Kemal Okuyan: What does all of this have to do with the Özel-Erdoğan meeting?

Kemal Okuyan, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP), wrote an article following the announcement that CHP leader Özgür Özel would meet with President and AKP Chairman Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Here is Okuyan's article:

"THE ISSUE HAS GONE BEYOND ERDOĞAN"

CHP Chairman Özgür Özel met with Erdoğan. Before the meeting, Kılıçdaroğlu's words, "One does not negotiate with the Palace, one struggles against it," were widely discussed and mostly criticized. Thus, Kılıçdaroğlu, who helped the AKP government overcome many crises during his chairmanship, has taken Özel under his wing.

Of course, if opposition to Erdoğan can be the fundamental criterion for right-wing or left-wing politics... And if anything is left of the concept of right and left in this country...

It doesn't matter anyway. Who is right-wing and who is left-wing in the CHP has not been important for a long time. The "New CHP" did not shift to the right; it led the entire Turkish political landscape to shift to the right. The "Newest CHP" is trying to impose a new definition of the left on society in its own way; may it be for the best.

What should really be discussed regarding the Özel-Erdoğan meeting is not whether this move plays into the AKP's hands. As I said, we are not going to look for a "blue bead" (a sign of favor) in everyone who positions themselves against Erdoğan. The issue has already gone beyond Erdoğan.

"A VERY DANGEROUS LINE..."

Immediately after the March 31 elections, a wind of "softening" blew through the establishment politics in Turkey. One source of this wind was big capital, which did not want an opposition that would challenge the AKP government—which has been making broad social segments suffer by implementing IMF prescriptions—even if only in words. However, it is not just that. Capital and Western imperialist countries have been searching for a more manageable AKP, and perhaps an AKP without Erdoğan, for a very long time. According to them, one could not return to the pre-AKP era; Erdoğan and his friends had achieved a "great success," but over time, they had turned to "mischief" brought about by a lack of alternatives and had become a headache. The local elections were an opportunity to bring Erdoğan and the AKP into line.

To seize this opportunity, the openly and unlimitedly pro-American wing, which stood "reluctant" at best during the election campaigns and was accused by some of sabotaging the party, moved quickly and brought the legend of the AKP returning to its factory settings back to the screen.

Reconciliation with the CHP, normalization with the EU, rapprochement with the US, strict adherence to the rules of the market economy, improvement in the fields of human rights and democracy...

When we include those who covertly serve this wing in the list, we are faced with a very powerful focus. They are influential not only within the AKP but also in the media and the bureaucracy. For those who are curious, I must say that what this team voices in the fields of tolerance, democracy, and human rights does not interest me in the slightest. We are not going to stoop so low as to forget or ignore the mission with which pro-market, pro-American types have acted throughout history.

For our working people, for our country, they represent a dangerous, a very dangerous line.

"THEY ARE NOT CONTENT WITH ANY RESTRICTIONS"

And we are no longer talking about parties here. The unmeasured pro-American crowd is scattered across many parties, and it seems they like İmamoğlu very much and are discussing whether or not to partner in a project around him.

The issue is not solely about who will be the President after Erdoğan. In fact, this is not at the center of the issue. At the center of the issue are the efforts of the US and its close allies, who want to draw Turkey into closer cooperation during the chaotic process that the imperialist world has entered.

So, is this possible? This is certainly possible, and it has been seen in recent months that it is possible.

But is it possible to the extent that this crowd we are talking about wants? It is very difficult, if not impossible, for Turkey to turn toward a completely pro-American, pro-NATO line under these world conditions. For more than one reason, we cannot expect Turkey to abandon the specific claims of its capitalism and align its present and future with the agenda of Western imperialist countries.

While the AKP was destroying the gains of the Republic one by one and making Neo-Ottomanism an official policy, it also created a space for movement that corresponded to the expansion needs of the capitalist class. TÜSİAD capital, which traditionally sees its interests in the US-UK-Germany triangle, benefited greatly from this space of movement and was happy. However, since they still feel more comfortable in that triangle, the bosses at the very top have occasionally made moves to narrow this space of movement.

But let us not forget, capital rule is never limited to the capitalist class. In the final analysis, even if they serve capitalists and do not step outside the mechanisms that capital rule has bound to unchangeable rules for a long time, there are people in every country who look at events primarily through the lens of the "state," and this is even more true in Turkey.

It is not surprising that those who "think they act on behalf of the state" are at the forefront of those who do not want to abandon the space of movement gained on an international scale during the AKP era. Marxism has said very concise and comprehensive things about the "state"; there is no need to go into them. However, I want to continue by reminding you that the question of where the state begins and where it ends is very complex.

Within this segment, there are convinced Ottomanists. They never internalized the Republic and were always preparing for a revanche. Because of their Ottoman-specific Islamic understanding of the state, they also took on secularism and tried to erode it. Even if they have served imperialist interests in the past, the longing for the Empire brought them to the point of "let us be a world power in our own right."

It is not surprising that there are also fascists among those who stand against the fully pro-American wing today. Fascism, on one hand, recognizes no rules, and on the other, sets its own rules. They are ready to do anything for the exaltation of the "homeland" they have designed. Although they have often shed blood in the service of NATO in the past, today they are not content with any restrictions on their own behalf.

"WHAT DOES IT HAVE TO DO WITH THE ÖZEL-ERDOĞAN MEETING?"

But it does not end here. In Turkey, there are also elements within the state and establishment politics who see selfishness and treason in big capital, who think that one should not get too close to NATO, and who are seriously uncomfortable with religious sects. To the extent that these elements do not have a healthy assessment of the foundations of the imperialist-capitalist system, they see no harm in mingling with Ottomanism and fascism, and they can evaluate the working people as a worthless mass that can be sacrificed for the supreme interests of the state. The patriotic-revolutionary accumulation that has always existed within the system in the history of this country and has made itself felt more in some periods is not capable of separating itself from this pragmatic segment today.

It is not, because we are not yet at a stage where an independent class movement is concretized in a sufficiently strong way on a communist political line.

Finally, we must say that state cadres who believe in the continuity of the state, and in this sense do not see or do not care about the reality of a class society, always maintain their existence in all this ideological confusion.

So, what does all of this have to do with the Özel-Erdoğan meeting?

"CAN IT BE ACHIEVED BY OPENING CREDIT TO THE OTHER SIDE?"

Namely, while one wing wants to redesign the political landscape in line with its own pro-American orientations, the other wing is concerned with reminding both Erdoğan and Özel of the "boundaries." No one should think that the strings are in Erdoğan's hands. Erdoğan's current power is that he is the person neither wing can give up right now. However, while one wing acts with the comfort of finding a strong alternative in the person of İmamoğlu, the other wing is concerned with blocking İmamoğlu's path and bringing all political parties, including the CHP, closer to its own designs.

With one approach, a fight is going on here between national forces and non-national forces.

Capitalism; the rule of money buries the concept of "nationality" into the ground. We cannot get anywhere with these concepts. On the other hand, if we take into account that almost all variants of the "left" today are leaning toward the pro-American wing in order to push back the Palace regime, we have to say that there is a very serious problem. The only thing we can say against the understanding of "wherever freedom comes from, it is welcome; NATO, US, EU do not matter" is this: NATO, the US, and the EU are the enemies of freedom. They are warmongers, occupiers, and the headquarters of policies that impoverish the working people.

Removing the Turkish working class and intellectuals from the influence of these segments is one of our fundamental tasks.

Can this task be achieved by opening credit to the other side?

No, it cannot. It is also our historical responsibility not to waste the public-spiritedness, economic statism, secularism, and anti-US and anti-NATO stance that have deep roots in Turkish soil within a direction blended with Neo-Ottomanist, fascist elements, and thus a form of ruthless capitalist dictatorship.

News Source: 12punto