Preliminary expert report on Antalya cable car accident prepared: No certificate of competence!

In the Konyaaltı district of Antalya, a preliminary report has been prepared regarding the investigation conducted by the Antalya Chief Public Prosecutor's Office into the cable car accident that resulted in 1 death and 7 injuries. The report states that the cable car facility, which was under the jurisdiction of the Antalya Provincial Special Administration, was transferred to the management of the Antalya Metropolitan Municipality in 2016.

The report, which includes a mechanical evaluation, noted the following:

"It is understood that 7 years have passed since the facility was put into operation. It was determined that on April 12, around 17:20, the bolts securing the flange connections of cable car pylon number 5 snapped. The cause was identified as the cabin carrier rope system on the pylon becoming jammed in the metal components of the pulleys due to deformations of unknown origin, causing the system to be unable to withstand the strong tensile load resulting from the movement, leading to the snapping of the bolts connected to the pylon flanges. Our examinations during the site inspection revealed that as a result of the snapping, the upper part of the pylon struck the lower part of the cabin due to the tensile force, tearing off the steel structure and causing the people inside the cabin to fall."

The report, which determined that pylon number 5 consists of a total of 7 flanges and 10 pipe pylon segments, rising from a tripod base and continuing as a single column from the seventh flange upwards, pointed out that the bolts forming the flange connections were found scattered on the ground and deformed, and that the deformation in the bolts was due to tension-shear.

The report stated that no deformation was observed in the flanges connecting the parts of the pylon, and that upon approaching the toppled pylon, it was determined that one of the pulleys holding the carrier-hauling ropes had been deformed by the effect of the rope, and that the rope had entered (slipped into) the pulley.

CARRIER ROPE JAMMED

The report, which emphasized that the factors causing the incident were examined in two groups, noted that the toppled pylon exerted a moment on the pylon due to the hauling or carrier ropes jamming in the pulley and the failure of the safety switch to perform its function, causing the pylon to topple when the bolts on the second level from the bottom snapped due to the tension.

The report included the finding that the pulley was deformed due to the rope entering it during the toppling phase of the pylon, and therefore the pylon toppled not because the rope was jammed, but because the bolts could not carry the load and snapped, and included the following statements:

"It was observed that work order forms for the facility have been kept daily since 2017, and the operations performed were seen in the work order form documents for January, February, and March of 2024. However, it was determined that checks for gaps in the torque of the pylon bolts, detection and control of whether the bolts had undergone corrosion, and replacements of machine elements such as bolts, washers, bearings, etc., at certain intervals, taking material fatigue into account, were not performed. It was observed that there were no records or control forms regarding the periods at which the rubber pulley groups operating on the traverses of the nine cable car pylons at the facility were replaced."

COMPLIANCE LICENSE GRANTED

The report noted that a review of the file showed that an Operating Technical License Control Report for a Ropeway Transport Facility designed for carrying people was issued by the Chamber of Mechanical Engineers Bursa Branch on April 19, 2017, and that a compliance license report was provided.

The report stated that there are 2 safety switches in the cable car system, which are protection elements that cut the energy of the entire system and provide braking in case of rubber damage that may occur in the rope carrier pulleys of each pylon, and included the finding: "At the time of the incident, the control cable coming to the panel on the pylon to which the safety switches were connected was severed due to the relevant part of the pylon being dislodged and toppling, cutting off the circuits providing movement energy; for this reason, it was seen that the cabins remained suspended along with the carrier rope."

In the report, which included an evaluation in terms of occupational health and safety, it was stated: "It was observed that the risk assessment prepared by the risk assessment team belonging to Anet AŞ in November 2023 using the 5x5 matrix method was not prepared in accordance with the facility and that the risks in the facility were not fully identified during the environmental surveillance. However, in article 31 of the risk assessment, it was determined and reported that there were no lightning rods in the general area of the facility."

LACK OF DOCUMENTATION FOR MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL...

In the expert report, the expression "Although it was requested that the documents be delivered to the management in reference to the vocational qualification certificate included in the risk assessment, it was observed that some of the maintenance personnel did not have vocational qualification certificates" was used.

The report noted that the maintenance and operation contract for the facility made with Anet AŞ and Megatower AŞ was examined, and that many maintenance tasks in the contract were assigned by Anet AŞ to be performed by the Megatower company.

The report, which stated that the works to be done were listed in the contract content, said the following:

"When the list content is examined, in clause K, the inspection of pylon connection elements, the control of ensuring appropriate tightness by eliminating deficiencies, the determination of the status of components on the pylons (platform, ladder, yoke) and the control of their suitability, and the torquing of pylon anchor bolts were assigned by Anet AŞ to be performed by the Megatower AŞ company. However, no documents were found in the files regarding how the inspection and final acceptance engineers working at the Anet AŞ company performed their final acceptances and controls. It was observed that the appointments of occupational safety specialists and workplace physicians suitable for the hazard classes of the Megatower and Anet AŞ companies were made through the ISG-KATIP program, and although the occupational health and safety training, personal protective equipment determination records, and occupational health and safety workplace operating instructions of MegaTower employees were up to date, no current Emergency Plans and Risk Assessment were found. However, the determination of the Megatower AŞ occupational safety specialist in the occupational safety detection and recommendation book on September 14, 2023, that the risk assessment was delivered to MegaTower AŞ was observed."

The report stated that although there was a detection and recommendation book approved by the Antalya Provincial Directorate of the Turkish Employment Agency on July 7, 2022, in the occupational health and safety file belonging to Anet AŞ, it was seen that there was no information or detection inside it.

On the other hand, the preliminary expert report also included photographs of the snapped bolts and nuts found in the accident area.