A structural-functional analysis of the Bülent Ulusu Government

First observations on September 12

September 12, 1980, fell on a Friday. I was a student at the university. Early that morning, the military wing of the National Security Council seized power under the name of the National Security Council.

The Council justified the coup with the “duty to protect and preserve the republic” found in the TSK (Turkish Armed Forces) Internal Service Law. A curfew was in effect. Council Chairman General Kenan Evren announced on our black-and-white televisions in the afternoon that “their goal was to put the derailed democracy back on track with sound foundations,” and pledged that after the restoration of the regime, they would return to democracy and a multi-party political life within a certain calendar. While my mother and father welcomed the coup with the thought that anarchy and terror would end, I interpreted the event as a fascist coup, even if I did not explicitly voice it. Those who lived through those days will remember how the process unfolded.

What I remember from the weekend following the coup is that the weather was sunny, like summer. I remember our citizens fishing at Arnavutköy Akıntı Burnu in this beautiful weather on TV. In the interviews, opinions stating that the army was even late in seizing power were dominant. The feeling clearly felt in the air was peace and security. It was not yet clear what was developing in the background of this peaceful environment.

As can be predicted, apart from the end of violence and personal safety, the ordinary citizen did not care about what might happen. Within a few days, the constitutional foundations of the new regime became clear. It was published in the Official Gazette. Instead of the dissolved parliament, the five-member NSC would perform the legislative duty, and a Council of Ministers to be approved by the Council would perform the executive duty. As my late professor Bülent Tanör mentioned in his article “Political History 1980-1995”, the Council paid attention to ceremony. Detailed regulations were made regarding state procedures and etiquette, down to the forms of address for the new administration. For example, it was officially announced that the Chief of General Staff of September 11 would now be addressed as “Mr. President of the State.” The members of the NSC, who had seized legislative power, took their oaths in the TBMM (Grand National Assembly of Turkey) ceremonial hall. Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren also donned the title of President of the State.

HOW DID BÜLENT ULUSU BECOME PRIME MINISTER?

There are signs that the September 12 administration initially thought with the logic of the March 12 interim regime. They were primarily thinking of forming a government that included ministers from the center-right AP (Justice Party) and the center-left CHP (Republican People's Party). They wanted to legitimize the administration this way. In other words, an AP-CHP government under the arbitration of the military. This strange idea showed how the generals perceived politics as of that date. Deposed Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel and main opposition party leader Bülent Ecevit had been placed under mandatory residence at the Hamzakoy TSK facilities. And this practice was announced to the public as being under the assurance of the Armed Forces.

Under these conditions, it was contrary to the logic of politics for the two main actors of politics to accept such an offer, which would mean the legitimization of the junta. However, it is understood from Kenan Evren's memoirs that they studied such an idea.

As for the prime ministry issue, the first formula the Council found was strange. The primary candidate was Prof. Dr. Turhan Feyzioğlu, the well-known representative of the style of Atatürkism that the soldiers loved so much.

Feyzioğlu had been able to win 3 seats with 1.9% of the vote in the 1977 elections. He was the chairman of a political party that our people did not favor much: the Republican Reliance Party (CGP). Despite this representation rate, it is understood that the name Professor Feyzioğlu was seriously considered—and that Feyzioğlu intended to accept it. It is Turgut Özal who ensured that the Feyzioğlu option was taken off the table.

Another name the NSC considered for the prime ministry would be Emin Paksüt. As an example of “right-wing Atatürkism,” Paksüt had been a member of the 1961 Constituent Assembly. He had served as a deputy from the CHP for three terms during the 1961 democracy era. After Ecevit was elected chairman, he joined Feyzioğlu's ranks with the indignation that “the CHP cannot be a left-wing party.”

Paksüt was a name that fit the NSC's expectations perfectly in terms of his way of thinking. However, although he had told Evren “I am at your command at any moment,” he expressed an excuse by saying that he was not in good enough health to handle the prime ministry. He asked to be excused. What was apparent was that the NSC was in search of an Atatürkist prime minister in the style of Nihat Erim or Ferit Melen. Just like in the days of March 12. However, the conditions were completely different. The parliament and government had been dissolved. Party leaders were—for now—under surveillance. The Atatürkist civilians liked by the soldiers were standing on the sidelines and did not want to take responsibility.

Meanwhile, NSC Chairman Kenan Evren could very well have assumed the head of government as well. Just as Cemal Gürsel Pasha did after May 27. This option was avoided. The idea of an executive apparatus outside the Council and responsible to it prevailed. When it was understood that none of the candidates they had thought of from the beginning could be brought to the prime ministry, the NSC called for an expanded Military High Advisory Board meeting. The delegation, consisting of Council members, army commanders, martial law commanders, and generals up to a certain rank, decided on the name of Admiral Bülent Ulusu, who had retired on August 30. President of the State Evren entrusted the prime ministry task to Ulusu. I have some records in my memory regarding the new government—which I smile at as I remember.

The scenes are as follows; Prime Minister Ulusu is reading the government program before the members of the legislative assembly (NSC), and Kenan Evren is sitting in the chair. I think the venue is the Senate of the Republic Hall. After Ulusu reads the program, the vote of confidence begins. Turkey's 44th government receives a vote of confidence unanimously. As if a vote of confidence were being held for a parliamentary government.

TURGUT ÖZAL'S PLACE IN THE SEPTEMBER 12 GOVERNMENT

When the September 12 operation was carried out, the Justice Party minority government was in office. The Prime Minister was Süleyman Demirel. Turgut Özal was the Undersecretary to the Prime Minister.

Özal had been authorized to take a series of decisions to save Turkish capitalism, which was facing a severe crisis. These decisions are known in our history as the January 24 Decisions. In the hours following the coup, Özal was invited by the NSC and asked to continue his duty.

This meant the following: The junta had overthrown the government but would continue to implement its policies exactly as they were. In short, the NSC had no objection to the economic policies of the government it had overthrown. This meant that they would be busy with other things.

At this point, Özal's identity needs some examination. As is known, September 12 justified itself on the basis of terrorist acts, extremist movements, and the danger of civil war. The term extremist movements did not only mean the Marxist left. Islamism and Pan-Turkism were also included in extremist movements. The ideology of the MHP and MSP was within the scope of extremist movements. As will be remembered, lawsuits were filed against these parties. Their leaders were tried while in custody for a long time.

On the weekend before September 12, a rally to save Jerusalem had been held in Konya by the MSP Organization. This was one of the early examples of countless rallies to save Jerusalem. In the eyes of the soldiers, this rally had turned into a complete reactionary demonstration. The rally was used for a long time in September 12 literature as one of the standard elements of condemnation of reactionism.

But interestingly, Turgut Özal had also been a candidate from this party in İzmir in 1977, but could not be elected. If he had been elected, he could have been among the defendants in the MSP case. Like his younger brother Korkut Özal. But on the morning of September 12, his profile as Demirel's man who understood the economy was decisive. He was closer to the Demirel identity than to Erbakan. He had been close to him since the mid-50s. He had received an economics education in the USA with a scholarship.

When Demirel became prime minister in 1965, he had brought him to the head of the State Planning Organization. When he was dismissed from the SPO on March 12, he worked at the World Bank for a long time. He served as a consultant for Turkey. Upon his return, he took on managerial roles in large capital organizations. He worked as a manager in the Metal Goods Industrialists' Union (MESS). Although Özal's closeness to the Naqshbandi order was contrary to the NSC, his being someone who knew capitalist political economy well made him an indispensable actor.

For these reasons, Özal had enough power to veto Feyzioğlu against the “new statesmen.” Even when he had not yet been brought to any official duty. As a result, the 44th Government, established under the chairmanship of Ulusu on September 21, 1980, would remain in office until it handed over the prime ministry to Turgut Özal on December 13, 1983.

The first features that stand out in the government are that the ministers can be categorized in a few groups. In the first group, there were retired generals close to the NSC administration. The ministries they were appointed to were those related to security policies. For example, the Ministry of the Interior. General Selahattin Çetiner served as Minister of the Interior until the end of the period. This preference is important. The soldiers did not leave the responsibility for internal security to anyone else.

The people brought to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defense were also chosen from among diplomats respected by the NSC.

İlter Türkmen, who was brought to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was a respected diplomat with experience in relations with the West throughout his professional career. Türkmen stood out as a very competent name in terms of US-NATO-Europe relations. He remained in the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs until the end of the September 12 regime. He also had another credit with the NSC. He was the son of Behçet Türkmen (staff colonel), who founded the Intelligence Organization (MAH/MIT) in the early republican period.

Türkmen had held diplomatic posts in Washington and Moscow and had served as a permanent representative to the United Nations. Türkmen was serving as the secretary-general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In other words, the September 12 administration brought the highest bureaucrat of the Turkish foreign service to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The same can be said for Ümit Haluk Bayülken, who was brought to the Ministry of Defense. One of the most experienced diplomats of the foreign service was brought to the Ministry of Defense. Bayülken had served as Ambassador to London and permanent delegate to the United Nations; he had served as Minister of Foreign Affairs during the March 12 interim regime period (in the Erim, Melen, and Talu cabinets). With this appointment, a diplomat with high credit in the West was brought to the Ministry of Defense.

In the 1983 elections, he was nominated as an independent candidate (XVII. term) from the Nationalist Democracy Party, which was favored by Evren, and was elected as a deputy. In the next term, he would be nominated as an Istanbul deputy candidate from Demirel's DYP.

The NSC administration secured Turkey's place within the alliance system by appointing Türkmen and Bayülken to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense. The power had changed, but the state policy had not.

In the Bülent Ulusu cabinet, two people stand out in terms of labor-capital relations. The preferences are interesting, to be honest. While Sadık Şide, Secretary General of Türk-İş, was brought to the Ministry of Social Security, the appointment made to the Ministry of Labor was Professor Turhan Esener. A very important point to remember here is that September 12 had closed all labor confederations. There was a wide wave of arrests of unionists. There is no doubt that the biggest target was the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DİSK).

Hak-İş, close to the MSP, and MİSK, close to the MHP, did not suffer as much persecution when compared to DİSK executives. They were scolded a bit by the military regime. They were reproached. DİSK, on the other hand, was treated as the “red enemy.” As for Türk-İş, it was the only labor confederation that was not closed. It was seen as the labor confederation where yellow unionists had come together since 1952. It had been established during the Democrat Party era under the guidance of American unionists. The NSC administration made a small gesture to the working class by bringing Sadık Şide to the Ministry of Social Security.

In contrast, Professor of Labor Law Turhan Esener, who is well known by employer circles, was appointed to the Ministry of Labor. These two preferences are good evidence of which forces September 12 stood by in labor-capital relations.

The appointments made to the two technical ministries in the government are of a nature that explains the class basis of September 12 without leaving any room for doubt. For example, the Ministry of Energy. Serbülent Bingöl was first brought to the ministry. Bingöl had held the same position during the March 12 interim regime period (Nihat Erim government). Fahir İlkel was brought to the ministry on December 23, 1981. İlkel was a senior executive at Koç Holding. After graduating from the engineering department of Robert College, he had received postgraduate education in the USA. Before being brought to the ministry, he was a member of the executive committee of Koç Holding.

The appointment of Mehmet Turgut to the Ministry of Industry is also meaningful. Turgut was an engineer of ITU origin. He was a Justice Party deputy from 1961 to 1980. He was the minister of industry and trade in the Demirel governments established after 1965. He was brought to the post of minister of industry in the Bülent Ulusu government.

In 1981, the Consultative Assembly was established. The National Security Council brought Mehmet Turgut directly to the membership of the Consultative Assembly from its own quota. This choice is meaningful. One of the strongest representatives of the Justice Party was brought to the post of Minister of Industry by the September 12 administration and was subsequently elected as a member of the Consultative Assembly. It is possible to interpret this preference as follows: While the Council administration kept its distance from the Justice Party leadership, it appointed one of its own staff to a very important ministry and subsequently brought him to the membership of the Consultative Assembly, which would draft the new constitution.

To understand the economic policy of the September 12 regime, one must look carefully at the management of economy and finance. First of all, the appointment of Turgut Özal as the deputy prime minister responsible for the economy is extremely meaningful. From this, it is understood that Özal was seen as the main actor who would pull Turkey out of the economic crisis it had fallen into. Although Özal had some characteristics that were contrary to the NSC administration, they were probably thinking, “we are at the helm of the ship anyway.” However, the truth was exactly the opposite. There was an alliance of ruling classes at the helm of the ship. They were the ones who were actually benefiting the most from the NSC.

As a result, Özal remained in office until the “Bankers' Crisis.” He left the government close to the referendum and cut his ties with the interim regime. The message he gave was, “I did my best for my country. I could not agree with the Council, I am leaving.” The timing was masterful. He went to the USA to make preparations to fill the void that would emerge in politics. However, for two years, he had implemented a “class policy” that was impossible to implement with any option other than a military dictatorship, and had fulfilled his historical duty.

The system Özal implemented was actually very simple. To remove all protection areas in the economy, to end the import substitution model. To reduce the share of labor in the national income as much as possible, to cut spending. To increase savings with a high-interest policy, and to transfer the deposits collected in banks to the capital class as credit as a lifeblood. This was how the model called neoliberalism was implemented. Reagan in the USA and Thatcher in England were the representatives of these policies.

There was no innovation unique to Özal in the model. The model had been proposed and implemented as a way to make countries that had remained relatively independent, like Turkey, dependent on the central countries of international capital. The event that Özal called leaping through the ages and liquidating the status quo consisted of nothing more than this.

After taking all the reins as prime minister in 1983, he privatized all areas such as education and health with more radical policies. He increasingly narrowed public spaces. The policies implemented by Çiller in 1994 and by Kemal Derviş in 2001 were actually the same. Whenever capitalism entered a crisis periodically, the bill was passed on to labor.

Another important ministry was, of course, the Ministry of Finance. Kaya Erdem was a very meaningful choice. After the interim regime, he was always elected as a deputy from ANAP from the XVII. term to the XX. term. He served as the speaker of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey between 1989-91. Kaya Erdem, like Özal, after leaving the ministry in July 1982, the person brought to the head of Finance is also meaningful: Adnan Başer Kafaoğlu. Kafaoğlu had served as the National Unity Committee Representative of the Constituent Assembly (January 6, 1961 - October 15, 1961) and was appointed as the General Director of Revenues of the Ministry of Finance in 1966. He had chaired the Turkish Negotiation Delegation in the GATT Trade negotiations (1974-1978) in 1972. In 1978, he was elected as a Quota Senator by President Korutürk. On September 12, 1980, he was appointed as the Economic and Financial Advisor to the Presidency. While in this position, upon the resignation of Kaya Erdem, he became the Minister of Finance in July 1982. Adnan Başer Kafaoğlu had participated in the Constitution “brainstorming meeting” organized by the Tercüman newspaper in Kilyos in the summer of 1980, together with Coşkun Kırca and Prof. Aldıkaçtı, and had stated that economic stability was only possible with stability in administration. A few months later, stability was achieved. The drafting of the constitution would not be delayed much either.

If one needs to take a brief look at the other ministers in the Ulusu cabinet, an interesting profile is Mehmet Özgüneş, a former member of the National Unity Committee and a natural senator. Özgüneş was appointed as a state minister—20 years later. Another name that the May 27ers made a minister, Şahap Kocatopçu, also became a minister during the September 12 period. Kocatopçu was appointed as Minister of Industry in the governments established under the chairmanship of Cemal Gürsel and in the Ulusu cabinet.

It would be useful to examine his biography to understand what Kocatopçu represented during both interim regime periods. Kocatopçu had returned in the 50s after receiving a doctorate in ceramic engineering from MIT (USA). He had worked as a manager in the public and private sectors since the Democrat Party era. He was a representative portrait that the Turkish bourgeoisie trusted extremely, having served as the President of Turkish Cement, Şişecam, the Turkish-French Chamber of Commerce, the Istanbul Chamber of Industry, the Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations, TÜSİAD, and the Marmara Group. Şahap Kocatopçu had served as the Minister of Industry and Trade before Mehmet Turgut in the Ulusu government.

Other ministers who should be mentioned are in the category of managerial elites. For example, prominent names such as Zeyyat Baykara, İlhan Öztrak, Ali Bozer, Cafer Tayyar Sadıklar, İlhan Evliyaoğlu, and Cihat Baban took part in the Ulusu cabinet. It is noteworthy that Ali Bozer joined the founding staff of the MDP after serving as the Minister of Customs and Monopolies in the September 12 Government. After the dissolution of the MDP, Bozer moved to ANAP. He served as Minister of Foreign Affairs. It is known that Turkey's application for full membership in the European Union was made by Bozer.

GENERAL EVALUATION REGARDING THE ULUSU GOVERNMENT

The Bülent Ulusu government was established at a time when Turkey was in a crisis in every sense. This government is an attempt to emerge from a conjuncture where social and political division and economic bottlenecks were experienced with an authoritarian regime.

In later years, although the bill for September 12 was laid at the feet of the cadres who carried out the coup, the segment that emerged most profitably from the September 12 balance sheet is Turkey's ruling classes. The NSC administration had enacted all political and economic measures that were impossible to carry out under open regime conditions for the benefit of the “ruling classes.”

A very important point that needs to be emphasized is the fact that many of the political actors after 1983 emerged from within the September 12 regime. Starting with Turgut Özal. Özal came to power in 1983 together with the team that held important ministries during the closed regime period. The founding cadres of ANAP are figures who actively served in the September 12 regime. For example, Kaya Erdem.

A similar diagnosis is also valid for the Nationalist Democracy Party (MDP). The NSC had seen the MDP as suitable for power and had left Özal in reserve. It should not be forgotten that there were many figures in the founding staff of the MDP who had served as members of the Consultative Assembly from the NSC quota. Starting with Bülent Ulusu and Minister of Defense Haluk Bayülgen, there were ministers and Consultative Assembly members elected from the MDP list.

The extraordinary performance drop of MDP chairman Retired General Turgut Sunal was easily defeated by Özal's cunning. The party dissolved until the 1987 elections. Its cadres were distributed between the DYP and ANAP. The party disappeared into history.

As a result, the representatives of Turkey's ruling classes, some coming from the government and some from the consultative assembly, established their own parties with the transition to multi-party political life.

The faction representing authority (MDP) in the de facto coalition established under the military regime was pushed back. ANAP came to power under the guise of free enterprise-liberalism. The party established by the wing of the September 12 government representing authority was disappointed in the first free election. It was liquidated within a short time.

ANAP led a more enthusiastic capitalism by completing the resource and energy charge for Turkish capitalism, which had fallen into trouble before 1980. Özal had provided this accumulation during the NSC regime period. He was not an antagonist of that regime, but an ally. But only up to a point.

One final point, it is extremely meaningful that almost none of the cadres of September 12 took part in the Populist Party, the main opposition party that received 30% of the vote in the 1983 elections. September 12 created the MDP and ANAP. This is enough to define the interim regime government as an alliance of the ruling classes against the left.