Balances shifted in Bab-el-Mandeb: The vacuum in the Red Sea line strengthens the hands of the Houthis and Iran

Recent developments in the Bab-el-Mandeb line, where the Red Sea opens into the Gulf of Aden, have reopened the debate on the balance of power in the region. The Houthis' consolidation of control over certain critical points along the Yemeni coast and around the strait in September has made the fragility of the strategic architecture that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel have long sought to build in the Horn of Africa-Red Sea equation visible.

In assessments regarding the region, it is emphasized that Bab-el-Mandeb, through which approximately 12 percent of world trade passes, is of critical importance not only for the Yemen war but also for global energy and container shipping. The increased influence of the Houthis around Mayun/Perim Island has led to interpretations that Iran could exert more pressure on maritime passages through its allies in the region.

This picture points to the limits of the influence policy that the UAE has developed in recent years through ports, bases, and local allies along the Yemen, Socotra, Mayun Island, Somaliland, and Puntland line. Abu Dhabi's approach has long been a subject of debate in the region due to its support for local or sub-state actors instead of central state structures.

THE UAE'S MARITIME LINE HAS BEEN SHAKEN

The support the UAE has provided to the Southern Transitional Council in Yemen and to structures like Somaliland in the Horn of Africa was associated with the goal of creating a security and influence network in the southern Red Sea. Among the stated justifications for this line were monitoring maritime traffic and preventing the Iran-linked flow of weapons reaching the Houthis.

However, the tension between UAE-backed forces and Saudi Arabia in Yemen caused this structure to disintegrate rapidly. The moves of the Southern Transitional Council toward Hadhramaut and Al-Mahrah were evaluated as a threat to border security in Riyadh. Subsequently, the withdrawal of the UAE from certain critical points in Yemen weakened the footholds of the anti-Houthi front on the coast.

This vacuum facilitated the Houthis' advance along Yemen's Red Sea coast starting in the summer months. Developments around Mocha, Perim/Mayun, and the Hanish Islands have strengthened assessments that control has effectively changed hands on the Yemeni side of Bab-el-Mandeb.

In some analyses based on US officials, attention is drawn to the role of Iranian Revolutionary Guard elements on the ground. In Abu Dhabi-based publications, it was claimed that Quds Force commander Abdolreza Shahlaei was influential in directing the operations. These allegations brought with them interpretations that Iran is trying to obtain an indirect leverage tool over passage security in Bab-el-Mandeb, just as it does in the Strait of Hormuz.

ANKARA, CAIRO, AND RIYADH MET AT THE SAME POINT

The tension in the Red Sea is not limited to Yemen. Israel's move toward recognizing Somaliland was seen as a direct challenge by Turkey, which defends the territorial integrity of Somalia. Ankara has been one of the primary actors supporting Somalia's unity within the scope of the military and political relations it has developed with Mogadishu since 2011.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's characterization of the recognition of Somaliland as "illegitimate and unacceptable" clarified Turkey's stance on this file. Joint statements made with Saudi Arabia and the support given to the Somali federal government showed that Ankara and Riyadh have met on a similar line on this topic.

Egypt also approached the same position for different reasons. Cairo views Bab-el-Mandeb as a strategic extension of the Suez Canal. Ethiopia's memorandum regarding maritime access and establishing a base with Somaliland was evaluated in Egypt in connection with discussions on both canal security and water security in the Nile basin. For this reason, Cairo chose to increase defense cooperation with the Somali federal government.

Ultimately, the regional equation that the UAE and Israel have tried to build through local actors like Somaliland has led actors such as Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar to take a more distinct stance around the central Somali government. The fact that the African Union and the European Union also emphasized the territorial integrity of Somalia strengthened this counter-position at the diplomatic level.

The current situation in Bab-el-Mandeb shows that Red Sea security can no longer be ensured solely by external military presence or port investments. The Houthis' statements of pressure on Saudi maritime shipping and the decline in Saudi crude oil shipments have made the risk the strait carries for global energy flow concrete.

The new picture emerging in the region indicates that the strategy of establishing influence through proxy structures that weaken central states has not produced the expected stability. While the vacuum formed on the Yemeni coast strengthens the hand of the Houthis, and thus Iran, the rapprochement between countries defending the integrity of Somalia in the Horn of Africa has also accelerated. This change at the southern entrance of the Red Sea will continue to be one of the most critical topics of both regional competition and global trade security in the coming period.