The landslide in Erzincan's İliç district was a disaster waiting to happen: 'This amount of slippage is dangerous'

Statements have been obtained from 6 suspects arrested and 2 of the 3 suspects released under judicial control conditions by the İliç Criminal Court of Peace as part of the investigation into the cyanide gold mine in Çöpler village, İliç district of Erzincan.

One of the arrested suspects, oxide department chief engineer M.B., stated that he had been working in the heap leach area at the mine since 2023.

M.B. explained that a company had been contracted for consultancy since 2020 and that this company drew up where and what to dump, saying, "The project unit was guiding us in the heap leach work together with this company. In line with the instructions coming from there, we were determining where and how much to dump in accordance with the design."

"BLASTING WAS CARRIED OUT AT 12 THAT DAY"

Stating that two different companies were doing the membrane work and construction work in the leach area, M.B. mentioned that one company was doing the truck material transport, drilling, and blasting work, and used the expression, "Blasting was also carried out around 12:00 that day."

Explaining that another company was also doing construction and rough excavation work in the leach area, M.B. testified, "However, the Anagold company project unit provides the guidance in accordance with the project. Each step is created from 8 meters, and according to the project, we had the authority to go up to the 36th step. This incident occurred while we were at the 33rd step."

M.B. explained that they held a routine meeting regarding occupational safety at 08:30 on the morning the incident occurred, and continued as follows:

"Our senior supervisor for the heap, K.Ö., told us there were cracks, so I left the meeting and went out to the field. Before leaving, I informed A.C. about the issue. We first toured the area where the cracks were; the cracks were in the form of a line. They were continuous from southwest to northeast. We had a meeting with geotechnical engineer B.M., and he said there was 70 millimeters of slippage. This amount of slippage is a dangerous amount; I shouted warnings quickly for all employees to leave the area. I told them to leave whatever material they had in their hands and get out. I did not leave the area until they had left. We completely evacuated the area, and I left there at 10:00 to attend the meeting. Later, at 10:30, we went to the leach area, and I had all the roads closed. I went to the leach area with J.R.G., B.A., and C.S.H.; the solution was still flowing until we arrived. As soon as we arrived, we closed all the roads, finished the work, and completely evacuated the area."

"I THINK THE BLASTING MAY HAVE CAUSED IT"

Stating that 3 foreign individuals, whom he thought were senior executives working within the company, wanted to see the leach area, M.B. recounted the following:

"When they saw that we had closed the road with bollards, Mr. S. tried to prevent it and called K.M.A. When permission was granted, they entered the leach area with 3 cars. I definitely had no knowledge of these people entering the area. The three foreign individuals, Ms. E., and K.M.A. went up to the upper part of the leach area, but Adnan Keklik returned from the lower middle part; the incident occurred at 14:28 just as he was returning. Kenan Öz and Ramazan Çimen also entered the area with them in a separate car; I had no knowledge of them. The first reason that comes to my mind as the cause of this area collapsing is that there might have been a problem with its design. I think there is a problem with the project planning, and I also think that the blasting might have triggered this incident because blasting was also being done at the back of the heap leach area to expand it. I think this might have also caused the incident."

H.Ü., the company's oxide process manager and one of the arrested suspects, stated that the project planning in the leach area belonged to a foreign-based company.

Providing information that this company did the project planning, H.Ü. said, "According to the project within the company, there was no problem with loading up to 36 floors; we were only at the 33rd floor. I perform the spreading of crushed material and irrigation processes in the leach area."

"THE RADAR WAS MISSING IN THE REGION"

Stating that the leach where the incident occurred had been built since 2010, H.Ü. continued his defense as follows:

"The main guidance in this region is provided by Anagold's engineers, but those working in the region can be subcontractors' workers. The radar operation department would share their reports with us every Monday. The leach project was complied with in terms of both the covered area and height, and no overloading was done. 2 radars and 2 robotic machines were missing in the eastern region. A budget was allocated for this from the open-pit operation unit's budget, but the devices had not yet been purchased in this region on the date the incident occurred. Cement and lime are added to the soil spread during the spreading process. Reducing or increasing this was up to the technical unit within the company to which we sent the analysis and the firm that performed the analysis outside. We could make reductions or increases in the amount in line with the instructions coming from there. We were not the ones who made the decision on this within our own structure."

Noting that the amount of water in the part under the leach ground was constantly monitored, H.Ü. recounted the following:

"The solution given to the soil is also monitored in the same way; our unit deals with these processes. When there is ponding in the parts where we give the solution, we can already cut this off and inspect it. I had not been given any report regarding the slippage that occurred 3 days ago in the leach area. In the first period when I started my duty, there was an opening in the leach area, but this was an area too small to be detected by radar. We closed this with gravel in line with the information provided by the geotechnical unit, and there was no problem. We already received support from the geotechnical unit by evaluating that there might be a problematic situation in openings between 20 and 50 millimeters, and this was intervened in. The geotechnical unit is also the unit that monitors the leach area with radar. I was on leave on the day of the incident; I want to say that I have no fault."

"A MOVEMENT THAT EXCEEDED THE CRITICAL LEVEL"

Senior geotechnical engineer A.R.K., who was released under judicial control, stated that he was the person who checked the radar system in the leach area and gave warnings when it reached a critical level.

Pointing out that he had been working in the same unit for 10 years, A.R.K. said, "I was on leave from February 1-12; I started work on February 13 at 10:30 and went to the field. The personnel in our unit, B.M., called me around 09:30 and gave me information. An email had already been sent to all units at 09:30."

Stating that he returned to the field after going to the office and that a closure process with bollards was being carried out when he returned, A.R.K. continued his statement as follows:

"A landslide occurred in the phase 4 part of the leach area in 2018; such an event is true. When I went to the field, I made a check to see the parts with cracks. Since the work on the south wall had not yet been completed and there was a gap in between, I saw a movement towards the north. When I checked the radar, I saw a movement that exceeded the critical level. I determined that the cracks could no longer be eliminated by filling the gap and that it was dangerous to work in the area. Afterwards, I wrote an email, stating that the movement was at a critical level, that no work should be done in the area, and that the cyanide should be cut off. I went to M.B. and J.R.G.'s room and conveyed my findings. My findings were approved, and the necessary actions were taken. We ate lunch and went back to the field around 13:30; I wanted to check the tension cracks one last time in the field. I wanted to see if there was any visible opening. I noticed a 50-centimeter collapse in the nose part where we went by vehicle. I realized that the area was very dangerous, and I returned to the office saying that the area should be evacuated, and the incident happened during this time. I and the personnel under me left the scene 15 minutes before the incident occurred."

"I REPORTED THE SITUATION AT 11 O'CLOCK"

Mining engineer M.T., who was released under judicial control, also noted that he started his duty on February 12.

M.T. stated, "On the date the incident occurred, my orientation training had not yet been completed, and my emails had not been opened. I was going to serve as the open-pit mine manager. This incident happened the next day. If I had started, my main duty would have been until the ore taken from the mine pit was taken to the crusher. I have no duty or information regarding the leach area."

The company's Canadian manager J.R.G., who was arrested as part of the investigation: "We went to the leach area on the day of the incident and saw the cracks. I reported this situation to the center in America at 11:00. Due to the time difference, it being 02:00, no return was made" - Supervisor S.D., responsible for piping in the company's leach area: - "We saw that there were cracks in two points. My superior K.M.A. gave the order to close the road. Ş.D. also sent an email regarding the road closure. We received the instruction to close the solution around 13:30, and the ADR department closed the solution"

Stating that the person primarily responsible for the mine was K.Ö., who served as the operations director, and that A.C. was serving in his place, J.R.G. said, "My duty is to observe the mine site and report to the country manager at the company center. I am conveying the information I received from M.B. to the country manager at the company center."

"I REPORTED THE SITUATION TO THE CENTER IN AMERICA"

Stating that he had no duty in the leach area, J.R.G. recounted the following:

"We went to the leach area on the day of the incident and saw the cracks. I reported this situation to the center in America at 11:00. Due to the time difference, it being 02:00, no return was made. I was informed in August 2022 that the height, which should have been 8 meters, had been exceeded. That reporting had been done before I started; a report had even been prepared for it to be reduced to the required level. I reported that it should be made compliant with the project. Companies were already regularly auditing the leach area. When I went out to the field on the day of the incident, we saw small cracks; the largest crack was 6 centimeters in size. We went to a high point to see better; the solution was still being given. When the danger was understood, I said that the solution should be transferred to different points."

The arrested suspect stated that he did not accept the accusations against him and that he had a heart condition.

"I SENT AN EMAIL REGARDING THE CLOSURE OF THE ROAD"

One of the arrested suspects, S.D., the company's supervisor responsible for piping in the leach area, stated that the leach area began to be created in 2010 and said, "My duty consists of organizing the pipes through which the solutions pass. I did not encounter anything related to overloading in the leach area. There were cracks in the leach area in 2018 due to a burst in the pipes, but these were not caused by slippage. These parts are being closed with cementitious material."

Explaining that he was in a meeting on the morning of the incident, S.D. testified, "After I left the meeting, K.Ö. called me and came and picked me up by car. We saw that there were cracks in two points. My superior K.M.A. gave the order to close the road. Ş.D. also sent an email regarding the road closure. We received the instruction to close the solution around 13:30, and the ADR department closed the solution. My duty was only to provide the solution to the places where pipes were laid."

"CRACK PHOTOS WERE SENT FROM THE GROUP"

One of the arrested suspects, the company's oxide crusher engineer Ş.D., also mentioned that he worked in the crushing of the material that would go to the leach part.

Stating that agglomeration (making the ore into large masses, pelletizing) tests were performed every day in the region, Ş.D. said, "In these tests, how much cement, lime, and water were added to the soil sent to the leach is audited. On the morning of the incident, photos showing that there were cracks in the leach area were sent from the group. There was no damage to the department I worked in due to the incident."

Ş.D. recounted the following in his statement:

"The crushing plant was not working due to the cracks. When I learned about these cracks, I was in my main office in the lower part. Blasting was being done during the expansion at the back of the leach area, but I remember that no blasting was done on the day of the incident. I attended the online meeting in the heap area at 08:30 on the day of the incident; the discussion on occupational safety began. Supervisor K.Ö. informed us of the cracks, and in line with this, M.B. came to the field. Geophysical and OHS experts were informed, and then an investigation was started in the field. Leach area engineer K.M.A. asked me to send an email stating that the leach area was closed. When I went down to the office part, I sent this email. As far as I remember, I sent the email to the occupational safety, maintenance, mine, oxide operation, sulfide operation, and İliç white-collar units."

Ş.D. stated that he had no information about why the people who remained under the soil were there.

"I WAS LOOKING TO BE HELPFUL"

One of the arrested suspects, maintenance manager A.C., said that he worked in the area where oxide and facility equipment were located.

Stating that he had no duty in the leach area, A.C. mentioned that he performed the maintenance of the "ADR and sart parts and the sulfide facility" in the mine pit.

Stating that M.B., who was responsible for the leach, informed him about the cracks on the morning of the incident, A.C. defended himself by saying, "I told M.B. to convey this at the 10:00 meeting. J.R.G. was also attending the meeting, and I told him to convey it to him. All operations and occupational safety units were under J.R.G. I did not go to the leach area on the day of the incident."

Arguing that he was not technically responsible for any part or activity of the leach area, A.C. explained that he also did not have technical knowledge on these subjects.

Stating that he was told to act as a proxy for K.Ö. because his English was good and he could communicate better with the company's Canadian manager J.R.G., A.C. said, "Actually, I don't have much information about the unit K.Ö. worked in. I was looking after K.Ö.'s place to be helpful to J.R.G. The person who will do the actual work is J.R.G.; I already don't have technical knowledge about K.Ö.'s field. The unit primarily responsible for the feasibility of the leach area is the project unit. My area of expertise is electrical engineering; I have no duty related to this field."

Work had been initiated to find the 9 workers who went missing as a result of the landslide that occurred on February 13 in the region where the gold mine in Çöpler village, attached to İliç, is located.

In the investigation regarding the landslide, 6 suspects, including the company's Canadian manager, were arrested, while 3 suspects, including the company's manager in Turkey, C.D., were released under judicial control conditions.