The Turkish Revolution, the state, and its founding philosophy

The Turkish Revolution has universal dimensions. One of these is that some of the concepts it utilized, and which belong to it, are also used in a political sense in other languages. For example, the term 'Young Turk' is used worldwide—especially in developing countries, in the third world, and among oppressed nations—to describe anti-authoritarian, liberal civil-military intellectuals, and it is used widely from Vietnam to Argentina. A significant portion of the Young Turks, who studied in the West or in Western-style educational institutions and worked in the bureaucracy upon returning home, would later support the Committee of Union and Progress, then work for the Kuvayı Milliye (National Forces) and the Association for the Defense of Rights, and subsequently take their places among the leading cadres of the CHP.

Our great leader Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who preferred to say 'devrim' (revolution) rather than 'inkılap' (reform) in his speeches after 1936, was aware of this: New social classes mean new social, political, and economic demands. Behind every revolution, there are already social classes that carry out that revolution and want it to develop, take root, and strengthen. This reality holds true for the English Revolution (which was two-staged: the first phase being the civil war and Commonwealth period between 1640–1660, and the second being the Glorious Revolution of 1688–1689), the French Revolution (1789), and the October Revolution (1917) as well.

Unlike the English and French revolutions, the Turkish Revolution is a revolution in which the influence of a single class did not stand out excessively, and where all pro-independence classes and strata united and fought as a front. It is a typical, classic example of revolutions within the definition of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) and has served as an example to all oppressed nations—or in the words of Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, 'mazlum milletler' (oppressed nations).

During the War of Independence, the understanding of national will, national sovereignty, and independence gave birth to the Association for the Defense of Rights and the Assembly for the Defense of Rights. The Assembly conducted the War of Independence, managed the army, and founded the state. In other words, the Turkish Revolution gave birth to the Republic of Turkey.

In political science literature, the republic is, in its shortest definition, the general name given to all non-monarchical regimes. In another definition, it is a regime where governance is not based on a sultanate and is not passed from father to son. However, a republic is, of course, much more than this. It is national sovereignty, populism, citizenship, equality of citizens, secularism, freedom, equality before the law, and having rights and responsibilities. It means that lineage, family, class characteristics, or sub-identities are not—and are not considered—a source of superiority, weakness, or privilege.

Like every republic, the Republic of Turkey is sensitive and protective regarding the singularity of the state, the unity of the nation, and the integrity of the country. Like every state, the Republic of Turkey has its own unique qualities, characteristics, red lines, and sensitivities.

One must not forget that the state is also an organization. However, it is not an ordinary, commonplace, or simple organization. It is not an organization that can be established at random. It is an organization that can only be established through the struggle of people who share a common hope, have experienced common pain, and have common goals at a moment of historical rupture. These common hopes, pains, and goals are decisive in the establishment, institutionalization, and maturation of the state's founding philosophy.

The founding philosophy of the state is the mortar and foundation of the state. Contrary to what liberals think, it does not change easily. It does not change through the ballot box either. For it to change, force is required, power is required, weapons are required, war is required, or a revolution is required. Furthermore, another misconception of liberals is the belief that states cannot have ideologies. This is wrong. States have ideologies. They must have them. It is unthinkable for a structure that is itself a political apparatus, institution, and organization not to have an ideology. The state's founding philosophy determines the state's ideology.