Iran's nuclear deterrence

While Iran's official discourse has long rejected the production of nuclear weapons, an article published in June 2026 by the Fars News Agency — known for its close ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps — under the headline "There is no choice but to build an atomic bomb" openly argued that Iran must acquire nuclear deterrence. Although the article does not reflect official state policy, it is regarded as a significant turning point in that pro-nuclear weapons discourse within security circles close to the regime has been brought into the public domain this openly for the first time. Amid these debates, on 2 July, Israel's opposition also accused Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu of exploiting Iran's nuclear capacity to generate public anxiety.

On one side, pro-nuclear weapons discourse gaining strength in Iran, and on the other, the nuclear threat becoming a subject of domestic politics in Israel, have brought a fundamental question — debated for many years — back onto the agenda:  Can Iran actually build a nuclear weapon? The answer to this question lies not only in Iran's uranium enrichment capacity but also, it can be argued, in the country's historical experiences, security concerns, and foreign policy outlook.

Iran's nuclear programme is built on three core elements: ideological approach, the concept of national sovereignty, and security concerns. Having been a theatre of great-power competition throughout history due to its geostrategic position, Iran experienced a serious crisis of trust with the West — particularly after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. In this process, nuclear technology became a symbol of independence, national sovereignty, and the regime's resilience, going well beyond energy production.

How Did Iran's Nuclear Programme Begin?

Iran's introduction to nuclear technology dates back to the mid-1950s. During the Cold War, concerns about the spread of communism and the possibility of Iran falling back under Soviet control led the United States to provide Iran with support for nuclear technology; Germany and France later joined this process as well.

In the 1970s, under the Shah, nuclear power plant projects were launched and Iran aimed to harness nuclear energy for electricity generation. At the time, Iran was regarded as one of the United States' most important strategic allies. Accordingly, Iran's nuclear activities were supported by the international community and were not viewed as any kind of security threat.

However, the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution changed this course entirely. Ayatollah Khomeini viewed the projects from the Shah's era as an extension of Western influence and halted many nuclear activities. Nevertheless, this approach proved short-lived; changing security conditions soon caused Iran to turn back towards its nuclear programme.

The Iran–Iraq War Became a Turning Point

Iraq's attacks on Iran's military assets and cities, the support Western countries provided to the Baghdad government, and the military difficulties Iran faced throughout the war all demonstrated how great a risk dependence on external actors posed to national security.

During the same period, Israel's strike on Iraq's nuclear reactor also served as an important lesson for Iran. These developments laid the groundwork for a strong deterrence doctrine within Iran's leadership and led nuclear technology to be seen not merely as a means of energy production but also as an element of national security.

After the war, the religious authorities' view of nuclear technology also shifted. The majority of ayatollahs supported nuclear energy on the condition that it was intended to protect Muslims and would not be used for offensive purposes. However, drawing lessons from the Shah's era, the regime declined to accept direct assistance in order to avoid dependence on the West, instead developing nuclear cooperation with countries such as China, Pakistan, and Russia.

Even as the official discourse continued to reject nuclear weapons, claims that Ayatollah Khomeini sent a letter to senior officials in the final stages of the Iran–Iraq War stating that advanced defence technologies might be needed under extraordinary circumstances to win the war are noteworthy in terms of illustrating the extent to which security concerns had grown.

Regional Security Balances

Shaped by this historical process, Iran's nuclear programme — when viewed in the present day — has evolved from being merely a matter between Iran and the West into a regional security issue that directly affects the balance of power in the Middle East.

It is widely believed that an Iran with high nuclear energy capacity would pursue a more aggressive political and military policy and provide greater support to proxy organisations. From a sectarian perspective, concerns are also raised that a nuclear-armed Iran could expand Shia influence in the region, which could in turn pose an existential threat to some Sunni governments.

The country that most forcefully opposes Iran's nuclear activities is Israel. Having possessed nuclear weapons potential since the late 1960s, Israel holds the position of being the only country in the Middle East with nuclear weapons. For this reason, the possibility of Iran developing nuclear weapons is viewed by Israel as a direct existential threat. Indeed, Netanyahu's argument in a 2015 CNN interview — that "Iran aims to destroy Israel" and that "the nuclear deal offers Iran a free path to the bomb" — reflects this security outlook. Iran, for its part, regards Israel's nuclear capacity and the United States' military presence in the region as among the greatest threats to its own security.

Western countries, meanwhile, are concerned that if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other regional states might also move towards armament. Such a development could trigger a new nuclear arms race in the Middle East.

Can Iran Build a Nuclear Weapon?

From a technical standpoint, taking into account Iran's uranium enrichment capacity, missile technology, and trained human resources, numerous assessments suggest that it is a country that has come close to being able to produce a nuclear weapon. However, producing a nuclear weapon is not solely a matter of technical capacity. Such a decision also involves political will, international costs, and security calculations.

Conclusion

Iran's nuclear programme is a strategic state policy at the intersection of historical experience, security concerns, nationalism, and ideological approach.

At the point reached today, the real question to be debated is not whether Iran can produce a nuclear weapon, but whether it will decide that doing so is necessary for its own security. Because technical capacity and political decision are not the same thing.

Furthermore, given that nuclear-armed Pakistan is also considered one of the key actors in the negotiations being conducted between nuclear-armed the United States and Iran, approaches that focus solely on restricting Iran's nuclear activities invite criticism of double standards within the international system, owing to the presence of other nuclear powers in the region. 

It is therefore not surprising that, following the sanctions, military strikes, and mounting pressure to which Iran has been subjected over its uranium enrichment activities, voices advocating nuclear deterrence have become more visible in the Iranian press. 

That said, in the period ahead, any new crises with Israel, the policy pursued by the United States, regional security balances, and the course of international negotiations will continue to be the most important factors shaping Iran's nuclear programme. For this reason, Iran's nuclear programme will continue to be one of the most critical items on the international political agenda for many years to come.