very influential in the streets and intellectual life from the 1960s to the end of the 1970s. We even experienced the left taking social dynamics in front of it. We saw that a fair number of turncoats emerged from within the left, which received a heavy blow on September 12, 1980, and that they all together developed objections to this kind of determination. We also witnessed them being rewarded.

Our equation is as follows: Turkish reactionism, that is, the Islamists together with their capital-backed allies, may have seized the state, but they could not quite seize society to the extent they wanted. They could not overcome the resistance of women in particular.

The fact that the left could not be influential over the state despite determining society in places during the 1960-1980 period, and even that it considered organizing within the state as a "disgrace to infiltrate the state" with a strange and even fake radicalism, was influential in this impasse (the inability to defeat each other). Here, the exclusion of Doğan Avcıoğlu's efforts from the socialist movement was also not ineffective.

With a dirty civil-society approach, they almost turned society into voluntary captives.

IT IS POSSIBLE TO NULLIFY THE DESTRUCTION WITH A PLAN

We said all this for this reason: This government is the declaration of the end of Turkey, that is fine, but do those who resist know how they can prevent the end of the republic we know?

Looking at the AKP's judicial violence, let us not think that a game is being played on the CHP on stage.

We have the right to say that the CHP, in its two-headed state, is a complementary actor of the AKP tyranny together with the DEM and its allies.

But the problem is huge, the crisis is very deep. We cannot claim that those who say we are going through a civil war, which is still in a covert stage in places, are very wrong.

The pains are very concrete. A terrible poverty and decay prevail.

The problem is, what are those who think they can end this destruction with a revolutionary response planning?

A plan?

Yes, a plan. A central plan!

Ending Turkey's destruction is only possible with uncompromising secularism, ending those agreements made with all imperialist centers that exploit us to the bone, an independence-seeking insistence that will kick out NATO, and a policy of gratuitous nationalization/statization to be followed through central planning.

The plan discussions that two important socialist writers, Alper Birdal and Aytek Soner Alpan, have tried to trigger with articles published in recent months are very important in terms of the main topics that need to be opened on our agenda.

Alper Birdal:

https://gelenek.org/teknolojideki-gelismeler-ve-sosyalist-planlamada-yeni-olanaklar/

Aytek Soner Alpan:

https://katmanportal.com/planlamayi-yeniden-dusunmek-i-chibberin-elestirisi-ne-olcude-hakli/

Developing this line is important.

Turkey has enough economists. We are talking about revolutionary, populist economists.

We can only get the destroyed republic back on its feet with a socialist economic policy.

Otherwise, our end is Yugoslavia, Iraq, Syria. Even much worse than them.

But we did not mention these examples in vain. The truth is, our hand is not that weak: The soft underbelly of the tyrants is this new generation of intellectuals: the Birdals, the Alpans, and there are thousands of them.

Let us not be hopeless either.

We will talk about these things...