Where is the Russia-Ukraine war heading? The third year on the front lines

Suat TEKİN - 12punto.com.tr

The war between Ukraine and Russia has entered its third year. In the war, which Russian President Vladimir Putin described as a 'special military operation' and which both Russian and Western analysts expected to end quickly, at least tens of thousands of people from both sides have lost their lives to date.

Over the past two years, millions of people have become refugees. Meanwhile, rearmament in Europe has gained significant momentum. European countries imported 93 percent more weapons in the 2019-2023 period compared to the 2014-2018 period. In recent months, both Western and Russian officials have made statements highlighting the possibility of a conflict between the West and Russia in the coming years. Most recently, French President Emmanuel Macron suggested that troops could be sent to Ukraine. 

CGTN Türk news coordinator Erkin Öncan and harici.com.tr editor Emre Köse, discuss how Ukraine and Russia are being affected by the war, what kind of future awaits the region and the world, and the potential outcomes of the conflict. to 12punto.com.tr. evaluated.

RUSSIA AND UKRAINE: BEFORE AND AFTER THE WAR

Assessing the current situation in Ukraine and Russia, Öncan stated that Ukraine is experiencing political infighting, corruption, and resource issues. On the other hand, he underscored that Russia is much better prepared for war militarily, economically, and socially. Köse, meanwhile, points out that Russia is turning eastward economically, while he describes Ukraine's situation as 'political and financial exhaustion' as he defines it.

Öncan describes the situation with these words:

"The ongoing conflicts have, of course, affected both countries in various ways. Regarding Ukraine, it is possible to say that the 'right-wing' and 'pro-Western' transformation Ukraine underwent following turning points such as the 2004 Orange Revolution, the 2014 Maidan events (or Maidan coup), and 2019, when Zelenskyy came to power, has ended in failure. The processes in Ukraine where all these significant transformations took place were also the scene of competition between political factions that were simultaneously standing together and struggling against one another. Zelenskyy coming to power in 2019 with a promise of 'peace' ended in disappointment. This disappointment occurred long before the Russian attack, due to the domination of armed neo-Nazi groups, which represented the most dynamic force of those factions. Today, Ukraine is struggling with fighting against Russia, internal power conflicts, and problems regarding the use of military/financial aid coming from the West (which is seen as insufficient). Socially, delayed demobilization periods, forced conscription, and corruption reflected in the public eye are increasingly fueling social unrest."

On the other hand, pointing to Ukraine's problems, Köse says the following:

"On the Ukrainian side, there is a palpable sense of political and financial exhaustion. Even the government that was formed following the street protests after 2014 severing ties with Russia had a devastating effect on its own. Furthermore, Ukraine had already lost the Donbas region, the cradle of its industrial production. The number of people who have fled the country since the war began also tells a story. The country has lost most of its workforce. The Financial Times recently warned that drafting agricultural sector workers as part of general mobilization would bankrupt the food sector. There are also signs of the manpower shortage and the tightening of mobilization practices. It appears that Ukraine no longer has the resources to sustain its existence as a state."

Öncan also states that the economic sanctions imposed on Russia have been largely ineffective.

"As for Russia, it is possible to say that the Kremlin had been 'preparing' the Russian public for an operation in the Donbas for a long time, in parallel with the developments in Ukraine. In other words, when Russia's operation began on February 24, 2022, the majority in Russia already supported this war, or at the very least, saw it as 'necessary.' With the war, it was seen that the economic, political, and even social sanctions imposed on Russia did not work as expected, especially in the economic sphere. Of course, the Russian economy also suffered great damage from the war, but the reason it did not suffer as much as the West expected is due as much to the Russian economy taking the necessary measures quickly as it is to the West's dependence on Russia. Today, we see that economic sanctions against Russia are being circumvented in various ways by many European companies themselves."

On the other hand, emphasizing that Russia approaches the war not as a Russia-Ukraine war, but as a war between NATO and Russia, Öncan continues his words as follows:

"Another important issue is this: the Kremlin never prepared for this war as a Russia-Ukraine war. Russia has always promoted the idea that this war is a step in a 'reckoning' between Russia and the West, led by the US. Both this, and the fact that the people of Donbas are Russian and the historical ties shared with Ukraine, led the Russian public to largely support this war. Nationalists, communists, and liberals in Russia mostly support this war. In fact, the Communist Party and the Liberal Party had long been advocating that Russia should take control of the Donbas, well before the decision of the Putin administration. Therefore, by prioritizing the sense of protecting the 'legacy' left by the Soviets and the 'Russian identity,' the Russian state manages to provide the necessary motivation against economic and political sanctions, even when economic difficulties are experienced."

Köse also says the following regarding Russia's situation:

"If we start with Russia, the intensification of sanctions after February 2022 has been a phenomenon felt in every area of life. Some foreign companies withdrew from the country or transferred their businesses. We witnessed Russian citizens being banned from international sports competitions and cultural and artistic events. An intense witch hunt was launched using irrational methods. Economically, it was seen that Russia broke away from the West and turned to the East; that is, due to Western embargoes, it began supplying its commodities, primarily oil and natural gas, to China and India. On the other hand, it can easily be noticed that the sanctions did not create the expected effect; Russia's growth this year exceeded that of most developed Western economies. Likewise, the sanctions did not bring about an end to the military intervention in Ukraine."

WHAT IS THE SITUATION IN THE WAR IN ITS THIRD YEAR?

Both experts believe that Russia holds the advantage based on the situation on the front lines, though the strategy the Russian army will pursue remains unclear.

Öncan assesses the military situation on the ground with the following remarks:

“When we look at the current situation on the ground, the general consensus is that the war has entered a phase of ‘stalemate.’ Another prominent view is that for Russia, all these steps are part of a ‘bigger picture,’ where Russia is locking down the field and waiting for Ukraine and the West to wear themselves out. I think both are partially true. It is clear that the active urban warfare strategy of neo-Nazi forces, weapons provided by NATO/USA, and CIA training have challenged Russia. Russia has experienced delays in its strategy of ‘forcing Ukraine to the negotiating table through military deterrence,’ both on the ground and due to the ‘uncompromising’ statements of the Ukrainian administration, which relies on the West. This, of course, is reflected on the battlefield. However, another important point that should not be forgotten is that as we enter the third year of the war, Russia has still not shifted into ‘full-scale war’ mode. Moreover, in terms of manpower and ‘political unity,’ Russia is in a more advantageous position than both Ukraine and the West. In other words, there is no social movement within Russia with the power to change the course of this war. The existing anti-war factions are largely discredited because some are directly pro-Western, and their political space is very limited. Most of the anti-war protesters, who are mostly young, are unorganized.”

Öncan also states that Ukraine’s offensive power has been exhausted.

“The counter-offensive, which was expected with great hope and heavily invested in by the West and Ukraine, ended before it even began. This is a picture that emerged from a series of factors, such as aid becoming a subject of greater debate in the West, the countries providing aid reaching a point where their own economies are affected, the inability to deliver aid on time, instability in Ukrainian politics, and failures on the ground. It is precisely for this reason that Ukrainian forces have shifted their focus in recent months from all-out front-line attacks to sabotage attacks against Russia. At the rhetorical level, the Ukrainian administration says it aims to take back even Crimea, but we can say it is common knowledge that an effective counter-offensive is now a dream.”

Köse, who evaluates Ukraine’s military situation, expresses that Western military aid has remained ineffective with these words:

“Kyiv’s spring offensive last year ended in a heavy defeat, and it turned out that the Leopard tanks supplied as a result of meetings held under the Ramstein contact group—primarily to convince a hesitant Germany—as well as other US-made Abrams and British-made Challengers, did not do much good despite being called ‘miracle weapons.’ The type of weapons supplied to Ukraine has become more serious over time, and recently, the supply of long-range missiles that could allow them to strike targets inside Russian territory has been on the agenda. Berlin is currently under pressure regarding the supply of Taurus missiles. And the weapons are running out; now, the deployment of NATO troops to Ukraine has been heard from Macron’s own mouth. Although it is known that a large number of Western military and intelligence personnel are in Ukraine under the title of ‘advisors,’ especially from the United Kingdom, this statement has a different meaning. Rather than comparing the war capabilities of Moscow or Kyiv, it would be more accurate to discuss whether this will evolve into a direct NATO-Russia war. It seems that this possibility is not very far off.”

THE WEST'S SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE AND THE FINANCIAL BURDEN OF THE WAR

Assessing the course of the war, Öncan and Köse pointed out that the support provided to Ukraine has sparked political debates in the West. According to Köse, the fact that Western countries supporting Ukraine have begun to experience financial difficulties threatens Ukraine's war efforts. Öncan, meanwhile, stated that Western military support will not end in the short term.

Köse noted that the West is becoming fatigued due to the financial burden of the war and offered the following assessment:

“Russia's hand on the battlefield is currently strong, and it has been able to adapt its economy very well to active weapons production. This was also previously stated by retired military officer Mick Ryan, an expert at the CSIS think tank, in his article for Foreign Affairs. Moscow struggled to shift gears early in the war, but it is learning better than Kyiv now. And perhaps even better than the West, which has realized it is struggling to produce weapons according to wartime needs. On the other hand, public support has also become strained. The impact of sanctions and the cutoff of cheap natural gas supplies have fueled deindustrialization in Europe, particularly in Germany. Therefore, a significant sense of fatigue prevails, and one can see that calls for the start of negotiations are increasing.”

Öncan summarized his views as follows:

“First of all, I do not think that the West's military support for Ukraine will end in the short term. The biggest example of this is the new show of force initiated with Steadfast Defender. Furthermore, the US and the West are in great need of a ‘Russian threat’ and a climate of war. This is an important way to deflect social unrest caused by serious problems such as the migration crisis, the climate crisis, and the economic crisis. We could call it a kind of ‘external enemy’ narrative. From the US perspective, Ukraine is one of the most important stops in the strategy to contain Russia. Moreover, accepting defeat in Ukraine after this point would be a development that would strengthen the hand of the opposition within Western countries themselves. Therefore, I do not think the support will be interrupted, but its scope will certainly decrease because it has reached a point that directly affects Western countries. Of course, if Trump is re-elected president in the US, it will completely change the equation. As you know, one of the biggest criticisms Trump has leveled at the Biden administration concerns its stance on the Ukraine war.”

TRANSNISTRIA AND GAGAUZIA’S REQUEST FOR ‘PROTECTION’

Evaluating the requests from Transnistria and Gagauzia for ‘protection’ from Russia, both Öncan and Köse see the probability of the war spreading as low.

Öncan evaluated the 'protection' request from Transnistria and Gagauzia, drawing attention to the importance of the port of Odessa:

“The process experienced by Transnistria and Gagauzia shows great similarities to what is happening on the Ukraine and Donbas front. The presence of a significant Russian population in Transnistria, Moldova, just as in Ukraine; the presence of a Russian military contingent; the fact that Gagauz Turks are considered 'pro-Russian' because they are politically closer to Russia; and the pressures applied by the central government on these two regions—similar to what Ukraine has done—regarding the native languages, identities, and political preferences of the Gagauz and Transnistrians... All of these represent problems that have remained unresolved since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It is a struggle between pro-Western governments and ethnic groups or autonomous regions that are Russian or close to Russia.”

Therefore, all of these are problems created by the 'color revolution' wave that emerged during and after the collapse of the USSR. It was an expected situation for these two regions in Moldova to ask for help from Russia. Because both regions consist of people who long for the Soviet era, advocate for closeness to Russia, and are at peace with their Russian identity.  It is difficult to predict whether the war will spill over outside of Ukraine; unexpected developments can occur every day. However, thinking specifically about Moldova, the fact that the disputed regions of Transnistria and Gagauzia share a border with Ukraine's Odessa region—and knowing that Odessa is a vital gateway for Ukraine to the Black Sea and is among Russia's most important targets—certainly provides some signals... If the war continues actively and Russian forces capture Odessa, they will be bordering Transnistria and Gagauzia, which have already openly requested help from Russia and are facing pressure for being perceived as pro-Russian.”

Köse, on the other hand, emphasized that Russia does not want to spread the war to different geographies:

“Statements emerged from the Tiraspol parliament and Gagauzia that did not quite resemble mere speculation, and a vague request for 'diplomatic support' was heard. In any case, there is no doubt that these regions have increased their contact with Russia. However, Moldova is a region that has increasingly fallen under the influence of NATO member Romania in recent years, a territory that Bucharest has transformed from the inside out and even considers its own. It is not out of the question for the autonomous regions here to become new fronts, and the fact that the Chisinau administration, following Igor Dodon of the Socialist Party, has become deeply engaged with the West under Maia Sandu and is showing signs of abandoning neutrality suggests that the danger should not be ignored. In truth, despite the hysterical reactions in the West, Moscow has no intention of turning Poland, the Baltics, or Southern Europe into a battlefield. It does not even have the intention of capturing Western Ukraine.”

IS THERE A POSSIBILITY OF CONFLICT BETWEEN RUSSIA AND NATO?

Evaluating the possibility of a conflict between NATO and Russia, both experts agree that it would be incorrect to expect a clash in the short term.

Öncan assessed the possibility of a conflict between NATO and Russia with the following remarks:

“I am frankly not sure if there is an imminent risk of war for NATO countries that share a border with Russia, especially the former Soviet states. Because in all the risky areas we have seen so far, we have observed ethnic or political conflict zones where the Russian population was a party to the issue. It was like that in Ukraine, and it is the same in Moldova. The countries I mentioned, however, do not harbor significant Russian populations or ‘pro-Russian’ politics; they have long since completed their Western integration and joined NATO with the latest rounds of expansion. Therefore, I do not think a conflict will break out in these countries as it did in Moldova and Ukraine. However, what will increase tension there is NATO increasing its military presence. In Steadfast Defender-24, the largest NATO exercise since the Cold War, the alliance will practice the ‘transfer of military power’ from the Atlantic to Eastern Europe, and some countries bordering Russia will become key bases for this exercise. The Russian side had stated that if the threat increases, the ‘places where the threat originates’ could also become legitimate targets. What increased the tension was NATO starting a large-scale war rehearsal. Therefore, I think it is too early to say whether a total world war will break out in the next 5 years, but it is possible to say that military tensions and regional conflicts will continue.”

Köse stated the following:

“It can be said that Russia wants this the least. It is hoped that negotiations will resume in a short time. Historians have questioned extensively how European powers fell into the First World War, the first catastrophe of the 20th century. However, only a large-scale military operation involving the entirety of NATO could bring Russia to the brink of conventional defeat.”