Retired Admiral Cem Gürdeniz evaluates the foreign agenda on 12punto: 'There will be a competitive order that constantly produces crises'

News: Cenk Başboğaoğlu

Retired Admiral Cem Gürdeniz stated that the praise for Turkish soldiers and the emphasis on "NATO territory" by General Ingo Gerhartz, Commander of the Joint Force Command in the Netherlands, who directed the "Steadfast Dart 26" exercise held in Germany, should be approached with caution, even if it seems positive at first glance.

'TRUE ALLIANCE IS POSSIBLE ONLY BY EQUALLY EMBRACING TURKEY'S SECURITY CONCERNS'

Gürdeniz said, "While the expression 'NATO territory' reflects a security perception centered on Central and Northern Europe in practice, Turkey's unique threats in the Black Sea, Aegean, Eastern Mediterranean, and southern borders are often not addressed at the same priority level. Therefore, there is an asymmetry between highlighting the Turkish soldier in the defense of Central Europe and the insufficient support for Turkey's own security sensitivities. Seeing Turkey's military capacity as an element that closes Europe's security gap, while not equally embracing Turkey's geopolitical interests, is a serious issue. Turkey faces encirclement pressure in the Mediterranean and the Aegean originating from Southern Cyprus, Israel, and Greece.

The EU's Seville map has not yet been withdrawn. The TRNC has not withdrawn its EEZ declaration. Europe's defense capacity gap makes the Turkish army attractive to EU administrators for pragmatic reasons due to Turkey's field experience and rapid deployment power. On the other hand, the need for the EU and NATO to keep Ankara in line with the alliance is also in the background of this praise. Turkey should have two red lines in this process.

First, it should not take risks that will create direct tension with Russia for the sake of economic advantages. The balance in the Black Sea is of vital importance for Turkey. Second, EU and NATO countries must recognize Turkey's geopolitical interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Aegean, and the TRNC, and should not encourage a puppet Kurdish state with an outlet to the sea in our south, together with Israel. True alliance is possible not only by praising the Turkish soldier, but also by equally embracing Turkey's security concerns."

'A SEARCH FOR A SECURITY BACKING ALTERNATIVE TO THE US'

Regarding whether Europe sees Turkey as an alternative backing to the United States in the face of a major war possibility, Gürdeniz said, "It can be said that there is a search for a security backing alternative to the US in the background of Europe using encouraging language towards Turkey in the face of a major war scenario; however, it would be wrong to read this as a simple attempt to create a 'new big father'. Europe has felt a regression in its security architecture, especially in recent years due to the US shifting its strategic priorities to the Asia-Pacific and the volatile political will in Washington. This situation has strengthened the search for 'strategic autonomy' within Europe. Turkey, with its geographical location, military capacity, and actual war experience, is a country that can take its place not in the outer ring of European defense, but at its center. Therefore, the importance given to Ankara stems not from a desire to protect Turkey's interests, but rather from a search for cheap blood for themselves.

However, the issue is different for Turkey. Europe's encouragement of Turkey pushes it into a more prominent frontline country position against Russia. This situation may strain Ankara's balanced foreign policy ground. Turkey's interest is neither to lean on a European security umbrella that will replace the US, nor to enter a direct tension line with Russia on behalf of Europe. Economic relations with the EU should be maintained, but in the great power competition, Turkey's geopolitical autonomy and, in this context, a new structure centered on Ankara and the Turkic world should be taken as a basis. Europe is currently looking for military and political backing to compensate for its own weaknesses; what Turkey needs to do is to read this search correctly, but not to position its own strategic mind in a way that fills someone else's security gaps."

'IT IS NO COINCIDENCE THAT THE SUMMIT TO BE HELD IN ANKARA IS POINTED OUT'

Gürdeniz commented on German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul's reference to the summit to be held in Ankara for the future of NATO: "It is no coincidence that German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul points to the summit to be held in Ankara for the future of NATO. This is a clear indication that Turkey's geographical and military weight is seen as indispensable in the European security architecture. Europe today wants both to reduce its dependence on the US and to build a more resilient line against Russia. In this picture, Turkey is the key country on the line extending from the Black Sea to the Middle East.

However, there is a serious strategic risk here. Presenting Turkey as a central country in this process also includes the desire to effectively place it in Europe's frontline security belt. This carries a direction that could disrupt the delicate balances with Russia and damage the delicate and fragile balances established with the Montreux Convention in the Black Sea. While we maintain intense commercial ties with the EU economically, expanding the military role within NATO could push Turkey into a very, very risky and even dangerous position in the great power competition. Moreover, our domestic political picture also increases this risk. There is no real strategic dialectic between the current government's tendency to keep security and finance-based relations with the West alive to consolidate its power, and the opposition's approach of giving more open messages to NATO and the EU — and therefore to financial capital circles — in line with its goal of coming to power. There may be a difference in method between the government and the opposition; but in the big picture, there is a strong common ground regarding being engaged in the Western security architecture. This has the potential to narrow Turkey's geopolitical maneuvering space.

The summit in Ankara will ostensibly give Turkey prestige and diplomatic weight. But the issue is not symbolic, it is strategic. If this process drags Turkey into a sharper line of opposition with Russia, the economic and security costs could be heavy. Unfortunately, the current political atmosphere and the financial conjuncture our country is in do not seem very conducive to producing a dialectic that will approach this proposal with a distant and long-term state mind. I hope it turns out otherwise."

'IT IS PART OF A BROADER REGIONAL STRATEGY'

Gürdeniz commented on the background of the blockade policy applied by the US to Cuba. Regarding the relationship between the hardening of the policy in question and the occupation of Venezuela, Gürdeniz said, "There is a direct geopolitical link between the hardening of the blockade policy applied to Cuba and the American pressure and intervention process against Venezuela. The Cuban economy has relied heavily on oil support from Venezuela for many years. The energy cooperation between the Caracas administration and Havana was one of the fundamental elements balancing Cuba's chronic foreign exchange and energy deficit. The US increasing sanctions on Venezuela, intensifying pressure, and restricting Venezuelan oil trade has indirectly cut Cuba's energy vein. Thus, the blockade has ceased to be merely a financial and commercial embargo and has effectively turned into an energy siege.

For Washington, the issue is not just Cuba's economic capacity; although Cuba does not have as rich resources as Venezuela, a country in the US sphere of influence remaining outside American control is seen as unacceptable within the framework of the Western Hemisphere priority emphasized in the national security (NSS 26) and defense documents (NDS 26) of recent years. In this context, the hardening of economic pressures should be read as a strategic squeezing process spread over the long term rather than a short-term punishment policy. The goal is not direct military occupation, but to create economic attrition through sanctions, financial isolation, and energy cuts; to create pressure for transformation on the regime through social dissatisfaction and internal pressure over time.

Therefore, the intervention against Venezuela is part of a broader regional strategy that also targets Cuba. The resulting picture reflects a long-term power projection by the US aimed at re-consolidating its own control area in the Western Hemisphere."

US-IRAN TENSION

Regarding the view that the tension between the US and Iran will rise according to some sources, Gürdeniz said, "It is extremely unlikely that Washington will risk a large-scale and long-term war with Iran. The reason for this is not only the military cost, but the risk of the war escalating uncontrollably from the very first moment. Iran has hinted many times that it will not limit its response to military targets the moment the first bullet falls. In such a scenario, Israeli cities become direct targets; the conflict quickly turns into urban warfare and high civilian casualties. In this case, the war is no longer a limited operation managed by the US, but a regional and destructive fire.

Iran may also declare American bases on the territories of US allies as legitimate military targets. Bases in the Gulf, deployments in the Eastern Mediterranean, and presence on the Iraq-Syria line become at risk. More importantly, the possibility of the Strait of Hormuz closing would shake global energy markets, send oil prices skyrocketing, and drag the world economy into a serious crisis. Such an outcome would also severely affect the US economy. Therefore, a large-scale war is not rationally in the interest of either Washington or financial capital.

This conflict dynamic is more related to Israel's security perspective. A direct reckoning with Iran is at the center of Israel's strategic agenda. The US, on the other hand, would be the main actor that would have to bear the cost of this war. For this reason, the Washington administration is hesitant to enter a direct war. However, in domestic politics, especially during election periods, the expectations of the strong Israel lobby, the Evangelical base, and hardline circles can create pressure on the White House. This can sometimes lead to limited operations or harsh rhetoric in the nature of a show of force. But Iran has now declared that it will no longer tolerate such limited shows as it used to. Tehran, which thinks that a new attack comes after every controlled crisis, now defines the crisis as an existential threat. For this reason, who fires the first bullet will be critical. If the US or Israel initiates a direct military move, the conflict could quickly expand and regional destruction with high loss of life could become inevitable. It also seems difficult for the US to show social resilience to a long and costly war at a time when it is so divided domestically. For this reason, the rhetoric may be harsh; but a full-scale and long-term war is an extremely risky and difficult-to-control option for Washington."

'A COMPETITIVE ORDER THAT CONSTANTLY PRODUCES CRISES'

Regarding what kind of a world the "imperialist aggression," which is increasing in intensity day by day, will shape, Gürdeniz explained, "My opinion is that 'imperialist aggression' will not progress with large and long-term wars under US control in the coming months and years, but rather with small-to-medium-scale, short-term, and repeated shock crises. Because a long war puts Washington in a difficult position in terms of both cost and domestic front resilience. However, the goal today is to manage the system with controlled tremors, disrupt the growth rhythm of its rivals, and enter the post-hegemonic period as advantageously as possible. In this context, another goal is to re-establish the internal social balances, which have become very strained and polarized, especially as a result of ICE operations, with state power - using force if necessary. Because every country hopes for an external threat when there is trouble inside. The US is also trying to get through this troubled period at home with the small-scale crises it creates. In this way, both attention is diverted and the opportunities to implement the regime of oppression and autocratic measures are increased. Indeed, Trump's rhetoric of a $1.5 trillion defense budget for 2027 points to a great security state reflex not only against the external front but also against the fragility within the country.

In this framework, the strategy for the coming period should be read as squeezing China through energy and critical minerals rather than defeating it with a direct all-out war. The goal is to make China's access to energy expensive, to pressure supply lines, to make its dependencies in the field of critical minerals/intermediate goods a bargaining chip, and to narrow its maneuvering space by making China more dependent on 'risky/open to blackmail' energy ecosystems like Iran and Venezuela. The goal is not to collapse China; but to create friction that will keep its growth permanently below the 3% band and to gain bargaining superiority for the US while the new order is being established.

Therefore, the main result that will shape the world will be a competitive order that constantly produces crises, rather than an era of great wars. Sudden jumps in energy prices, pressure on maritime transport lines, expansion of sanction regimes, bloc formation in technology and critical minerals, and the weaponization of monetary-financial channels are options. Trumpism here, while claiming to fight with 'globalists/financial capital' on the one hand, consolidates its bargaining power by growing the security apparatus and creating selective shocks abroad on the other. The US's goal is probably not to start new great wars; but to wear down its rival without entering a long war, to realign alliances, and to enter the post-hegemonic period with a better starting position."