Turkey's Fourth President Cemal Gürsel: A Coup Plotter or a Founder?

Who is Cemal Gürsel?

Two of the presidents of the 1961 democracy  — Cemal Gürsel and Cevdet Sunay — participated in the First World War and the  National Struggle. Both were taken prisoner by the British in 1918,  and were held in prisoner-of-war camps in Egypt.  After returning to the country through a prisoner exchange, they crossed into Anatolia and joined the Turkish War of Independence.

They completed their military academy and staff college education after the victory. For Gürsel and Sunay, this  meant participating in the war while they were still students. Both of them  witnessed the liquidation of the old regime and the Republican revolutions, as well as the eras of Atatürk and İnönü. They had the opportunity to observe the first experiences of the multi-party political life.  observe  They had the opportunity to observe. Although the multi-party political life had an aspect that seemed chaotic to the military, they knew very well that Turkey's direction since the Great Atatürk had been Western civilization and democracy.  knew.   It would be accurate to evaluate Cemal Gürsel's presidency within this context.

In 1957, Gürsel became the commander of the 3rd Army, headquartered in Erzurum, with the rank of general, and was later appointed as the Commander of the Land Forces.  His position as the Commander of the Land Forces, which is the backbone of the army, is significant in terms of the fate of May 27. 

Gürsel was a general who had long been known in the army for his fatherly demeanor as "Cemal Aga" (Brother Cemal). If the term of Chief of General Staff Rüştü Erdelhun had not been extended for another 3 years, Cemal Gürsel would have become the Chief of General Staff.  was possible.  Cemal Gürsel was not the commander who organized the May 27 coup. However, as a force commander, he was aware of the unrest within the army. 

Before May 27, he had sent a 12-point letter to Minister of Defense Ethem Menderes and had gone to Izmir on leave, intending to retire.  The content of the letter—contrary to what some writers have claimed—did not show a general eager for a coup,  but rather a roadmap aimed at saving multi-party political life and democracy.  Cemal Gürsel was not unaware of the revolutionaries. However, he did not have comprehensive information about their cadre. On the morning of May 27, during the hours when the situation was ambiguous, the committee's first problem was the issue of military hierarchy raised by Third Army Commander Ragıp Gümüşpala, who questioned the legitimacy of the administration.   

Gümüşpala had threatened to dismantle the Committee if there was no general more senior than him at its head. Indeed, there were no generals at the army commander level in the National Unity Committee (MBK), except for First Army Commander General Fahri Özdilek. 

The most important problem in the army was how the new hierarchy would be established. This was also closely related to the structure of the committee. Major General Cemal Madanoğlu, the de facto leader of the revolution, organized the appointment of Cemal Gürsel to the head of the Committee.  Gürsel rose to the position of the highest-ranking commander after figures such as Chief of General Staff Rüştü Erdelhun and Air Force Commander Tekin Arıburun, who had been interned by the revolutionaries, were purged. His appointment as the head of the Committee resolved the military hierarchy issue within the army, including for Gümüşpala. 

With Gürsel's  presidency of the National Unity Committee,  it was a necessity for him to assume the titles of Head of State, Head of Government, Chief of General Staff, and Commander-in-Chief. Gürsel's presence balanced the composition of the NUC, which essentially consisted of mid-to-lower-ranking officers.  Some opportunistic figures who wanted to be part of the Committee were quickly sidelined, the staff was clarified, and it was announced in the Official Gazette. 

The Committee's first problem was to establish a new command structure loyal to the revolution. Following the extensive purges carried out in the army, including Fahri Korutürk and Gümüşpala—later known as the Retired Revolutionary Officers—the army was brought to a relatively stable state under the Chief of General Staff, Gen. Cevdet Sunay. This structure was largely maintained until the date Sunay became president in 1966.

THE IDEOLOGY AND CADRES OF MAY 27

 May 27, 1960, is essentially a petty-bourgeois action. The NUC, which seized power, was class-wise composed of the leaders of Turkish modernization  he represented a  faction  of the bureaucratic class from which he emerged.  In this respect, it is possible  to characterize May 27, 1960,  as a Young Turk action. 

To the revolution,  we must also look from the perspective of the international conjuncture  to examine.  The Turkish Army in the 1950s  had been integrated into the North Atlantic alliance. The 50s in Turkey was a period  where 'Free Worldism, Americanism, and anti-communism' were championed. The main opposition party did not fundamentally object to this. It only had some reservations regarding the details. For a country that was a member of the North Atlantic alliance,  being governed by a long-term military  administration was contrary to the nature of things.  For this reason,  Turkey, albeit problematically, returned to a multi-  partisan  had to continue along the path of democracy.

MAY 27 AND SEPTEMBER 12 ARE NOT THE SAME 

The National Security Council regime was a dictatorship designed to solve the problems of the ruling classes in line with neo-liberal policies. September 12,  can be understood in the context of the Cold War, anti-communism, and Turkey's  place within  the North Atlantic Alliance. The National Security Council regime can be defined as a long-term closed regime that corresponded to the needs of the ruling classes and Turkish capitalism, which was integrated into international capitalism as a peripheral country.  defined.

There is no alliance of ruling classes behind May 27. On the contrary, there is a wing of the military  bureaucracy that was uncomfortable with it. May 27, 1960  must be evaluated within this  class and historical context.  May 27 differs from September 12 in many respects. The only adversary of May 27 is the Democrat Party government. Although there were problems with other  parties, they were not actors whose legitimacy was questioned. During the National Unity Committee period, there was a military regime in Turkey, but there were also political parties. These were the parties represented in the Constituent Assembly and newly established ones: such as the AP, YTP, and TİP.

THE CLASS CHARACTER OF THE 1961 CONSTITUTION 

In the 1961 constitution  strengthening the separation of powers is a result of the revolution's petty  bourgeois character. For this reason, majority rule was weakened;  the executive branch was placed under strict oversight by the judiciary and other institutions. In the constitution,  public  freedoms  and the way they were addressed, and generally the reason why the 1961 democracy was based on institutional democracy  is this.

CEMAL GÜRSEL'S ROLE IN ESTABLISHING THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

After accepting the chairmanship of the National Unity Committee, the first major problem  Gürsel would have to face  was the division within the Committee regarding the program for a return to democracy.  This issue was resolved by purging the faction that favored long-term military rule, which would later be known as the 'Group of 14'.   The Committee was dissolved and reconstituted through a decree signed by Gürsel. This meant that the military regime would be governed by a delegation favoring a return to democracy.

There was a period when Gürsel was under various influences regarding the transition to a new constitutional order. The initial stance that emerged was that the Constitution was an 'academic' matter.  There was a circle that argued Turkey's new constitution could enter into force through the adoption and proclamation by the Committee of a text prepared by scientists. For example, Ord. Prof. Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu  held this view.  This thesis considered the revolutionaries as the "constituent power."  This view was not incorrect  from the perspective of public law. However, the disagreements between the Ankara and Istanbul commissions led to the conclusion that the constitutional adoption process was not merely an academic task.   

As it became clear that a return to democracy would only be possible through a new constitution, the necessity of granting representative legitimacy to the constitution-making process emerged.  The House of Representatives was established through the Constituent Assembly Law. The Constituent Assembly Law provided the Head of State with the right to directly appoint 15 members. Gürsel exercised this authority   by selecting well-known figures in society.   In addition to names such as Abdurrahman Nafiz Gürman and Kazım Orbay, as well as figures like Orhan Köprülü, Behçet Kemal Çağlar, and Esat Çağa,  minority representatives such as Hermine Agavni Kalustyan and Kaludi Laskari were also included.  were also among the names  appointed as representatives. 

Finally, the Constitution text, completed exactly one year after May 27, 1960, was accepted in Turkey's first public referendum with a relatively weak majority (62%). The constitutional order of the new Turkey (the Second Republic) had been established.

Meanwhile, the trial process of the ousted Democrat Party leaders at the Yassıada High Court of Justice was nearing its end. The authority to ratify  the court's decisions—only for death sentences—   should have rested with the Constituent Assembly,  which consisted of the National Unity Committee (MBK) and the House of Representatives.   However,  Interestingly enough,   the House of  Representatives ended its proceedings before the decisions were made. This  in my opinion, was a decision  taken by the Assembly to avoid  responsibility. Under pressure from the Armed Forces Union, the Committee reviewed the files  with the judgment that it held legislative authority  exclusively. In the vote that followed—despite Gürsel's negative vote—  despite this—the sentences were approved by a vote of 13 to 9 (by majority). The execution of the sentences caused the upcoming Turkish Grand National Assembly (Senate and National Assembly) elections, to be held one month later, to take place in a tense atmosphere. October 15, 1961  elections introduced Turkey to a new reality:  No political party had won the election,  and power  remained in limbo. 

FACTORS THAT STRENGTHENED GÜRSEL'S HAND AGAINST POLITICAL ACTORS

Although the Committee represented the May 27 revolution,  it had already demonstrated its intention/thought of handing power over to civilians through its actions and decisions. In this respect, against the interventionist factions within the army  the existence of the National Unity Committee was a guarantee. 

For this reason, it was a necessity for political parties to rally around General Cemal Gürsel.  With the parties,  the Round Table Meetings held  and the process of the Çankaya Protocol signed after the elections  had Cemal Gürsel as their main actor. This was the meaning hidden in the words of Cemal Gürsel, who was at the head of the state: 'I cannot leave the country in this state.' 

THE TBMM AND THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT ON OCTOBER 25-26, 1961 

The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) convened for the first time in the III. Assembly building, which was used by the Constituent Assembly. The greatest indication of the conditions under which the transition would take place was, for that moment, still held by General Cemal Gürsel, who carried the title of Head of State.  was his arrival in uniform.  The First Assembly of the Second Republic was, by its own nature,  in a Joint Session. It was not even clear  where the Senate   would convene. This speech Gürsel delivered in uniform holds extreme historical significance.  

Following this, just as it was during the opening of the 1961 Constituent Assembly, the  second  most senior member of the National Unity Committee (former 1st Army Commander Fahri Özdilek) invited Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu to the podium with a brief speech to preside over the assembly.  The process had now begun to function. The interim Presidential Council completed the swearing-in ceremony for the members of Parliament. This took place on October 25. The agenda for the following day was the presidential election. The sole candidate put forward in accordance with the Çankaya Protocol  Naturally, Senatör Cemal Gürsel was elected as Turkey's  fourth  President with 432 votes against approximately 150 blank ballots. This was to be followed by the National Assembly and the Senate of the Republic electing their own speakers.  The most important threshold had now been crossed. Cemal Gürsel's transition from Head of State and Chairman of the National Unity Committee to the status of President meant that both chambers of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey would begin to function according to the procedures and principles set forth in the Constitution. The army's 'Cemal Aga' had now become the fourth president of Turkey. 

THE CANDIDACY OF ALİ FUAT BAŞGİL 

Professor Başgil was nominated by extremist Justice Party (AP) members—signed by party leader Gümüşpala—  signed  Despite the Çankaya Protocol-  Having his mind swayed by the dream of the "presidency" did not rest on a rational foundation, neither numerically nor politically. His candidacy was not realistic. Even if he were a candidate,  it was impossible for him to reach the majority required by the constitution.  The Justice Party deputies and senators would mostly remain loyal to the protocol. Ekrem Alican's New Turkey Party (YTP) would not have voted for him anyway. The Republican Villagers Nation Party (CKMP) (Bölükbaşı's party) was against İnönü, but this could not mean they would support Başgil, who was considered the "man" of the Democrat Party.  

THE FOUNDING PRESIDENT OF THE 1961 CONSTITUTION: CEMAL GÜRSEL  

The office of the presidency has become identified with Atatürk and Çankaya. Under the 1924  Constitution, during the single-party era and  even after the transition to multi-party political life, the President was not outside of politics. Atatürk and İnönü had maintained their CHP identities, while Bayar had maintained his Democrat Party affiliation.  

The 1961 Constitution, however, defined the presidency  in a different way.  The president under the new constitution was no longer the head of state in a political regime characterized by the unity of powers and parliamentary supremacy, but rather the head of state in a parliamentary regime where state powers were divided and a soft separation of powers was applied. Cemal Gürsel  was elected president the day after serving as a natural senator for one day. For this reason, his position was very different from that of Atatürk, İnönü, and Bayar.

WHO WILL FORM THE GOVERNMENT? 

President Gürsel faced a problem that had not posed an issue for any president until that time (from 1923 to 1961).  It was a problem that Atatürk, İnönü, and Bayar had not encountered: the task of forming a government. In the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM),   there was no majority party capable of forming a government on its own. There was a necessity to form a coalition government. There was even talk of a National Coalition in which all parties would participate. This proposal was, of course, contrary to the logic of politics. But in the military wing, a national  coalition  idea was received positively. For this reason, it was claimed that the military staged a coup to bring the CHP, which could not come to power through elections, to power. The National Unity Committee (MBK) and  the military were being accused of staging a coup by being provoked by the CHP. To dispel this narrative, a government in which all political parties were represented could be formed. In that case, power would have been given to all parties. Thus, the military would have been  freed from the accusation that they 'staged a coup to bring the CHP to power.' Naturally, there were many  obstacles to the realization of this formula: Primarily the sectarian attitude of CKMP leader Osman Bölükbaşı. Osman Bölükbaşı's demagogic stance had been creating problems since the Constituent Assembly period. And this situation was met with dissatisfaction by the National Unity Committee. Under these conditions, Turkey's first coalition government was to be formed between the CHP and the AP under the  presidency of İnönü. 

İNÖNÜ GOVERNMENTS AND PRESIDENT GÜRSEL

The coalition government that İnönü formed with the Justice Party, partly due to necessity,   should have lowered  the political tension. Contrary to expectations, sharing power did not bring  calm  to the members of the Justice Party (AP).  They attempted  to gain the initiative by increasing the tension. 

The main subject of political tension   for the coalition government  There was to be an amnesty for the Yassıada prisoners. For the Justice Party wing,  this was, in a sense, their only agenda.  İnönü  was sincerely in favor of the amnesty but believed it would be correct to handle it through a gradual policy. The reason was that the military, as an institution, was vehemently opposed to the reorganization of the Democrat Party components. Ultimately, the First İnönü Government broke  at its weakest point. Turkey's first coalition government was able to remain in office until June 25, 1962. 

In my opinion, the most important events of Gürsel's presidency in terms of our  political history are the coup attempts by Talat Aydemir (1962-63). The fact that these coup attempts could be put into action in the country's capital, despite the new constitution and the  elected parliament, is significant for understanding the political atmosphere of those days. If the Aydemir junta  just as it was doubtful what kind of administration would have been established in Turkey had it succeeded,  when the fact that the Fourth President Cemal Gürsel would have been overthrown along with the parliament and the government is taken into account, Turkey turned back from a critical threshold. 

During Gürsel's presidency,  the country was essentially governed by the unstable governments formed by İnönü.  Despite all the weaknesses of the İnönü governments, and even  his occasional threats to "walk away," the conditions the country was in made it impossible to form a government without İnönü. Again, the one formed  under his leadership  and which lasted from June 1962 to December 1963  The second coalition, which lasted until  (with the CKMP and YTP), ended when the coalition partners decided to withdraw (significantly) while he was in the U.S. for President Kennedy's funeral.  

The third İnönü Government (the government he formed with the support of independents) did not even have  a  majority. It was in office with a relative (plurality) majority. In fact, İnönü had no intention of forming a new government at the beginning of 1964. However, the outbreak of the Cyprus events and the Bloody Christmas incidents caused the deterioration of Turkish-Greek relations, which had been very positive since the 1930s.  continued to be. 

It was clear that in such a tense environment, Turkey could not conduct a foreign policy without İnönü, the chief negotiator of Lausanne, Atatürk's prime minister, and the 'Second Man.' For this reason, all political parties,  despite being against him, wanted to see him at the forefront in the Turkey of 1964.  The letter from U.S. President Johnson  left İnönü with no options as relations became strained.  The parties opposing the CHP  were both opposing İnönü and, in such  an environment, wanted him to remain at the forefront, while avoiding any attempt to take responsibility. 

THE EMERGENCE OF THE SÜLEYMAN DEMİREL OPTION

Of the three prime ministers with whom President Gürsel worked (İnönü, Ürgüplü, Demirel), the one who remained in office the longest  was İnönü. Within 3.5 years, İnönü served two  After suppressing the coup attempt, he faced the Johnson letter and the Cyprus issue, and struggled to deal with complex matters such as the amnesty for former Democrats and the restoration of their political rights. 

In the days when the Johnson Letter broke in the press, Ragıp Gümüşpala died suddenly at the Lido facilities in Ortaköy, Istanbul. Following Gümüşpala's   death,   at the Extraordinary Party Congress that convened, it was not Bilgiç, the leader of the radical wing, but  civil engineer Süleyman Demirel who was elected party chairman by a large majority—likely with the support of the US—which was a strong indicator of his candidacy for Prime Minister in 1965. 

Prime Minister İnönü, who was reluctantly continuing his third government, resigned after the 1965 budget was rejected with 225 votes.  In November 1961, the option of forming a government with parties other than the CHP, which was impossible under the conditions of that day,  was realized under the leadership of Suat Hayri Ürgüplü, who was a Senator from Kayseri on the AP list.  took place.

Demirel was a high-ranking bureaucrat favored by the ruling power during the Democrat Party era. As long as his DP background was not highlighted, Demirel's candidacy for power did not pose a problem. And that is exactly what happened.  Gürsel was not concerned when the Justice Party won the 1965 elections. This was because he was certain that Demirel was aware of the red lines of the president and the military—and that he was a man who would resolve  issues calmly. 

Gürsel had finally  found what he was looking for. This was  Demirel. Demirel wanted to make both the army and the party base forget about May 27. As would be seen in the future, unlike some extremist Justice Party members,  he would pursue a policy of "neutralization" by drawing closer to the military, and he would be successful in this until March 12. 

He was the heir to the Democrat Party, but it was clear that he had no intention of creating tension with the Turkish Armed Forces.  It was clear.  He took care to send a message of "no problem" both to Gürsel in Çankaya and to the army under the administration of Sunay, which had partially   reached a state of calm, as well as to the National Unity Group consisting of natural senators in the Senate.  In fact, the natural senators welcomed Demirel's premiership.   Ultimately, the ideology and Constitution of May 27 theoretically held hegemony, but political power had passed to the Justice Party, the successor to the Democrat Party. 

GÜRSEL'S HEALTH CONDITION AND THE VACANCY OF THE OFFICE 

Had his life permitted, Cemal Gürsel would have remained in office until 1968.  The parliament that would take office after the 1965 elections was once again going to elect one of its own members to Çankaya. Gürsel had serious health problems. His condition worsened starting from February 1966.  worsened.  He was taken  to the USA for treatment. He was in a coma when he was brought back.  As his condition continued to be irreversible, a report by a large medical board of 38  people   decided that the  “presidential office should be considered vacant.”  The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) elected  Cevdet Sunay to the office  of the presidency. 

AN EVALUATION OF CEMAL GÜRSEL'S PRESIDENCY 

The heavy ideological hegemony created by the AKP government presents history almost as a struggle  taking place  between coup plotters and democrats.  Islamism—despite having no connection to the Democrat Party in terms of its politics, ideology, and origins—seeks to derive legitimacy from the Menderes myth.  continues to benefit from it. According to this dominant view, May 27, 1960, was a coup carried out against a legitimate government. Cemal Gürsel is an early prototype of Kenan Evren. 

In other words, Turkey's  fourth President, Cemal Gürsel, is considered the "father of coup-making."  Today, under this ideological hegemony, even an attempt at an objective assessment of the role  Cemal Gürsel played in Turkish political history could mean risking a severe attack.

In my opinion, Gürsel is the founding President of the 1961 democracy. Starting from his position as  chairman of the National Unity Committee on May 27, 1960, while transitioning to the new constitutional order,  political  identity  has changed. After ascending to Çankaya, he became the president of the political order envisioned by the 1961 Constitution. 

In the new  regime period, which was based on the parliamentary separation of powers, Gürsel's greatest support  was the presence of İsmet İnönü. To this, one must add  Cevdet Sunay, who had proven his  loyalty to civilian authority.  The governments formed by İnönü until February 1965 tackled issues such as the Talat Aydemir uprisings, the Cyprus question, the Johnson Letter, and the amnesty for former Democrats, despite having a weak majority. In 1965, İnönü's  By the time he stepped down from the premiership, many balances had fallen into place. 

From then on, Gürsel did not create obstacles for the Justice Party's march to power. Here, the premiership of Suat Hayri Ürgüplü and the process leading to Demirel's  victory  in the 1965 elections and his rise to power  show a mutual attitude of moderation, which is significant. Ultimately, the 1965 elections  established a new balance in Turkish politics. This would be a new era where the Justice Party government under Demirel held power, and the CHP, which had been significantly worn down between 1961 and 1965, became the Main Opposition Party. 

Cemal Gürsel, compared to Evren,  emerged from a more conflict-ridden environment  despite becoming president by emerging  from the military, he did not act as one of the sides in politics, as Kenan Evren did from 1983 to 1987.  Cemal Gürsel was a pro-Western, secular republican figure who had red lines regarding both the left and the right.  Gürsel  and the May 27 coup, equating them with Kenan Evren and  the September 12 coup is in many respects  misleading. For this reason, Gürsel should be remembered in our political history as the founding President of the 1961 democracy rather than as the leader of a coup.