Why did Hakan Fidan and İbrahim Kalın fall out? The new equation in the resolution process...

Sercan MERİÇ

It all began with the call made by MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli at his party's group meeting on October 22, 2024, about a year ago.

That day, Bahçeli had proposed the "lifting of the isolation" of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. He even requested that Öcalan speak at a DEM Party group meeting and declare that the organization had been disbanded. There was a concept that stood out in this speech, which shook the political world: "The right to hope..."

Bahçeli had extended a hand for Öcalan to be released from prison.

It is useful to go back 21 days before this speech.

On October 1, 2024, the opening of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) took place. Bahçeli's handshake with DEM Party deputies at the opening of the General Assembly was captured by cameras. This handshake brought to mind the words Bahçeli uttered after the 2023 General Elections: "Many things will change. I hope the Republic of Turkey does not change."

The frog was being heated slowly, but it was unclear how far it would jump. Bahçeli announced that range.

On October 8, Bahçeli defined the hand he extended to the DEM deputies at the opening of the TBMM: "Become a party of Turkey, take a stand against terror."

In fact, these were times when we were witnessing the step-by-step shaping of a pre-planned policy. Although that statement on October 22 caused astonishment, it was a move that had been signaled in advance.

That day, Bahçeli proposed that if conditions were met—such as lifting Öcalan's isolation conditions, Öcalan speaking at a DEM Party group meeting, and declaring to the public that terror had ended and the organization had been disbanded—arrangements such as the use of the 'right to hope' for Öcalan could be made.

One day later, Ömer Öcalan met with Abdullah Öcalan at İmralı Prison. Shortly after, DEM Party delegations applied to go to İmralı, and contacts were made with the Ministry of Justice. In parallel with Bahçeli's statements, Öcalan also began sending messages to the PKK to "withdraw to a political and legal ground."

The public had difficulty adapting to Bahçeli's MHP, which turned the key to the "new resolution process," and the traffic to İmralı.

Naturally, eyes turned to the AKP and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

What would Erdoğan say?

Had Bahçeli made such a call without Erdoğan's knowledge, or was the process being carried out as the People's Alliance had planned in advance?

All these questions were discussed in the media and by the public. But not enough!

Erdoğan spoke about the "new resolution process" for the first time at his party's group meeting on October 30, 2024. He said, "While borders are being redrawn in our region, our primary interlocutor in the path of preserving our eternal brotherhood forever is our Kurdish brothers themselves. My dear Kurdish brother, we want you to protect your faith, your Islam, your call to prayer, your homeland, and the law of brotherhood. Come, let us build the Century of Turkey together."

Bahçeli and Erdoğan's statements were parallel, and it was obvious that there was a common consensus on how the new process would proceed.

It is precisely at this point that the "Turk-Kurd-Arab" emphasis made by Erdoğan was the clearest data regarding a new paradigm related to the identity of the Republic that is being attempted to be changed. At this point, we witnessed the birth of a new contradiction between Erdoğan and Bahçeli. Or an illusion shown as a contradiction...

In this contradiction, we must remember: What happened in the first process, where do those who managed the old process stand in this, with what motives are those who manage the new process making these moves, what kind of approach and attitude do all parties involved in the process show, and what political gains is the main goal of this process?

It is not possible to answer all these questions...

First, let's lend an ear to the whispers in the government wing:

We learn the following from Ecevit Kılıç's book "The New Deep State," published by Doğan Kitap: This process began under the coordination of the 10th President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, former MIT Undersecretary Sönmez Köksal, and Afet Güneş, who was expected to become the MIT undersecretary. Afet Güneş had the leading role in the Oslo negotiations...

There is no point in telling the time that has passed and dragging out the story. Afterward, this work proceeded under the coordination of former MIT Undersecretary and current Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. As time passed, there was a change of duty. İbrahim Kalın came to the head of MIT. Fidan was appointed as Foreign Minister.

The rumor is that; before this distribution of roles, Fidan was almost going to be banned from politics by Erdoğan. When we think about how he was blocked by the Palace following his announcement as a Diyarbakır parliamentary candidate by Davutoğlu, these allegations seem consistent with the nature of things...

Let us convey that it has been talked about in Ankara's backrooms for some time that this change of duty damaged the relationship between Kalın and Fidan in a way that cannot be repaired.

It is clear that the "new resolution process" had soured the relationship between this duo. It began to be frequently voiced that Fidan was against this process.

MIT President Kalın said the following at a press conference he held in İnegöl a month ago, on August 20:

"The most important issue at this stage in the resolution process is now 'the complete silencing of weapons,' that is, the terrorist organization laying down its arms. When this is achieved, as the President (Erdoğan) has previously stated, the process will have reached its goal."

It is also useful to remember what former MIT President and current Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said:

After Bahçeli's first statement, Fidan said, "The elimination of the YPG is our strategic goal," and added: "The elimination of the YPG is our strategic goal. Either they dissolve themselves, or they will be dissolved."

On January 10, 2025, he said, "The new Syrian administration should be given a chance."

On January 6, 2025, he said, "The liquidation of the YPG is near."

On July 11, 2025, he said, "We will remain on alert until the KCK, with all its components and elements, ceases to be a threat to our country, our nation, and our geography."

There is a difference between Kalın and Fidan: Kalın coordinated the act of laying down arms by conducting diplomacy. Fidan, by raising the stakes, shows his attitude that this work will fail. Yet, it was Fidan who managed the process behind closed doors in Oslo...

So, why is he taking a stance against this issue today?

The preparations taking place in the AKP for the post-Erdoğan era are one of the answers. In the book "The Secret Cube" (Sır Küpü) written by Caner Taşpınar, we read that Fidan is trying to play a Polat Alemdar with a Valley of the Wolves (Kurtlar Vadisi) effect and the preparations he is making for his own career for the post-Erdoğan era.

Many people who pondered this issue were politically "destroyed" by Erdoğan.

Therefore; both İmralı and DEM executives trust Kalın, not Fidan. It is not for nothing that DEM Co-Chair Tuncer Bakırhan said, "It is better for us to talk to Kalın than to Fidan; there is an intellectual difference between the two."

The answer to the question in the headline lies a bit here.

Tomorrow: How did the Fidan-Kalın struggle reflect in the media?