Negotiations on the US–Iran line: A cost calculation, not a reconciliation

The negotiations planned between the US and Iran for February 6 in Muscat, the capital of Oman, represent a notable threshold for moving the long-standing tension onto a diplomatic footing. Although both sides have expressed openness to negotiations, developments on the ground show that the process remains fragile. Iran's planned military exercise in the Strait of Hormuz and the downing of an Iranian unmanned aerial vehicle near a US warship demonstrate that the tension persists. 

It appears that the US is constantly changing its policy regarding Iran. US President Donald Trump, who issued statements of support for protesters during the demonstrations in Iran, had brought up the possibility of military intervention and sent warships to the Gulf during that period. However, with the suppression of the protests and the relative calming of the situation, it is evident that the US has shifted its strategy. This indicates that the US has adopted an approach shaped by developments rather than a clear, long-term strategy in its policy toward Iran.

Nevertheless, the tension between the two countries has not yet turned into a direct and comprehensive military conflict. Harsh rhetoric and messages of deterrence have come to the fore. While the occasional mention of military options by the US and Israel increases tension, Iran prefers to keep diplomatic channels open. This preference can be explained by strategic calculations that the military and economic costs of a potential war would be high for Iran. In addition, the European Union's steps to include the Revolutionary Guards on its terror list in response to the loss of life during the protests have created psychological pressure on Iran and have been one of the factors driving Iran toward negotiations.

With the start of the negotiation process, the topics of discussion have also become clear. The US side is bringing up the limitation of Iran's nuclear activities, the removal of enriched uranium from the country, the restriction of missile range—particularly within the framework of Israeli security—Iran's relations with proxy forces in the region, and the Iranian administration's respect for its people. Iran, on the other hand, wants the negotiations to be conducted solely within the framework of the nuclear program. For Iran, accepting all of the US's conditions carries serious risks in terms of its perception of sovereignty and security. Therefore, while Iran signals a willingness to compromise on limiting its nuclear activities to defensive and peaceful purposes, it remains cautious on other issues.

From the US perspective, it has not completely ruled out the possibility of a symbolic attack to maintain its reputation for deterrence, which it could not achieve at the negotiating table. Furthermore, it is likely that the US will not abandon its activities aimed at regime change in Iran, will continue to support protesters, and will keep using diplomatic and economic elements to this end. However, it should not be overlooked that these possibilities could make the negotiation process even more complex.

The location of the negotiations has also been a subject of debate. It was decided at the last minute, at Iran's request, that the talks—originally planned to be held in Istanbul—would take place in Oman as a bilateral meeting. Although the US initially reacted to this change, it later accepted it. While some circles in Turkey have criticized this preference, it should not be forgotten that in such a sensitive process, the main issue is that the parties have agreed to sit at the table, rather than where the meeting is held. The change of venue does not necessarily mean that the negotiations will yield positive results.

Why Oman?

Oman is a country that has long stood out for its neutrality in regional and global crises and has made its role as a mediator an important element of its foreign policy. For Iran, Oman is an actor that is both trusted and has hosted diplomatic processes that have yielded results in the past. Indeed, a significant portion of the indirect talks conducted between the US and Iran in 2024–2025 took place in Muscat.

One of the primary reasons Iran insists on Muscat is its desire to remain free from pressures that could influence the negotiation process. Assessments suggest that while Turkey's initiatives toward regional peace are not being ignored, there is a preference to avoid turning the meetings in Istanbul into a broad-based regional summit, specifically to prevent the negotiation process from taking on a political dimension.

It had been announced that Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman, and Pakistan would also participate in the planned meeting in Istanbul. While the fact that these are Muslim-majority states created expectations that they might influence decisions in Iran's favor, their close relationships with the US have simultaneously created a contradiction. 

US Objectives

The US keeping its attack plans constantly on the agenda, citing either the meeting location or Iran's nuclear activities, creates a clear contradiction with the support it claims to provide to the Iranian people during protests. This approach is evolving into a pressure strategy that targets not only the Iranian administration but the Iranian people directly.

It is evident that the US has not abandoned the idea of an attack on Iran. The US approach toward Iran is not limited solely to the nuclear program. The US is also aiming to take precautions against the possibility of Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz, to strengthen its presence in the Gulf to protect its regional bases, and to extract more comprehensive concessions from Iran. The warships and military assets sent to the region can be evaluated as a message of deterrence within this framework. 

If negotiations fail to yield results, the US may find itself forced to consider the pressure from Israel for military intervention against an Iran perceived as weakened by protests and economic hardships. However, it is clear that a potential war with Iran would be extremely difficult and costly. Indeed, during the eight-year Iran-Iraq War between 1980 and 1988, Iran fought not only against Iraq but also against numerous powers supporting Iraq. Therefore, from the US perspective, an approach is emerging that suggests a weakened Iran with diminished central authority, limited regional influence, and internal struggles would be a more predictable actor for Israel's security and US regional interests than a fragmented Iran. Furthermore, the US goal of narrowing the space for Russia and China in the Middle East power struggle is directly linked to its Iran policy. 

On the other hand, Gulf countries are also aware of the devastating effects a potential regional war would have on both security and the economy. For this reason, they do not want a regional war to break out, stating that they will not open their airspace for military operations. It remains to be seen over time how much these countries, which perceive a potential war as a serious security and economic threat, will be able to resist allowing the use of their airspace or stopping the war in a moment of crisis. 

Conclusion 

This negotiation process that has begun between the US and Iran should be read more as an effort to reduce tension and limit costs rather than a search for a compromise where the parties abandon their fundamental goals. It is clear that in a possible military conflict, the US would find limited regional and global support, and that such a possibility, even if short-lived, would entail high costs. Therefore, the negotiations are focusing less on the question of "who will make concessions" and more on "to what extent the crisis can be kept under control" .