A warning of ‘internal conflict’?

Since 2002, we have been sliding down the rankings as a country.

In the process that began with the AKP government, we have continuously declined in democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. 

We have fallen further and further in democratic standards.

The cornerstones of the rule of law have eroded one by one. While we were saying “we have anchored below mediocrity,” we are now rapidly heading far below mediocrity in every field.

If you see this only as a political assessment made from within, let us now look at a few data points coming from the outside.

The Spanish-based Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria’s research organization, BBVA Research, measured the long-term geopolitical vulnerabilities of countries in a study titled “Assessing Structural Geopolitical Risk,” published on June 15, 2026.

In the “Internal Political Risk” ranking prepared according to the 2021-2025 average, Turkey is in ninth place among 164 countries.

Ahead of us are Nicaragua, Myanmar, Venezuela, Yemen, Eritrea, Chad, Belarus, and Afghanistan.

Turkey is not in the same boat as these countries. The research does not say that Turkey has the same regime as these countries either.

What it says is much different, much more disturbing:

Turkey’s internal political and institutional vulnerability has grown enough to enter the ranks of the countries with the highest risk in the world.

In other words, it does not explicitly say, “the risk of internal conflict and civil war in Turkey is increasing, people are looking for opportunities to choke each other and gouge out each other’s eyes,” but it is implying it.

So why? 

That is the real question.

The answer is hidden in the figures of the research. BBVA created the Internal Political Risk indicator based on four main elements.

Political polarization, electoral democracy, the rule of law, and income inequality.

The values obtained in these four headings are enough to explain why the table is so disturbing.

Turkey’s political polarization indicator is 3.36.

The electoral democracy indicator is 0.29.

The rule of law indicator is 0.15.

The Gini value, which shows income inequality, is 44.48.

So, the ninth place is not a ranking that came out of thin air. It is the result of multiple indicators emerging together.

In the methodology of the research, political and institutional indicators constitute the weighted part of internal risk. Elections and democracy, the rule of law, political polarization, and income inequality together determine approximately 65 percent of internal political risk.

Now let us turn back to Turkey.

How did polarization grow so much?

Polarization in Turkey did not start yesterday. After 2002, it became, and was made into, one of the main tools of politics. When we look at the 23-year political practice of the AKP government, we see that elections have not remained merely democratic races that determine the government.

In every election, a new opposition was placed before society. They defined one side as “us” and the other as “them.” They did not hesitate to put dynamite under the social structure to gather their own voters around a common goal.

They portrayed the other side not as a rival making choices according to their own political understanding, but as a threat to the future of the country.

This method was enough for them to win all the elections. However, the political tension used to win elections did not disappear when the ballot box closed; on the contrary, it settled into society.

The result?

Trust has decreased.

Tolerance has decreased.

The ground for compromise has narrowed.

Polarization has grown.

Political risk has become structural.

This is a serious breaking point for a country. Because what we are discussing here is now far beyond the issue of “politics in Turkey has become a bit harsh”; it is the fact that political polarization has become a measurable structural risk.

In short, Turkey is already located in one of the most critical geopolitical regions in the world. The power struggle in Syria, Iraq, Iran, the Russia-Ukraine war, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Caucasus, and the Middle East is already increasing Turkey’s external risks.

Now you add the internal risks to this.

Let us return to 2002, let us go back to the beginning. What has happened in Turkey since that date? The standard of democracy has regressed. The rule of law has eroded. Trust in institutions has weakened. Elections have increasingly turned into an existential struggle. Different segments of society have drifted apart.

Political polarization has ceased to be a temporary tool for winning elections and has turned into a permanent social reality.

The cost of living that hurts more every day, inflation, the economic crisis that has been turned into a ruthless transfer of capital, and the injustice in income distribution that has reached terrifying dimensions...

Today, we see the reflection of these in BBVA’s figures.

We are in ninth place among 164 countries.

This is not a declaration of disaster, but let us conclude our article by saying that it is also very important in terms of drawing attention to the great danger facing Turkey.