How will the future of Syria under Al-Shara's administration be shaped? 'The cost to the AKP could be very high'

Ahmed al-Shara, leader of the newly established Transitional Government in Syria, has claimed he will put an end to the uncertainties following the Assad era. However, the situation in the 'new' Syria suggests that the country's problems have not diminished. As the map of Syria is being redrawn, the Israeli occupation and ongoing conflicts have raised questions about the future of the region. Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal evaluated the latest situation in Syria for 12punto.

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The Israeli army, which has advanced to within 20 kilometers of Damascus, is building military bases in the Syrian territories it occupies. Ahmed al-Shara, a former HTS member who was on the US list of wanted terrorists until 2024, has emphasized in his statements so far that they want to integrate with the West. Although a Damascus-based administration has been established in Syria, the conflicts in the country have not yet ended. On the other hand, while armed groups in different parts of Syria are conducting negotiations with the Transitional Government, they have not yet accepted the new authority in Damascus.

Following the Victory Conference held in Syria on January 29, 2025, Ahmed al-Shara was declared the president of the new Syrian government. While the Transitional Government stated that it needs a few years to prepare the country's new constitution, it also made statements indicating that they want to preserve the country's territorial integrity. Meanwhile, Transitional Government President Al-Shara stated that they would not enter into any conflict with Israel, which continues to occupy Syrian territory. As new problems emerge in Syria after the Assad era, uncertainties regarding the future of the region seem to be increasing. We discussed the problems that emerged with the end of the Assad era, the West's influence on the Al-Shara administration, and Turkey's Syria policies with Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal.

PROBLEMS OF THE NEW SYRIA

Ünal shared the view that problems have not decreased with the end of the Assad era, but rather that both problems and uncertainties have increased. In an environment where the Al-Shara administration seized power without elections, no clear date has been given for when the new constitution will be prepared.

Pointing to the contradictory statements made by the Transitional Government regarding when legitimate elections will be held in the country, Ünal noted the following regarding potential future problems:

''I do not think there are more positive options ahead for Syria compared to the Assad era; the problems have not decreased, they have rather diversified. We can say that both problems and uncertainties have increased. The current interim Syrian government first said 3-4 years for the drafting of the new constitution and elections, now they are saying 4-5 years. This could bring many problems with it.

It is difficult to predict where the discussions will evolve while trying to draft a constitution that will satisfy everyone during the transition period. It remains uncertain whether certain circles or groups will take up arms to gain rights within the framework of the new constitution, saying, 'We do not like this course of events.'''

Drawing attention to reports of violence in Syria, Ünal shared his view that even if the reliability of these reports is uncertain, significant problems are being experienced. Ünal stated, 'To put it as a general assessment, I do not think Syria's problems have diminished.'

'THEIR FOREIGN POLICY WILL BE AS THE WEST WANTS'

Stating that the new government in Syria is shaping its foreign policy in parallel with the lines of Israel and the US, Ünal explained that Iran and Hezbollah are defined as enemies by the al-Shara administration.

Ünal explained the Transitional Government's perspective on foreign relations with the following words:

'I think Syrian foreign policy will largely be in line with what the US, Israel, and the West want. The head of the transitional government, al-Shara, has already declared this. We are talking about an administration that is as pro-Israel as possible. This administration is already saying that it will not allow Syrian territory to be used against Israel in any way, that it wants to integrate with the West, that their only enemy in the region is Iran and therefore Hezbollah, and that they have no problems with other countries in the region.'

The foreign policy of the al-Shara government is generally parallel to the lines of the US and Israel. Since the day Assad was overthrown, Israel has occupied significant parts of Syria, that is, the remaining parts of the Golan region—the areas it could not occupy in the 1967 war. Al-Shara has no discomfort regarding Israel. On the other hand, reports recently emerged that they had launched attacks on Hezbollah. We do not know how accurate this is, but it is understood that they were fiercely repelled by Hezbollah. 

I think the new administration's general foreign policy framework will largely be formed in the way the West, and especially Israel, wants.' 

ISRAEL'S INFLUENCE IN SYRIA

With the collapse of the Assad regime, it was not only domestic groups that established their own spheres of influence in Syria. Following Assad's ouster, Israel also seized areas beyond the Golan Heights, which it has occupied since 1967. As the Israeli occupation expands, the al-Shara administration has declared that it will not enter into conflict with the Tel Aviv administration.

Ünal emphasized that he does not expect a conflict between Israel and Syria in the near future. Stating that the Druze region in southern Syria has come under Israeli control, Ünal explained the relationship between Israel and the al-Shara administration with the following remarks:

'Al-Shara is in a very weak position; they arrived in Toyota pickup trucks and seized power. They took control as a result of an as-yet-unexplained situation where the Syrian army did not want to fight. Now, it would be wrong to expect them to engage in a struggle with Israel. Furthermore, al-Shara says that they are not in such a position ideologically. He also states that those who have such intentions will not be given a place on Syrian soil.' 

'On the other hand, the question of what will happen to the territories occupied by Israel is a separate debate. The remainder of the Druze region, which Israel occupied in the 1967 war, has now also come under Israeli control. It is difficult to predict what will happen in these areas. Currently, what the Druze are saying is this: "If there is a federation and we, as Druze, obtain certain rights, we will integrate this region into Syria," meaning a federal Syria; otherwise, they are making remarks like "we could join Israel." This could turn into reality.'

Emphasizing that he does not expect the al-Shara government to 'struggle against Israel for any reason,' Ünal expressed the following:

'It can even be said that the collapse of Syria is the greatest success Israel has achieved since 1947, almost without firing a single shot. In fact, with this course of events, which it strongly supported, Turkey has given a great gift to Israel, which it criticizes so heavily.'

HOW WILL THE FUTURE OF TURKEY-SYRIA RELATIONS BE SHAPED?

Reports have appeared in media outlets close to the AKP government suggesting that Turkey will have 'great' influence over the al-Shara administration. While Ünal believes Turkey will have influence over Syria, he stated that he does not agree with claims that this influence will be 'unlimited.'

Regarding the customs tax decisions of the Al-Shara administration, Ünal noted that the taxes applied to Turkey during the Assad era remain in place, while these taxes are no longer applied to other countries, describing the situation as 'interesting'.

On the other hand, Ünal described Turkey's influence in Syria as follows:

'The talk in the pro-government media that whatever we want in Syria will happen is empty rhetoric. That is not how it works. But it would also be an exaggeration to say that Turkey's influence could be reduced to zero. Turkey will have some influence. But will this influence be a decisive one? I am not very sure about that.

This much can be said: Turkey is not pursuing policies in Syria that align with its national interests. We are acting quite emotionally these days. We are approaching the situation within the framework of a mission to put Syria back together.'

Noting that the right thing Turkey is doing in the region is 'focusing on the PKK/PYD issue,' Ünal also pointed out that the government has not taken any steps regarding the 'refugee issue'.

'In general terms, I think Turkey's approach to the PKK/PYD issue and its attempt to guide the central government on this matter is correct. However, the issue of refugees, which should be another priority for Turkey, is not being addressed at all.

Here we understand that the propaganda on TV for over 10 years—that 'if these people leave, Assad will slaughter them; Assad is a murderer who drinks people's blood, that is why these people fled'—was not true. Assad is gone now. There is an administration that they claim will be much better for these people. But they are still not interested in sending the refugees back.

It is therefore possible to conclude that 'Turkey actually does not want to send the refugees back.'