Hüsnü Mahalli and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hazal Papuççular weigh in: Assad wasn't even aware of Özel's 'Damascus' request!

As CHP leader Özgür Özel's remarks regarding the five federal charges faced by New York Mayor Eric Adams—which also include bribery allegations involving the Turkish House (Türkevi) building—sparked reactions, the CHP's stance on foreign policy and the Damascus visit that came to the agenda in July have also resurfaced. Journalist and author Hüsnü Mahalli evaluated Özel's 'Damascus' rhetoric on the '12'den' program, hosted by Tuncay Mollaveisoğlu, while Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hazal Papuççular also made notable remarks exclusively to 12punto.

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CHP leader Özgür Özel made statements in front of the Turkish House (Türkevi) building in New York on September 26.

Commenting on the events surrounding New York Mayor Eric Adams facing bribery charges, Özel said, "Turkey is not a country that needs to pay bribes in the United States; it is not in such a state of helplessness. Attempting or intending such a thing does not befit anyone representing the Republic of Turkey. I do not equate these, but if we saw a gesture during the process of acquiring such a building—a building we are all proud of—we have done more for the magnificent area allocated to the United States Embassy in Ankara. There is no side to this that can be measured by money; strong alliance relations would have required this anyway."

'ASSAD' VISIT COMES TO MIND

Following Özel's remarks on the Turkish House, while the CHP's stance on foreign policy became a subject of criticism, his statements regarding a Damascus visit in July came to mind.

Although months have passed since the announcements that a CHP delegation would meet with Damascus and that the meeting would take place in July, the meeting did not occur.

'THERE IS NO SUCH MEETING REQUEST'

Guest on the 12'den program, prepared and hosted by Tuncay Mollaveisoğlu, journalist-author Hüsnü Mahalli evaluated CHP Chairman Özgür Özel’s statements about meeting with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

Mahalli stated, "Özgür Özel says they want to meet with Assad, but when I talk to my friends on the Syrian side, they state that there hasn't even been such an application. Perhaps there might be intermediaries, but according to information I received from Assad's circle, there is no such meeting request."

12punto columnist and Political Scientist Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hazal Papuççular made notable evaluations in her article today titled, "The Foreign Policy of the Main Opposition."

'ANOTHER THING THAT WAS NOT CALCULATED WAS...'

The relevant part of Assoc. Prof. Dr. Papuççular's article is as follows:

"The CHP also has impulsive outbursts on some issues that do not reach a conclusion. For example, Syria. Since the beginning of the civil war, the CHP has been on a different line from the ruling AKP party on this issue. When the rhetoric of normalization/dialogue with Assad and Syria intensified this summer, news suddenly began to spread in the media that Özgür Özel would go to Damascus via Lebanon. When you scan the newspapers from the first half of July, you constantly see some news about this mission and even that a green light was given to this visit from Damascus. As a result, this visit did not take place. However, at that time, what exactly the CHP aimed to achieve with this visit remained a bit ambiguous. Since I only know what was reflected in the media, let me write that. The CHP had said it could take on a mediation role. But I think no one questioned whether the CHP had such power over the AKP and Assad. Another thing that was not calculated, in my opinion, was the possibility that such a visit could turn into a propaganda weapon against the main opposition party.

'I DO NOT BELIEVE IT HAS ANY BENEFIT TO THE MAIN OPPOSITION PARTY'

One must also add to the list how Syria could portray this visit. As a result, the CHP's desire to set the game by going to Damascus quietly fell off the agenda at the end of July. As far as I could follow from the media, Damascus had not actually given a green light to such a visit anyway. In short, I do not believe that such impulsive outbursts and inconclusive initiatives in foreign policy have any benefit to the main opposition party."

'THE POSSIBILITY OF THE OPPOSITION PRESENTING A CONSISTENT FOREIGN POLICY ALTERNATIVE IS DECREASING'

Speaking of an alternative, let's come to the last issue. The starting point of this article was actually the Turkish House issue, on which Özel made statements twice. For a while, the main opposition has been constantly emphasizing being "Turkey's party" on different platforms. Frankly, it is an overly defensive rhetoric. Moreover, for a party that has survived for over 100 years, it is also unnecessary. When you keep this emphasis in mind, Özel's statement does not seem very surprising. But still, one must ask: In a conjuncture where everything is permissible internally, if one is to act as if a monolithic reaction is required because everything externally has become a national issue, will the dirty laundry be washed in private in a claim where Turkey's reputation is also at stake? I think this question is important and closely related to the emphases above. Because if so, then the possibility of the opposition presenting a planned and consistent foreign policy alternative, which I mentioned above, also decreases. Something to ponder..."

'I DO NOT THINK THE CHP HAS THE POWER OF MEDIATION ON THIS ISSUE'

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Papuççular also said the following in her evaluation exclusively for 12punto:

"The Damascus move was an outburst that flared up suddenly but whose consequences were not really calculated. For Turkey's main opposition party to go all the way there would have been propaganda material in Damascus, and it would have created propaganda against the main opposition party within Turkey, and it would not have created a result either. The CHP had gone more through the issue of mediation on this matter, but I do not think it has such mediation power on this issue."