Organized crime in Turkey: Will a ‘Vor v zakone’ influx begin?

Utku Beycan - 12punto.com.tr

Mafia structures known as 'Vor v zakone' (thieves-in-law), which spread from the Soviet sphere to the rest of the world, continue their activities in Turkey. According to reports from the site ‘primecrime.ru’, which publishes the activities of the vory, two vory were killed and two were arrested in Turkey in 2025. Additionally, Interior Minister Ali Yerlikaya announced that a vor identified by the initials B.P. was arrested in Antalya.

WHO ARE THESE VORY?

The vory were initially defined as the judges of a criminal culture known as ‘vorovskoy mir’ (thieves' world). They generally took shape in Stalin's Gulags. Representatives of this culture, in which cooperation with the state was forbidden, created their own slang (fenya), laws, and tattoos in labor camps. In this culture, which has interesting rituals, two vory can appoint a person they vouch for as a vor by ceremonially crowning them (shotka). Although they had extremely strict rules and discipline (even getting a tattoo contrary to one's rank could result in a death sentence), the vory sometimes relaxed or re-tightened these rules to ensure their survival.

TURKEY IS A TRANSIT BASE FOR VORZAKONS

Federico Varese, a professor of criminology at the University of Oxford, warned Turkey against the vory in an email statement to 12punto. Varese stated the following:

"In recent years, many cases and reports have been documented regarding the presence of vory and other post-Soviet organized networks in Turkey. According to current evidence, Turkey is more of a logistics base and transit point for these groups rather than a full-fledged headquarters."

ISTANBUL, IZMIR, ADANA, AND GAZIANTEP ARE KEY HUBS

According to findings published by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, which Varese referenced, Georgian and Russian vor networks are present, particularly on the route connecting Turkey, Bulgaria, and Greece. These networks engage in arms trafficking, narcotics, money laundering, and human trafficking. Istanbul, Izmir, Adana, and Gaziantep are seen as key hubs for both domestic and foreign mafia-style groups.

CAN THE WAR ATTRACT THE VORY TO TURKEY?

The European Council on Foreign Relations has also reported cases regarding Russian criminal organizations in Turkey. These cases include individuals linked to contract killings and money laundering. Varese said that according to these reports, due to its strategic location, Turkey is a base for transit and financial operations rather than a command center.

On the other hand, Varese warned against the possibility of the vory increasing their presence in Turkey; "I cannot say that Turkey serves as a primary headquarters for the vorzakon, but Turkey is a convenient transit point. The war may drive some vory out of Russia, and Turkey should consider the possibility of them coming there," he said.

ACTIVITIES IN TURKEY

Varese recalled the murder of Azeri vor Nadir Salifov, nicknamed Lotu Quli, whose name was mentioned in Sedat Peker's allegations. Salifov's murder in Antalya in 2020 revealed both the presence of post-Soviet criminal organizations in Turkey and their internal rivalries.

Although Turkey has become closely acquainted with other vory, the fact that they belong to the 'thief-in-law' tradition has not been widely reflected in the public eye. Uzbek Botir Rakhimov, who seized the Paramount Hotel, Kurdish-origin Georgian mafia figure Aslan Usoyan, who sold weapons to the PKK, and Azerbaijani Rövşan Caniyev, who was killed in Beşiktaş, were some of these figures.

2023 REPORT: VORY SEEKING CENTERS ABROAD PREFER TURKEY AND THE UAE

According to another report published in 2023 by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, the Russia-Ukraine war pushed gangs to develop new connections with different partners. Russian criminals, who avoid appearing as an extension of the Kremlin and are looking for new centers and safe havens abroad, have increasingly begun to prefer Turkey and the UAE. Russia's pressure on the vory has reinforced this situation.

In 2020, high-level criminals who came from Volgograd and gathered in Antalya elected a new leader. The war has increased similar Russian criminal activities in Turkey. Now, some flashy restaurants in Istanbul and Antalya have turned into places where barons from the Soviet sphere (with the participation of local criminals) make deals, hold meetings, and organize coronation ceremonies. For example, Georgian vor Revaz Lordkipanidze, who was killed in Trabzon in January 2023, had been organizing such rituals in Turkey for six years.

Nevertheless, according to information cited from Cengiz Erdinç in the report, “The Russian-speaking mafia sees Turkey as a safe haven. … Even if they are based here, they do not conduct their activities here. That is why they are generally not touched, and their settling of scores is not with the Turkish mafia.”

“GRAY MARKET SMUGGLERS” ARE ALSO IN TURKEY

Alongside the gangs, opportunistic commercial structures using “gray market” channels in Russia have also operated in Turkey. According to the report, during the war, businesspeople transported household appliances with microchips to Russia from Turkey, as well as from Armenia, Kazakhstan, and the UAE. The parts in these devices were used in the construction of Russia's unmanned aerial vehicles and missiles.

Russia's shortage of high-end computer equipment was also covered using similar methods. Old game consoles suitable for reprogramming chips were bought from second-hand sites or charity shops. These consoles were smuggled into Russia via Belarus or Turkey-Serbia.

“RUSSIAN PROGRAMMERS HAVE REVITALIZED THE TURKISH CYBERCRIME ENVIRONMENT”

The report also stated that businesspeople and criminals who turned to countries like Armenia, Georgia, Israel, and Turkey during the war could create a “criminal diaspora” and lead to tensions with local gangs. The report, which notes that this situation has begun to occur to a certain extent in Turkey, states: “For example, Russian computer programmers who flocked to Turkey during the war have revitalized the Turkish cybercrime environment. Collaborating with local hackers, the Russians flooded the online market with tens of millions of new stolen personal data records. While the Russians provided the necessary technical skills, the Turks marketed the stolen data, particularly using their connections in Germany. Thus, the Russians gained new talents for the local underworld, but they could also be a destabilizing force.”