Fragile ceasefire

The ceasefire between the US and Iran does not mean that the war has ended completely; it is rather considered a step toward a temporary de-escalation of tension. It can be said that the short-term fifteen-day ceasefire is closely related to the complexities in the internal political balances of both countries and the reluctance of their publics to continue the war. In this context, it is understood that the parties aim to gain time both to appease their domestic audiences and to recover militarily and strategically. Therefore, whether the war will end completely remains uncertain. Developments in the Persian Gulf and Israel's potential military moves are among the main factors increasing this uncertainty.

At this point, although there are expectations that the ceasefire is a glimmer of hope for the end of the war, current developments show that the temporary cessation of hostilities does not mean the war is over. Because the strategic goals of the actors involved in the conflict have not yet been fully realized. This situation strengthens the possibility of new conflicts emerging after the ceasefire.

Although the ceasefire has been generally welcomed by the international community, the parties are presenting every stage of the process as a "victory" in their own favor. For the US, the opening of the Strait of Hormuz and the damage inflicted on Iran's nuclear infrastructure stand out as significant gains. Israel claims that the elements posing a threat to it have been weakened. Iran, on the other hand, presents the fact that it has ensured the continuity of the regime despite intense military and political pressure as a success. In this context, it is politically understandable for the parties to develop victory rhetoric for their own publics. However, it is also possible to make different assessments regarding the balance of power and the results. Nevertheless, it can still be said that Iran has achieved a victory. 

Dynamics in domestic politics also played a decisive role in the ceasefire decision. US President Donald Trump had stood out during the presidential election process with his promises of cheaper gasoline, a strong dollar, a lower budget deficit, less public spending, and not getting involved in wars. However, developments during the war process led to a significant reversal of these promises, and this situation brought serious pressure in domestic politics. The increasing economic cost of the war and the strengthening of anti-war tendencies in the American public may have forced the administration to take steps to temporarily lower the tension. In this context, the ceasefire can be evaluated as the result of a search for balance stemming not only from foreign policy but also from domestic policy.

However, assessments that the ceasefire could be a strategic "de-escalation" move are also noteworthy. In such a scenario, the possibility of a new military intervention against Iran after a temporary calm may come to the agenda. The US military presence in the region and the forces it has deployed show that such a possibility should not be completely ignored. In this framework, potential developments over strategic points, primarily Kharg Island, as well as Abu Musa, and the Greater and Lesser Tunb Islands, are of a nature that could affect the course of the power struggle in the region.

Nevertheless, the current picture reveals that the conflict is not limited only to Iran, but is part of a broader regional and even global power struggle. In this context, the process in question can be evaluated as a struggle with the potential to shape the future of the international order. A structure in which Israel's security architecture is at the center in the Middle East and some regional states are oriented toward ensuring their security through the relationships they have established with the US and Israel is becoming increasingly evident. Indeed, it is observed that alliances established with external actors are coming to the fore in the security policies of Gulf countries instead of regional cooperation.

In light of these developments, it would be appropriate to look back at the 1982 Yinon Plan. The plan in question saw the way to ensure Israel's security in the fragmentation of Arab states in the region on an ethnic and sectarian basis. Therefore, the developments experienced today strengthen the claims that the geopolitical vision of the Yinon Plan, which divides the region into pieces, is still effective. This situation moves the question of "which states are next" to the center of regional discussions. 

On the other hand, the US administration's occasional critical rhetoric toward international institutions such as NATO and the United Nations points to the possibility that the current global security architecture could transform. This situation brings up new possibilities for rupture and restructuring not only for the Western alliance system but also for regional organizations such as the Arab League.

While the ceasefire process offers a short-term "breathing space" for the region and the world, it has also paved the way for diplomatic initiatives. In this context, the talks planned to be initiated under the leadership of Pakistan are of critical importance. However, if these talks fail, there is a possibility that the conflicts could take on a much broader and more dangerous dimension. The demands of the parties, which were brought to the agenda before the war but on which no consensus could be reached, indicate how difficult the negotiations will be.

Furthermore, the fact that the US clearly states that it often prioritizes its own national interests raises question marks about the permanence of the negotiations. This situation strengthens the assessments that the talks may only be a tactical process and could be used as a tool of strategic pressure rather than a lasting settlement. In this framework, the possibility that the US may resort to the military option again to force Iran to accept its terms should not be ignored.

Ultimately, deep disagreements between the parties, primarily Iran's nuclear program, lie at the root of the current conflict process. However, despite the conflicts that have lasted for more than a month, these problems have deepened rather than being solved. Moreover, new topics such as the status of the Strait of Hormuz, war reparations, the role of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the future of the US military presence in the region have been added to the agenda. For this reason, it does not seem likely that a comprehensive settlement will be reached and a binding peace mechanism will be established between the US and Iran in the short term.

In the current situation, the only point on which the parties agree is that the cost of continuing the war is high and that there is a need to take a break from the conflicts, even if temporarily. For this reason, hostilities have been suspended for now and mediation initiatives have been launched. However, whether this process will evolve into a lasting peace or a new phase of conflict will be shaped depending on the steps to be taken in the coming period.

Nevertheless, the revenge rhetoric that emerged with the end of the 40-day mourning period for Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in Iran, along with the insistence of the US and Israel on achieving their goals, point to the possibility that the ceasefire may be short-lived and that lasting peace may be delayed.