CHP is not part of the 'scenario' being constructed; it must politicize the real agenda of the people pushed into misery

In Syria, the last stop of the 'Arab Spring', the 70-year-old 'Baath Regime' collapsed in an interesting way, in 12 days, after a 12-year bloody civil war, without even a single person's nose bleeding. With Assad leaving Damascus and taking refuge in Russia, the cards were reshuffled in the Middle East. In Syria, Colani (Ahmed al-Shara), the leader of the Al-Nusra/Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) front, who was coded as the leader of an 'Islamic-motif terrorist organization', became the new head of state of Syria. Truth be told, the world public is curious about what kind of regime awaits the multi-religious, multi-ethnic, and multi-sectarian Syrian society. Yet, for years, Turkey had inspired the Muslim-Arab world with its fully independent, secular, and democratic Islamic model. Atatürk was respected in all societies as the political icon of such a model.

Simultaneously with the developments in Syria, the public in Turkey witnessed another interesting political development with a heavy tactical aspect. What was interesting and surprising was that Devlet Bahçeli, the founder of Turkish nationalism and the idealist movement, in his speech at the MHP group in parliament, invited Öcalan to the DEM Party group and called for the 'PKK to lay down its arms', asking him to resolve this issue fundamentally by benefiting from the right to hope. In the message he sent through the DEM delegation that went to Imralı, Öcalan also started the process by saying that he would make a positive contribution to the 'paradigm' that requires historical responsibility, where all political circles will take initiative in parliament, for democratic peace and brotherhood.

Why was a subject that has not occupied the agenda for a long time (the Kurdish problem) moved to the center/top of the agenda by Bahçeli? While President Erdoğan says Israel has eyes on Turkish lands, let's strengthen the internal front, let's normalize, was an imperial plan that we could not foresee put into effect in the background? Do you think it is an ordinary situation for Öcalan, who is coded as the 'terrorist leader' and 'Imralı villain', to be given the right to hope and to be invited to speak in parliament? How can we place all these events into a rational and consistent perspective?

Let's continue with questions. How can we explain Erdoğan's different attitude this time, compared to the previous solution process, in the scenario constructed for the solution of the Kurdish problem, which constitutes Turkey's 100-year-old 'cultural fault line'? While on one hand, there is talk of an internal front, softening, peace, and brotherhood, on the other hand, the process of putting pressure on social and political opposition, appointing trustees to municipalities, and detaining mayors is happening simultaneously. How can this situation be interpreted? Of course, what these initiatives aim for in the eyes of the government will emerge soon.

Although the background and content of the 'new solution/opening process' are not fully clear, it is already possible to foresee the 'political codes' of the scenario for the coming period. First of all, it is a fact that a political strategy aiming for Erdoğan to become president for a third time has been put into effect. In this scenario, it is observed that there is a search for a new constitution, early elections, changing the burning economic agenda, squeezing, dividing, and fragmenting the opposition bloc, etc.

While the scenario created by the ruling bloc and the political strategy intended to be implemented aim to fortify the coming period, in my opinion, there is a regression in the political production practice of the opposition bloc and especially the CHP. Let's try to explain this with its reasons. The CHP, the first party of the March 31 local elections with the Great Turkey Alliance, had gained the advantage of morale and motivation by winning 412 municipalities, opening the door to the hope of coming to power. The same CHP, in the last 6-month period, was late in correctly reading the government's masking of the economic crisis that pushed the poor masses into great depression with developments in foreign policy (regime change in Syria, ending terrorism, etc.). In this process, it zigzagged by adopting a hesitant political stance. In a way, the main opposition party returned to the criticized 'defensive' position. Once again, the CHP became the party that followed the agenda, not the one that set it.

For this reason, without wasting time, the CHP must move away from its position of internalizing/legitimizing the agenda set by the government and return to its proactive political line that analyzes events carefully and calmly and produces the most accurate solutions. The CHP, the İyi Party, and the DEM Party, which formed the backbone of the 'Nation Alliance' that set out with the common denominator of a "strengthened parliamentary system" in the 2023 elections, display a disconnected and scattered political appearance. The distance between the CHP and the İyi Party is widening, and the roadmap of the Deva Party, the Future Party, and the Felicity Party, which formed a joint group under the roof of the 'New Way Party', seems uncertain. Therefore, while a scattered and fragmented appearance is experienced in the opposition, Erdoğan and the People's Alliance are turning to new searches, setting up games, making transfers from other parties, and sending messages and showing addresses to angry, undecided voters who do not go to the polls with trustees and detentions.

The ruling bloc is setting up a different game in the new solution process - whether it holds or not; that is, in the new period, the DEM Party will be asked to either support the People's Alliance or enter the election alone. The policy that the CHP will follow in this process has more fragile characteristics. In this new scenario constructed by the government, if the CHP supports the new solution process, it will risk losing its voters with secular nationalist, center-right, and nationalist sensitivities; if it does not support it, it will face the risk of losing anti-solution, radical left-socialist voters, some Alevi, social democratic voters, and most importantly, the secular, secular voters of the DEM Party. In such a minefield, the job of the CHP, which should lead the opposition, does not seem easy at all, like 'damned if you do, damned if you don't'. However, without falling into this trap, the CHP can dominate the process and turn it in its favor with a rational, self-confident, clear political exit. It has such experience in the past, and this is possible.

So, what else should the CHP do? As you know, in a political system based on the 50+1 rule, the CHP must re-gather, expand, and moderate the political opposition. It is impossible to understand why party staff have moved away from this mission. The CHP can mobilize the opposition and bring it together on a common denominator in a strong way again by combining its past accumulation and political potential for transformation with the right work it will do in the large municipalities it holds, turning it into an advantage.

In this vein, the CHP can use its power and resources rationally and competently. For example, the dynamism and synergy of mayors such as Mansur Yavaş, Ekrem İmamoğlu, Zeydan Karalar, Ahmet Akın, Ferdi Zeyrek, Mustafa Bozbey, Bülent Nuri Çavuşoğlu, Candan Yüceer, Burcu Köksal, Tanju Özcan, and Cemil Tugay, who have won elections by defeating their rivals with high votes in their cities and have achieved successful works, that is, who have achieved the difficult, can trigger "undecided voter groups" who have lost faith in the "political institution" and lost hope, and make them the subject of politics again.

The headquarters can start work from here with an agile and holistic approach. By doing 'special-strategic work' with the support and guidance of successful local governments, the CHP can become an attractive political address for both the masses who have cooled (or even hate, are disgusted by) politics and the voters who are uncomfortable with the general course of the country and therefore resentful of the AKP, who do not go to the polls but have a tendency to return to the AKP with recent developments. For this reason, general processes and developments should be understood in the light of healthy and periodic data, the pulse of the hot agenda should be constantly taken, and policies and discourses should be updated in this direction.

At this very point, CHP leader Özgür Özel and the managers responsible for the economy should listen to the cry of the oppressed broad masses of the people under conditions of heavy and deep poverty and politicize this cry at the highest level. To improve the living conditions of the lower and middle classes, who are fed up with high inflation and the storm of price hikes and have lost their will to live, the main opposition party must focus on a "policy design" that inspires trust and excitement and explain to the helpless, ignored, and excluded segments of the public, in a simple and convincing language, that it is a very strong alternative to the government. The CHP should turn its face to the weak segments, especially retirees, unemployed youth, minimum wage earners, low-income earners, and housewives, and instill hope for the future in them. The success, stability, and permanence of the realization of hope, without a doubt, seem possible with the mobilization of all progressive democratic forces, civil society, the business world, local governments, and academia in a "union of forces".