The 'Middle East' between the lines of the NATO Summit is alarming

The NATO Summit in Ankara left behind not only a final declaration but also a vast amount of political material that could be debated for a long time, both globally and in Turkey. The future of the alliance, defense spending, the war in Ukraine, and Turkey's position within NATO were the visible agenda of the summit. The Middle East, however, was not at the center of the table, but right beside it. It was not discussed much, but the lines between the summit and the accompanying diplomatic traffic offer more than enough reason to be concerned about the near future of the Middle East.

THE IRAN CLAUSE IN THE FINAL DECLARATION: A SYMBOLIC BALANCE RATHER THAN A STRONG MESSAGE

The inclusion of Iran in the NATO Summit final declaration was significant in itself. However, the wording of the relevant clause actually fell short of the political impact it created at first glance.

Stating that Iran should not possess nuclear weapons is not a new or radical stance. Iran, which is already a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, has never officially stated that it aims to develop nuclear weapons. Let us admit that the debate here is not about what Iran says, but at what point its nuclear program will turn into military capacity. For this reason, the phrase "Iran must never possess a nuclear weapon" is not a new threshold from a legal and political perspective. As might be expected, the declaration also gives no indication of what NATO would do if Iran were to move toward crossing this line.

The emphasis on freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz is similarly a call for a return to the pre-war situation. The Strait of Hormuz was already open before the war. Therefore, there is a desire here to restore the status quo that was disrupted by the US and Israel.

For this reason, the Iran clause can be read more as an attempt at political balance. It seems that a space for symbolic satisfaction has been opened within the alliance for US President Donald Trump, who has not fully found the support he sought from NATO countries in his operations against Iran. In short, it can be said that this clause served more to appease Trump than to "deter" Iran.

TRUMP'S IRAN RHETORIC: BETWEEN WAR AND NEGOTIATION

Trump's fluctuating statements about Iran continued in Ankara as well. On one hand, he said the war was not over, while on the other, he did not close the door to a diplomatic solution. This ambiguous language has become one of the most characteristic features of Trump's foreign policy rhetoric: Magnify the threat, leave the door to negotiation ajar, and finally use uncertainty as a bargaining tool! Trump has done this before in North Korea, in the trade war with China, and regarding Russia. Of course, it should not be forgotten that this language, which oscillates between toughness and reconciliation, is aimed at the domestic public as much as it is at the other side.

The memorandum of understanding signed between Iran and the US in June actually reflected this situation quite well. It was already unrealistic for problems that have not been solved for decades to be decided in a few weeks of diplomacy under war conditions. The current state of non-conflict, which is occasionally violated, is more of an interim silence than a lasting peace. This silence may give Trump breathing room until the upcoming elections. It may provide Iran with an opportunity for economic and military recovery. It may also give regional countries time to take new positions. However, the recent history of the Middle East shows that temporary ceasefires are often a preparation period for the next conflict rather than peace.

THE F-35 ISSUE: JETS AND BEYOND

Turkey's F-35 issue carries a broad meaning in terms of air power, regional balances, and, in fact, the hierarchy within NATO.

Although Trump says he approaches the resolution of the problem positively, it remains unclear how the political, diplomatic, and legal obstacles will be overcome. The S-400 issue, CAATSA sanctions, the stance of Congress, and Turkey's status in the program remain just as they are, amidst all the rumors.

Today, the F-35 is in the air forces of countries such as Italy, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Norway, in addition to Israel. Greece is also trying to acquire these jets. Turkey's possession of F-35s could create a change, especially in Middle Eastern and Mediterranean geopolitics. It is therefore not surprising that Israel is strictly opposed to Turkey's F-35 issue. Israel has long been trying to impose its military superiority on the entire region. Turkey's possession of F-35s could directly affect this superiority calculation, in which Israel has "invested" heavily in the Middle East.

It is clear that the current tension between Turkey and Israel remains largely at the level of rhetoric and serves a function of addressing domestic audiences. However, there is also a distinct divergence between the two countries' projections regarding the future of the region. The F-35 issue could make this divergence more visible and more strategic. This increases the risk of a struggle for influence that could be carried out through proxy actors in fragile fields, rather than the possibility of a direct hot conflict.

It is precisely at this point that the Lebanon and Hezbollah file gains importance.

LEBANON: A FORGOTTEN FAULT LINE

It was alarming that while Trump was praising Ahmed al-Shara in Ankara, he explained what a great gesture he made to Israel by "giving the Golan Heights" and also touched upon the Lebanon-Hezbollah issue. The statements clearly showed that Trump wants to assign a greater role to Syria in the Lebanon issue.

This approach by Trump is extremely problematic and quite risky. Because Lebanon is a political laboratory where almost every historical tension in the region overlaps. Sectarian balances, the Palestinian issue, Syria's historical influence, Iran's reach, Israel's security concerns, the interventions of Western powers, and the refugee problem are intertwined in the same geography.

The destructive legacy of the Lebanese Civil War seems largely forgotten today. Yet the war, which began in 1975 and lasted 15 years, did not just tear Lebanon apart; it created a multi-layered regional crisis that drew in Syria, Israel, Palestinian organizations, Iran, and Western powers.

For this reason, trying to intervene in Lebanon through any actor in Syria is extremely dangerous. While stability has not yet been achieved in Syria, which is a bomb ready to explode itself, giving Syria the role of "establishing order" in Lebanon means more than just absurdity; it means igniting the fuse of a new regional crisis.

Such a development could lead to the re-regionalization of the Iran war through Hezbollah, the evolution of the Israeli-Palestinian issue onto a different plane, and the emergence of new tensions in the Arab world. Our neighbor Syria could also once again turn into the front line of regional competition.

In addition to these, a Lebanon crisis with Syria at its center could become an indirect outlet for the tension between Turkey and Israel. A ground for competition could emerge where the parties do not face each other directly, but support different actors and different security networks.

Eastern Mediterranean Dimension

A new crisis that could be experienced through Lebanon would undoubtedly also affect the already tense Eastern Mediterranean balances. Lebanon's geographical location is important due to its energy lines, maritime jurisdiction areas, and proximity to the Israel-Syria-Turkey triangle.

The Eastern Mediterranean has long been one of the centers of competition between Turkey and Greece, Southern Cyprus, Israel, and Egypt. Energy projects, military bases, air power, and maritime jurisdiction areas are the fundamental elements of this competition.

Recent developments between Greece, Southern Cyprus, France, Egypt, and Israel can be read as part of an effort to create a power asymmetry in the region against Turkey. While it is open to debate whether Turkey's acquisition of F-35s could change this balance, it can be thought that it would bring about a new arms race.

Therefore, it would be incomplete to view the F-35 file only as an element of Turkey-US relations. The issue is also related to Israel's security calculations, Greece's military capacity, the power balance in the Eastern Mediterranean, and Turkey's regional position.

BEYOND WHAT IS VISIBLE AT THE ANKARA SUMMIT

Therefore, the Ankara Summit and the diplomatic contacts conducted on its margins show that separate crisis headings in the Middle East are increasingly meeting on a common tension line. The fragile ceasefire in Iran, the new role assigned to Syria, the Lebanon and Hezbollah file, and the tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean are fueling the same regional pressure. The NATO agenda, which stands apart from these at first glance, made it more visible at the Ankara Summit how these fault lines could connect to each other in the coming period. I hope all these possibilities remain only between the lines of the summit without turning into reality.