İmamoğlu and the sociological codes of accumulated social anger

Turkey is going through a major bottleneck. There is a general sense of 'suffocation' in society. On social media platforms, in shopping malls, on the streets, in the subway, at the market, and in coffee houses, everyone is asking: What is happening? Where are we heading? What will be the end of this? There are no smiles on faces. Uncertainty and pessimism prevail. Alongside fear and withdrawal, there is a growing social anger.

Those who came to power on November 3, 2002, with the motto of a "Conservative-Democratic Revolution" have, at the end of nearly a quarter-century, brought society to the brink of a deep economic, social, and political crisis. Those who separated from the Milli Görüş-Refah Party tradition by defining themselves as the "innovative wing" won the election, but for some reason, those who claimed to be pro-EU and 'democrats' every time they spoke became 'autocrats' once they came to power. They pledged to remove obstacles to democracy and end military tutelage. They promised to melt all political and cultural tendencies in the crucible of democracy, the rule of law, and freedoms. At the end of the day, what was experienced was an illusion of democracy. Founding actors of the movement themselves, such as Abdullah Gül, Bülent Arınç, Ali Babacan, and Hüseyin Çelik, are now criticizing the situation and admitting they were wrong.

We are facing a picture of a country that has plummeted in international democracy and economy indices. In the last 10 years, Turkey has been one of the two countries where "democracy" has regressed the most, and it ranks fifth from the bottom among OECD countries in "income distribution." In the World Happiness Report, it ranks 79th out of 156 countries. According to the results of the TurkStat Life Satisfaction Survey, the proportion of individuals aged 18 and over who declared they were "happy" was 62% in 2011, while it was 49.6% in 2024. One in every two citizens feels "unhappy."

In the 2020 Prosperity Index, Turkey ranks 154th out of 167 countries in terms of "social tolerance." In the last 10 years, more than 3 thousand women have been killed by men, and over a thousand women have been raped. Between 2002 and 2018, 5 thousand 486 people committed suicide due to "livelihood difficulties and commercial failure." The rate of "unemployed youth who are hopeless" about their future is 60 percent. In 2018 alone, 246 people committed suicide due to "livelihood difficulties." The World Health Organization's 2017 report states that 4.5% of Turkey's population is "depressed." In the last three years, the number of people applying to psychiatric clinics has exceeded 8 million. According to Ministry of Health data, "anti-depressant use" increased by 27% between 2013 and 2018. Nearly 100 thousand people are detained or convicted in penal institutions for "drug-related crimes." These data point to a deep "socio-economic collapse" and a "major regression in democracy." Since such a great social crisis does not mean anything to those in power, it is impossible for them to healthily analyze the social protests taking place in Saraçhane and other places.

Following the arrest of Ekrem İmamoğlu, the most popular actor of the opposition and the CHP, millions participated in protest actions in Saraçhane, Ankara Güvenpark, İzmir Gündoğdu, and the major squares of other provinces, especially in Istanbul. The crowds are growing like a snowball every day. People from all walks of life are supporting the actions.

As in the 'Gezi Park Movement,' the core of the actions consists of "youth/university students." People from different political parties, factions, unions, bar associations, and civil initiatives are acting with a sense of solidarity and brotherhood. With the elderly, the young, students, workers, and tradesmen, the squares are witnessing a 'voluntary' civil resistance movement, a meeting of democracy, justice, and conscience. They are meeting on the common ground that "what is done to the CHP and İmamoğlu is done to us and to democracy." The government's use of the 'judiciary' like the sword of Damocles triggers deep wounds and accumulated anger, providing lifeblood to the civil social movement without resorting to violence and vandalism.

Students supporting the actions are coming to the squares from deep-rooted and prestigious universities such as Koç, Bilgi, Sabancı, Istanbul, and Dokuz Eylül by boycotting their exams. They value urban, secular-liberal values and change. These are the children of new middle-class families who were once described as 'anxious moderns' and were subjected to 'neighborhood pressure.' They have accumulated justified anger. The tension is at its peak. They are raising their voices against the injustices experienced, subjective interviews, lack of merit, the high cost of living, class gaps, and the country's direction. They see the treatment of İmamoğlu as an injustice and do not accept it. They are uncomfortable with the government's threatening and arrogant language. Their affiliation with political parties or civil society is weak; they have been socialized in digital networks and online environments, and they are partially apolitical, unhappy, and hopeless about the future.

In essence, the crowds gathered in Saraçhane and the major squares of other provinces reflect the tension and restlessness accumulated in society through the person of İmamoğlu. Lawsuits and arrests against opposition figures from all walks of life—from business organizations to labor unions, from opposition party leaders to mayors, from civil society activists to journalists, from academics to astrologers—have created a major reaction in public opinion. A great climate of fear has formed in society. Trust in the judiciary has decreased. Political and emotional polarization has peaked. Concerns about property and life safety have emerged. The fear that the economic cost of İmamoğlu's arrest would be loaded onto the poor classes of the people has been the motive mobilizing the masses.

If remembered, the Gezi movement was a spontaneous, 'headless,' and leaderless movement far from political parties. CHP leader Özgür Özel organized and ignited the social anger and hopelessness accumulated against the violation of rights, law, and justice among the masses spreading in waves across Turkey. With an energetic and dynamic leadership vision, he established a social and political contract with the "hybrid" masses gathered in the squares. He mobilized CHP organizations. He also created intense interest and energy in traditional Anatolian cities such as Erzincan, Kastamonu, Konya, and Trabzon.

Despite this positive picture, what Özel must do from now on is to present a new democratic Turkey vision that will give hope and confidence to citizens who are tired and exhausted by oppressive practices and polarization; whose bread has diminished, whose purchasing power has fallen, whose pots are not boiling, who are struggling to make a living, and who expect urgent and clear solutions to these problems from the government; and to voters who have withdrawn into themselves due to the climate of uncertainty and fear, and who have become cold and distant from politics. This vision must absolutely focus on the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, and the fair distribution of prosperity.