US-Iran Agreement: A threshold for peace or a fragile interim period?

It appears that the US and Iran have reached an agreement on a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the fate of the war. According to reports in the media, the final signatures are expected to be placed in Switzerland on June 19. The full text has not yet been shared with the public. Therefore, every assessment made must carry a margin of caution. Nevertheless, the draft framework conveyed to the press by Iranian sources suggests that the agreement is not a comprehensive solution that eliminates the primary causes of the war, but rather a temporary political arrangement that freezes the conflict and gives the parties some breathing room.

THE STRATEGIC LIMITS OF THE “VICTORY” NARRATIVE

The arguments put forward by the US, along with Israel, to justify the attack on Iran were extremely severe and structural: Iran’s nuclear capacity, its ballistic missile program, its relationships with regional proxy forces, and finally, the regime’s position within the regional security architecture. However, the draft reflected in the press does not produce a final, verifiable, and institutionalized solution on any of these topics. The agreement appears to focus on issues such as the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, the lifting of the US naval blockade, the avoidance of new sanctions, a temporary waiver on oil sanctions, and a new 60-day negotiation process. However, the fate of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles, the scope of the nuclear inspection mechanism, what will happen to its ballistic missile capacity, and the framework under which the issue of relations with proxy forces—on which Iran is quite reluctant to step back—will be handled remain uncertain.

For this reason, it would be more accurate to read this agreement as an attempt to temporarily manage a war whose strategic costs are rapidly increasing. The Trump administration may claim that it has dealt heavy blows to some critical elements of Iran’s military capacity, liquidated important command echelons, and narrowed Tehran’s regional maneuvering space. But that is exactly where the problem begins. It is not clear what these so-called tactical successes mean for the US in terms of strategic objectives. In other words, the victory narrative that Trump is trying to construct seems quite detached from reality when evaluated in terms of the political goals of the war. The regime in Iran remains in place; its state capacity has not collapsed; Iran was already saying it had no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons, and it remains at that same point. Proxy networks have not been liquidated. Iran’s regional deterrence, despite all the blows it has received, could not be eliminated. This situation shows that, specifically for the US, military superiority has not translated into strategic success; on the contrary, the war has merely postponed a significant portion of the issues it was expected to resolve to a more costly and fragile diplomatic ground.

NOT REGIME CHANGE IN IRAN, BUT SECURITY-ORIENTED CONSOLIDATION

Moreover, it is highly likely that the war will produce results in Iranian domestic politics contrary to what was expected. Although the killing of high-level Iranian figures, including the Supreme Leader, has revealed significant vulnerabilities of the regime, such traumatic ruptures often reinforce the security-oriented veins within the system in Iran. Considering that his son Mojtaba Khamenei might succeed him in the post-Ali Khamenei equation, and given the relationships Mojtaba Khamenei has established with the Revolutionary Guards and the security apparatus, it would not be surprising at all if Iranian politics evolved toward a more militaristic and hardline stance. In this sense, rather than producing regime change, the war seems to have paved the way for the regime to re-consolidate with a more security-oriented formulation.

HORMUZ, THE ECONOMY, AND TRUMP’S DOMESTIC POLITICAL CALCULATIONS

For Trump, the most urgent function of the agreement should be sought in the short-term results it will create in domestic politics, rather than in producing a lasting success in foreign policy. The Iran war made the vulnerabilities in the US economy visible due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the pressure on energy supply security. Before the upcoming midterm elections, oil prices, inflation expectations, and uncertainty in the markets had begun to create a serious political cost for the Trump administration. In this context, the reopening of Hormuz will provide Trump with both economic relief and a “I solved the crisis” narrative that he can present to the public. However, there is, of course, a very important contradiction here. Before the war, the Strait of Hormuz was already open. If what Trump will present as his greatest diplomatic achievement today is making a strategic route that the war itself closed operational again, the question of why the war was started remains in the air with all its weight.

Optimism should also be kept limited regarding energy markets. The opening of Hormuz seems likely to create a short-term easing in oil prices. However, due to maritime transport, insurance costs, security risks, mine clearance, Iran’s potential regulations regarding the transit regime, and the damage sustained by Gulf energy infrastructure, expecting a quick return to pre-war stability is not realistic in the short term. Moreover, the war has also called into question the reliability of the US security umbrella for the Gulf monarchies. Although the US regional presence currently seems indispensable for these countries, the costs and effectiveness of this presence are now being questioned much more.

THE DEBATE OVER STRATEGIC FAILURE IN ISRAEL

Another critical issue is how Israel will approach this agreement. Because the US did not start this war alone. The fundamental problem with the draft agreement for Israel is how much of the war’s declared political goals have been (or have not been) achieved. The first reactions from the Israeli opposition signal that the agreement will be read as a serious strategic failure for the Netanyahu government. Yair Golan’s characterization of the agreement as an arrangement made over Israel’s head, which erodes military gains at the diplomatic table and offers a lifeline to the Iranian regime, is noteworthy in this respect. Similarly, Yair Lapid’s criticism that the agreement leaves the Iranian regime in place, does not touch the missile program, and could allow for the reconstruction of nuclear infrastructure shows that the issue will be debated in Israeli domestic politics directly through Netanyahu’s security leadership. The common point of these criticisms may be that the “security architect” image that Netanyahu has been trying to build for years could be seriously eroded in the face of a diplomatic agreement where Trump is the determining factor.

This situation creates a two-dimensional vulnerability for Israel. In addition to the failure to achieve goals regarding Iran’s nuclear, ballistic, and proxy force capacity externally, internally, the Netanyahu government could be accused of dragging Israel into a position of an actor dependent on US decisions with limited diplomatic influence. In this context, if one remembers that the conflict has largely continued in the form of proxy wars following the ceasefire signed in April, the uncertainty in the Lebanon file will remain one of the most fragile links of the agreement. It is highly likely that Israel will turn to military and intelligence moves that will push the limits of the agreement, even if it does not sabotage it.

NOT A SOLUTION, BUT A FRAGILE INTERIM PERIOD

In conclusion, the text before us is more of an interim formula aimed at temporarily managing the economic, military, and political costs that the war has begun to produce, rather than a historical diplomatic success that ends the war. Iran was damaged but not destroyed. The US showed strength but could not reach the declared goals of the war. Israel is not satisfied. And the Gulf is left with a more insecure security architecture. Therefore, the real issue is not whether the agreement will be signed, but whether it can truly calm the tension lines in the Middle East if it is signed. Because the postponement of unresolved crises in the region often does not produce stability. On the contrary, it gives actors the opportunity to reposition themselves and prepare the conditions for the next showdown. For now, the current situation seems more like a signifier of a fragile interim period that carries new tensions within it, rather than a diplomatic threshold opening to peace.