The struggle for religious leadership in Iran and the Kurdish strategy

The process of selecting a religious leader in Iran and the potential use of Kurdish groups in a possible ground operation are harbingers of new developments that will affect both domestic politics and regional power balances.

The New Leader and the Future of Iran

The future of Iran's political system and how its power structure will be altered remain uncertain. In particular, who will succeed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is being closely watched not only within Iran but by the entire world due to its regional and global implications. It is significant in terms of determining Iran's relations with the West, especially the US and Israel, as well as its nuclear activities.

One of the names most frequently mentioned in discussions regarding religious leadership is Mojtaba Khamenei. Due to his long absence from the public eye, various claims have emerged regarding whether he is still alive. However, other names are also being mentioned for the religious leadership. Potential candidates include Ayatollah Mohsen Araki, Ayatollah Hashem Hosseini Bushehri, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, Khomeini's grandson Hassan Khomeini, Sadeq Larijani, and Alireza Arafi.

In the Iranian political system, the selection of the religious leader is subject to specific constitutional rules. According to current regulations, a new leader cannot be elected until the funeral of the previous religious leader has taken place. During this process, a Leadership Council is formed to temporarily assume the duties of the religious leader. This council consists of President Masoud Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, and Assembly of Experts member Alireza Arafi.

The authority to elect the new religious leader is vested in the Assembly of Experts by the constitution. However, the state of war and political uncertainty in which Iran finds itself raise questions about when and under what conditions it can convene.

Despite this, it appears that the Iranian administration is sending messages that the religious leadership election will be held in order to create an environment of confidence among the public. Nevertheless, despite the strong institutional ties and influence over military institutions that Mojtaba Khamenei, who is mentioned among the candidates, has within the regime, there are significant obstacles to him succeeding his father.

According to the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih, the religious leader must possess specific religious and political qualifications. The hereditary transfer of this office from father to son is not a practice accepted in the Shia tradition in Iran. This situation is unique only to the 12 Imams. Indeed, during the era of Ruhollah Khomeini, the concept of leadership passing from father to son was rejected.

For this reason, political support alone is not sufficient for Mojtaba Khamenei to become the religious leader. His education is not sufficient to be a Velayat-e Faqih, nor is he an Ayatollah. Furthermore, requirements such as the approval of other high-ranking clerics must be met, and the endorsement of multiple high-ranking religious scholars is also important for leadership.

In this context, how Iranian society would react if Mojtaba Khamenei were to become the religious leader is another subject of debate. Among the significant reasons for the protests that have emerged in Iran in recent years are economic problems, allegations of corruption, and the high budget shares allocated to religious foundations. Some reports in international media outlets contain allegations that Mojtaba Khamenei owns properties in the UK and has moved millions of dollars to Europe. How these allegations are perceived by the public could be one of the factors that might affect the scale of social reaction in a possible leadership change.

Whether the newly elected religious leader will possess as strong a political and religious authority as previous leaders is also an important topic of discussion. Assessments are being made that Mojtaba Khamenei displayed more radical attitudes than his father while he was alive. This situation leads to the emergence of various scenarios regarding how Iran's domestic and foreign policy will be shaped during a possible leadership period.

The Revolutionary Guards, an important power center in Iranian politics, are one of the influential actors in the background in determining the successor to the religious leader. However, the killing of high-ranking commanders in US and Israeli attacks in recent years has led to a loss of power for the Revolutionary Guards and has made it controversial how influential they can be in the selection of the religious leader.

For this reason, the expectation that the new religious leader should have a profile that is not only ideologically aligned but also capable of reducing social tension, open to reforms, and conciliatory comes to the fore. Such a choice would be a development that could affect not only Iran's domestic political balances but also regional power balances.

Kurdish Strategy in the Shadow of War

Another dimension of the developments in Iran is the military and political activity in the western part of the country, where the Kurdish population is located. Due to geographical conditions, the US and Israel want to use the Kurds instead of direct military intervention in a possible ground operation against Iran. In this context, the targeting of certain military points in western Iran is noteworthy. The striking of border outposts in cities such as Tabriz, Urmia, and Kermanshah has brought these discussions to the agenda. It is observed that such attacks are in the most sensitive areas of western Iran. However, it can also be thought that the main plan is aimed at weakening the central government's control in these regions. The political vacuum in an Iran exhausted by war may be intended to be filled through the Kurds. However, this does not mean that the regime, exhausted by war, will collapse immediately.

A significant portion of the Kurdish population in Iran lives in the west of the country, and these regions have occasionally been the scene of protest movements. Just before the latest attack on Iran, five Kurdish parties in Iran announced that they had formed a political alliance against the central government. The environment of war has also created a suitable opportunity for the Kurds to struggle against the regime.

However, the military capacity of Kurdish groups in Iran is limited, unlike the Iraqi Kurds who also receive support from the US and have an army, and their forces capable of resisting the regime are insufficient. For this reason, it remains uncertain what role Kurdish groups could play in the event of a possible political vacuum in Iran.

Therefore, in the event of a possible reconciliation between the US and Iran, the position in which these groups will remain also creates another question mark. Examples from the past where Kurdish actors in the region were used as tools in the regional strategies of great powers and were left alone after various geopolitical calculations should not be forgotten.

Conclusion

The future of the religious leadership office in Iran is not just a matter of leadership change; it also points to a critical process that could determine the direction of the country's political system. The balance between religious authority and social expectations will be decisive in the leadership process.

Furthermore, ethnic and regional dynamics in Iran, especially the Kurdish issue, when combined with the strategic calculations of external actors, could make the country's domestic politics even more complex. For this reason, a possible change of power that may occur in Iran has the potential to directly affect not only the political equation within the country but also the power balances in the Middle East.