Turkey Analysis in Le Monde diplomatique: Erdoğan's Dilemma
An article by Jean Michel Morel in Le Monde diplomatique suggests that for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to run for a third term in 2028, he may be forced to negotiate with various political actors such as the DEM Party, the IYI Party, and the New Welfare Party (Yeniden Refah). However, the difficulty of reconciling nationalist interests with the Kurdish movement simultaneously is interpreted as a major political test for the government.
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The August issue of Le Monde diplomatique magazine addressed the reconciliation process in Turkey. In the analysis written by Jean Michel Morel, the dilemma facing AKP Chairman and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was summarized as follows: Should he seek reconciliation with the opposition, or continue to exert pressure on his political rivals?
The analysis included the following statements:
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan faces a critical dilemma in order to become President for a third time in 2028. The Constitution only allows for two consecutive terms. Erdoğan was elected in 2014, 2018, and 2023. A constitutional amendment is required for him to run again. This requires either going to a referendum with the support of 360 deputies in Parliament or making a direct change with the approval of 400 deputies. However, the number of seats held by the AKP (267) and the MHP (50) is not sufficient for this.
The government has potential alliance options ahead of it:
DEM Party (64 deputies): Represents Kurdish voters, left-wing groups, ecologists, and feminists. Their demands include the release of political prisoners, the withdrawal of state-appointed trustees, the recognition of Kurdish identity, and the freedom of Abdullah Öcalan.
IYI Party (44 deputies): Follows a nationalist–center-right line. Led by Akşener, who was the implementer of harsh anti-Kurdish policies in the past. An alliance with the DEM Party seems difficult.
New Welfare Party (Yeniden Refah Party) (5 deputies): Follows an Islamic–nationalist line. Stands out with calls for Sharia and the Caliphate; it is diametrically opposed to the Kurdish movement.
This equation is quite complex for Erdoğan. It is almost impossible for him to reconcile with both the IYI Party and the DEM Party at the same time.
However, there is a new development on the ground: Upon the call of Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK dissolved itself and laid down its arms in the spring of 2025. This historic turning point paved the way for the Kurdish issue to be discussed in Parliament again. A "National Solidarity and Democracy Commission" was established in Parliament, and a dialogue environment for peace was created. Even MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli addressed Öcalan, saying, "Let him come to Parliament to declare that terrorism has ended."
This picture offers a new exit door for Erdoğan: Thanks to the peace process with the Kurds and steps toward democratization, he could both gather the support necessary for constitutional change and win the support of approximately 17 million Kurdish voters. Furthermore, he must reduce tensions with Kurdish forces east of the Euphrates in Syria; as integration talks between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Damascus administration began in 2025 with the mediation of the US.
In conclusion: Erdoğan will either continue his authoritarian line of governance and reach a dead end with his shrinking support, or he will reach out to the opposition—especially the Kurds—to try to secure his third term.