Expert report on the Antalya cable car disaster revealed: 'It is not a work-related accident'

In the investigation conducted by the Antalya Chief Public Prosecutor's Office, a 52-page expert report prepared by mechanical engineer Hakkı Coşkun, occupational safety expert and mechanical engineer İsmail Denizlioğlu, and occupational safety expert Oktay Büyükkurt was submitted to the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office.

The report stated that in a search conducted under the title "Anadolu Teleferik A.Ş." on the page where accredited organizations are published on the Danish Accreditation Fund's website, no information was found indicating that the organization in question was accredited.

The report pointed out that, according to the findings of the General Directorate of Meteorology, no lightning or thunder activity was recorded in the area within a 5-kilometer radius of the Tünektepe Cable Car Station during the accident.

In the "Mechanical expert assessment" section of the report prepared by mechanical engineer Hakkı Coşkun, it was reported that the maintenance, repair, and technical operation service procurement contract made by the facility with Anet AŞ and Mega Tower AŞ was examined, and it was observed that many maintenance tasks in the contract were assigned to the Mega Tower firm.

It was stated that while the progress payment documents issued between the contractor firm and the administration included the replacement of pulleys and their quantities, there were no documents indicating which pulleys were replaced on which pylon and in which direction.

The report stated that it was determined that there were no minutes, service forms, or measurement documents to prove the data belonging to the list of works shown in the progress payment documents.

The report included the following statements:

"The general operation and service manual booklet states that the pulleys should be replaced once a year. When the progress payment documents for 2023 and 2024 are examined, although it is written in the booklet that they should be replaced once a year, the annual service procurement contract states that 'the necessary pulley tires will be replaced.' The designation 'necessary ones' here causes a contradiction."

Providing the information that the total number of pulleys on the pylons is 196 and that there are 20 pulleys on pylon number 5, where the accident occurred, the report stated: "On the sturdy pylon number 6 towards the Tünektepe direction, the bolts and nuts were visibly new, well-maintained, and tight; however, when a check was performed on the bolts on the flanges on the floor below the collapsed pylon, it was understood that none of them were tight, and some could even be tightened or loosened by hand."

Using the expression, "As a result of the examination of the 200-page 'General operation and service manual' technical booklet, it was understood that the accident occurred due to the disintegration of one of the 10 pulleys located in the return direction from the Tünektepe station on pylon number 5," the report noted the following:

"However, what happened to cause this one pulley to disintegrate? It is clear that the pulley, tires, and bolts (breakage, wear time, corrosion, including lightning) will only become clear as a result of laboratory technical analysis results. Since we do not have the results at the moment, it is my opinion and conviction that the incident occurred as follows: due to a reason related to lubrication, the dual pulley assembly jammed, causing one pulley to rise while the others descended, which resulted in the entire load being placed on a single pulley. This caused the rope to first tear the tire of the pulley, and within about 5 minutes, the friction between the rope and the single pulley bearing the entire load resulted in the rope, which is made of harder material, removing shavings from the slightly less hard pulley, causing the pulley to disintegrate and the system to stop. However, as a result of the system being operated from the main center, the 36 bolts at the midpoint of pylon number 5, which could not withstand the sudden pulling force, stretched and thinned, leading to this tragic accident."

The report stated that it was determined that there were loose bolts during the torque process performed on pylon number 5.

"THE INCIDENT IS NOT A WORK-RELATED ACCIDENT"

In the occupational safety expert findings included in the report, the information was provided: "The incident is an accident that occurred as a result of the Tünektepe Cable Car system pylon number 5 collapsing and hitting cabin number 28. According to Article 13 of Law No. 5510, the incident is not a work-related accident."

The expert report stated that an emergency plan existed as of August 29, 2022, but it was not organized in accordance with the "Emergency Regulation: Emergency Plan" form published on October 1, 2021.

The report stated that an emergency exit door was not created, and that revolving doors and turnstile gates could not be used as emergency exit doors. It was noted that no documents were found indicating that the facility had conducted emergency drills and evacuation drills.

The report stated that there was a maintenance, repair, technical operation, and service procurement contract for the Tünektepe cable car between the Anet firm and the contractor firm Mega Tower for one year covering the period of January 2-December 31, 2024, and it was noted that since this issue is outside the expertise of the experts and is seen as a legal interpretation, the evaluation of the business relationship between the parties is left to the discretion of the Antalya Chief Public Prosecutor's Office.

The report stated that the emergency plan prepared for the Anet facility in November 2023 was not organized in accordance with the "Emergency Regulation: Emergency Plan" form, and no drill report documents belonging to the facility were found.

The report emphasized that Mega Tower is classified as "low-hazard" in occupational safety legislation and is not suitable for performing cable car work, which is in the "hazardous" class.

It was stated that Mega Tower AŞ failing to fulfill its obligations and not stopping the cable car to ensure the life and physical safety of the people in the cabins, despite reports from people using the cable car before the accident that there were sparks on the rope, were among the factors of the accident.

Emphasizing that the failure to perform maintenance and repairs on the cable car pylon was one of the significant factors of the accident, the report stated: "In the event that it is accepted that these responsibilities also belong to Anet AŞ, whether Ahmet Buğra Samsunlu, as the acting general manager of Anet AŞ on the date of the accident, April 12, 2024, should be evaluated as an employer's representative and whether he has any responsibility is at the discretion of your esteemed prosecutor's office. Whether Mesut Kocagöz has any responsibility in the accident, given that he was not the general manager or employer on April 12, 2024, the date of the accident, is also at the discretion of your esteemed prosecutor's office."

The expert report also included photographs of the cable car pylons number 5 and 6 where torque tightening checks were performed, as well as broken bolts, nuts, and damaged pulleys and parts.

ABOUT THE ACCIDENT AND JUDICIAL PROCESS

In the accident that occurred at the cable car facility, 1 person who fell from the disintegrated cabin lost their life, and 7 people in the same cabin, including 2 children, were injured. 11 people evacuated from other cabins were also taken to the hospital for check-ups.

174 people who were left hanging in the air in 24 cabins due to the system stopping were rescued after approximately 22.5 hours of work coordinated by AFAD.

Of the 14 suspects detained regarding the accident, 5 were arrested, including Kepez Mayor Mesut Kocagöz, who is the former Chairman of the Board and General Manager of Anet.