Elections where the CHP was the leading party and what followed

The enthusiastic mood that has prevailed in the CHP since the recent elections reminded me of the 1973 and 1977 elections. The CHP base, its organization, and its leadership were extremely eager to take power and move into the position of government. After long years of opposition.

As will be remembered, the CHP also emerged as the leading party in the 1961 elections. The party organization hoped to come to power alone in these elections. It did not receive a result in line with its expectations. The real reason the CHP finished the election in first place was that the DP base was split between the Justice Party and the New Turkey Party. The CHP's vote, which finished the election in the lead, was 36.7%. In reality, with this vote share, the party had fallen behind the 42% it received in 1957. The Justice Party followed it with a vote share of 34.8%. Both parties had received 3.7 and 3.5 million votes, respectively. The CHP's first-place finish in 1961 occurred under these conditions.

GOVERNMENTS FORMED BY THE CHP BETWEEN 1961-1965

It would be accurate to say that from the 1st Coalition formed by the CHP to the 3rd Coalition it formed with independents, it remained in government at the expense of losing its own strength and dynamism. İsmet Paşa, with the coalition governments he formed, managed to consolidate the parties and institutions of the new democracy by struggling with many national and international problems between interventionist and revanchist tendencies. He prevented the regime from stumbling. But this process would cause the CHP to be the party that was worn down the most. As can be predicted, İnönü's efforts to keep the regime standing did not mean much to the voters. After the order was stabilized by İnönü, the Justice Party, chaired by Demirel, filled the void left by the DP starting from 1965. It came to the position of government.

Until the 1972 congress where Ecevit was elected chairman, the CHP experienced its most stagnant period in terms of representation and its most unsuccessful period in terms of election results. Despite İsmet Paşa's historical personality, the 1965 and 1969 elections were elections where the CHP remained far behind the ruling party.

ECEVİT'S ELECTION SUCCESSES AND UNSUCCESSFUL GOVERNMENTS

The dynamism for the CHP to come to power occurred during the March 12 interim regime period. The "Left of Center" debate that had been ongoing in the party since 1968 was resolved in favor of the Ecevitists. Bülent Ecevit was elected chairman at the Congress. The left-of-center discourse and Ecevit's "Karaoğlan charisma" made the party the leading party in 1973 and 1977.

There is a point here that should not be overlooked. Before the March 12 interim regime, the tendencies on the right that were represented within the DP in the 50s formed their own parties. Ferruh Bozbeyli's Democratic Party and Erbakan's National Salvation Party. These parties became the parties of the provincial trade and small industrial bourgeoisie; this development split the right-wing voter base that had gathered in the DP and AP in the past. In this respect, the CHP's first-place finish in 1973 is similar to the one in 1961. Votes on the right were divided between the AP, DP, and MSP. In these elections, against the 33.3% vote that placed the CHP in first place, Demirel's Justice Party was the second party right behind it with 30% of the vote. It was followed by the Democratic Party with 11% and the National Salvation Party with 11% with small differences.

This corresponded to the Justice Party's 52% vote in 1965 in total. As can be seen, the CHP's success was a relative success that emerged depending on the political conjuncture.

It is true. Ecevit's populist discourse after the congress had created excitement in society. Compared to 1969, the 6% increase in votes showed this. The other truth was this: 67% of society consisted of right-wing parties positioned against the CHP.

The CHP achieved a similar success in 1977: 42%. The Justice Party was again in second place: 36%. They were followed by the MSP in third place with 8.5% and the MHP in fourth place with 6.5%. A similar picture emerged in this election. It was again the division on the right that provided the first place to the CHP. When we look at the total, 58% of Turkish voters had voted for parties against the CHP.

The CHP's third chairman, Bülent Ecevit, formed three governments between 1974-1979, one of which was a minority government that could not receive a vote of confidence. The first was after the 1973 elections with the MSP, and the others were after the 1977 elections. I must state immediately—as someone who has voted for him many times—that all the governments Ecevit formed had to withdraw from power in complete failure.

I will not attempt to make long analyses here on the reasons for this. My readers who wish can take a look at my books and articles. However, I would like to draw attention to the fact that Ecevit's governments had weak representation power in parliament and were coalition governments that included right-wing parties.

Let us remember: Ecevit's announcement from the headquarters balcony after the 1977 elections—before the results were finalized—that they had come to power alone was a complete fiasco. The CHP had emerged from the elections as the leading party. But it had not won the 226 seats that would provide power alone, remaining at 213. The leader of the party had disappointed millions of CHP members waiting on the threshold of power. He had declared it as if he had won the election. This was a huge mistake. Following this, having President Korutürk approve a government that it was clear would not receive a vote of confidence, only to be brought down by a vote of no confidence, would be an even more egregious political fiasco.

At the beginning of 1978, 11 deputies who left the AP, along with the CGP and DP, managed to form one of the largest governments in the history of the republic in terms of the number of cabinet members, and one of the weakest in terms of parliamentary support.

Immediately after the government was formed, the Istanbul University massacre took place on March 16, 1978. The process continued with political murders and the Kahramanmaraş and Çorum events. As a result of a series of violent acts in which the counter-guerrilla was likely involved, the country became ungovernable. After 22 months, in the 1979 by-elections, the CHP could only receive half the votes of the Justice Party. Prime Minister Ecevit resigned by suggesting that Demirel form a minority government with CHP support. Demirel formed a minority government; but not with the support of the CHP. With the support of Erbakan and Türkeş.

In summary, the CHP became the leading party in 1973 and 1977. It also formed governments until September 12. These were weakly formed governments. Ecevit lost the power to govern in the face of heavy problems. He either resigned or was brought down by a vote of no confidence. The fate of the coalition government that Ecevit formed as DSP chairman—after 1999—was the same.

MARCH 31, 2024 LOCAL ELECTIONS AND THEIR RESULTS

Despite the Covid pandemic, environmental disasters caused by AKP policies, economic depression, inflation reaching unbearable levels, the skyrocketing of foreign currency and gold prices, the partisan use of public resources to an extent never seen in history, the ignoring of the constitution, the non-implementation of judicial decisions, and the de facto abolition of the basic qualities of the republic, the government has maintained its hold. In a real democracy, a government that appeared before the voters with such a balance sheet would have been dismissed by the general vote. That did not happen. It is necessary to dwell on this with importance.

The most recent general local elections brought results worth talking about not only for the CHP but for general Turkish politics. Let us first address the results:

The leading party was the CHP with 37.7% (17.3 m), and the AKP was in second place with 35.4% (16.3 m). An interesting development is that the New Welfare Party emerged from the elections as the third party: 6.1% (2.8 m). The DEM was in fourth place with 5.7% (2.6 m), the MHP was in fifth place with 4.9% (2.2 m), and the IYIP was at the very end with 3.7% (1.7 m). This was the distribution of votes in the March 31, 2024 general local elections.

If one were to comment on these results, there is a 2% vote difference between the first and second parties of the elections, the CHP and the AKP. Despite all the factors mentioned above, the CHP's success is—in my opinion—a relative success. What is important is the mobility on the right. Turkey's third party is now the New Welfare Party. The vote difference between the CHP and the AKP is 1 million votes. But the success of the YRP, which appeals to the conservative Sunni segment and claims to continue the ancient National View, is significant. In my opinion, this is one of the main determinants of the election result. For the YRP leadership, organization, and base, the AKP is a political party founded with betrayal to the national view movement and its historical leader, and brought to power on a ground of implicit compromise with capitalism and Zionism.

The YRP's alliance with the AKP in the presidential and parliamentary general elections was based on tactical reasons. The ultimate goal of the party chairman, Dr. Erbakan, is to unseat Erdoğan by splitting the AKP.

As for the CHP, the result it received is, of course, a success, considering the party's election results of the last 20 years. When the result obtained is examined a little, I am of the opinion that the real success of the party organization can be measured by evaluating the Istanbul and Ankara results separately. For this reason: The result obtained in these two metropolitan cities is related to the candidates' own political identities/charismas. The perception created by Ekrem İmamoğlu and Mansur Yavaş in the eyes of the public is that they are successful mayors despite all the unlawful and unethical obstacles of the government.

The public finds these two mayors successful and promising for the future of the country, despite the heavy administrative and financial siege of the central administration (political power). This is important. The voter responded to the government's attitude with a protest vote.

For this reason, the 4.4 million votes İmamoğlu received in Istanbul with 51% and the 2 million votes Mansur Yavaş received in Ankara with 60% are the product of the mayors' own efforts and identities. The 6.4 million voter will gathered behind the İmamoğlu and Yavaş duo cannot be explained by the performance of the CHP organization.

ANALYSES

Before September 12, CHP governments eroded rapidly and faced dramatic vote losses in the first elections.

I think this is a matter that needs to be dwelt upon and studied. In my opinion, the voter does not turn to the CHP by establishing real political ties. They show their dissatisfaction with the government by voting for the CHP. The CHP functions as a kind of catalyst.

This behavior has nothing to do with a reaction to fundamental rights and freedoms, long detentions, the judiciary becoming a branch of the administration, or the principle of secularism being ignored. This type of voter is closer to the right than the left. This is the reason for the CHP's drop from 42% to 29% in 1979, and Ecevit's DSP's drop from 22% to 1.2%.

If we want to concretize it in items;

1. After the 1961 constitution came into effect, the CHP emerged as the leading party in the elections three times: in the 1961 elections under the chairmanship of İsmet İnönü, and in 1973 and 1977 under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit. The same result was repeated in the 1973 and 1977 local government elections.

2. The vote share the CHP received always remained below the threshold for single-party power. It formed governments. However, the coalition partners were Turkey's small right-wing parties. These parties agreed to enter the government under CHP leadership due to the different class/political expectations of their own bases.

3. CHP governments could not manage the country well, could not find solutions to problems, and were unsuccessful.

4. The CHP could barely come to power with a marginal majority; it could not hold its own against Turkey's hegemonic powers. Ecevit could not correctly diagnose the real Turkey. Ecevit's Populism had an aspect that sounded nice in discourse but did not have its feet on the ground in reality.

5. The reason why the voter never gave the CHP a majority to form a government alone stems from Turkey's social, political, and class structure.

There must be conclusions to be drawn from this balance sheet regarding yesterday, today, and the near future.

ABOUT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The AKP government did not resemble other right-wing party governments. Because of the party's ideological, political, and class nature. The CHP's position against the AKP was also different from the Democratic Party, the Justice Party, and the Motherland Party. It is seen that the social ground and fortification that the government has created in 20 years are different, deeper, and stronger than other right-wing governments.

For this reason, the national will (general vote) that brought Ecevit down in 1979 and 2002 did not undergo a radical change, even though the government had dragged the country into an economic quagmire worse than the 2001 conditions. The right-wing voter warned the government by placing it in second place.

All of the state's operational apparatuses are in the hands of the government. The AKP intends to launch the 2024 version of the strategy that allowed it to overcome the traumas it experienced in 2015 and 2019. The government's goal is to create a new "exploratory" agenda. For this reason, the CHP—also considering its past—must be more careful in the steps it will take.