The barometer of society and the 'sedative' effect of the CHP

It is no secret that the People's Alliance and the DEM Party members wanted to cast the CHP in the leading role of this "betrayal" theater, which they have called a "process" from the very beginning.

According to them, the matter is extremely simple:

While Islamists, Kurdish nationalists, all sorts of enemies of the Republic, and their imperialist collaborators are collectively planting dynamite at the foundations of the country, the CHP should be by their side and even provide support so that the people of my country can be easily kept under control, things do not get too chaotic, and the nation does not get agitated and pour into the streets.

We know they thought that a strong and unifying opposition reaction could be prevented by the "sedative" effect the CHP would create on the masses.

They had already seen that Özgür Özel was able to successfully guide the voters in all the rallies he held since March 19, accompanied by songs, folk music, and slogans.

Looking from this perspective, it is possible to say that bringing the CHP on board was a highly logical strategy from their point of view.

When we consider the insistence of Öcalan and the DEM Party that "the CHP must definitely be in the parliamentary commission" and "there must also be CHP members in the Imralı delegation" within the same framework, the picture becomes even clearer.

Moreover, the CHP's management staff, especially Özgür Özel, does not stand at a point very far from them. With talk of a "city consensus" and the like, they are already in a shy alliance behind the scenes.

However, the color of the situation changed when Bahçeli cornered the parliamentary commission by saying, "I will take my three friends with me and go to Imralı."

The people of my country were practically agitated. No one accepted a blood-stained terrorist being treated as an interlocutor by the Parliament.

The society's reaction barometer dropped rapidly.

Already, there had been unease within the CHP for a long time. Public opinion polls showed that the vast majority of society, as well as the CHP base, were firmly against CHP deputies going to Imralı.

For the people of my country, the issue was not just about security or sensitivity to terrorism. This was also a debate about "legitimacy." The fact that a registered terrorist responsible for the deaths of 50 thousand people was being accepted as legitimate, acceptable, and reputable had deeply wounded consciences.

In short, when Özgür Özel saw this reaction from the base, he hit the brakes, but he still waited for a while. He stalled until the last minute, but when the storm did not subside, he necessarily took into account the reaction of the CHP voters or the masses who vote for the CHP out of a sense of duty because they see no other alternative to the government, and said, "We are not going to Imralı."

Beyond being a simple "no," this was a highly critical and profound political position "regarding the process."

Let us put on our reading glasses.

It is possible to evaluate the political moves of the DEM Party over the last year as "pushing the center of the opposition toward the CHP, but also linearly bringing the CHP closer to the DEM." In other words, we can say that they thought they could advance in the process in question by being in constant contact and pulling the CHP's political position toward their own demands.

This method was a well-thought-out political engineering that provided the opportunity to indirectly control the energy and orientation of the opposition voter, as well as "claiming every step taken by the CHP as their own success."

The inclusion of CHP members in the Imralı delegation would have been the most critical stone of this architecture.

However, with the decision "not to go," that stone was dislodged, and the entire construct was shaken. The DEM Party's strategy was severely thwarted. A major gap was opened in the plan to direct and control the opposition through the CHP.

If Özgür Özel had not said "no," he would have significantly brought his party closer to the political coordinates of the DEM Party. This would have strengthened the DEM Party's position, which can be summarized as the "main determinant of the opposition." At the same time, it would have reinforced the perception that "the CHP is on the same ground as us." Furthermore, it would have provided new material for the "CHP-DEM collaboration" narrative that the government has been building for a long time.

With the CHP hitting the brakes, this chain was broken. One stone was pulled back, and the whole equation fell apart.

This is where the rubber meets the road...

Because, until that moment, both the government and the DEM members thought that Özgür Özel would include one of the deputies in the commission in the delegation that would go to Imralı. Then he would come out and soften the voters, venting the frustration of the agitated opposition citizens of my country, which is exactly what those who orchestrated this process wanted.

Ultimately, he was at the head of the main opposition party and had the power to prevent the masses from consolidating against the government over this issue.

However, things turned around very quickly.

When it became clear that the nation would not follow the CHP, the CHP had to follow the nation. It became clearly evident that its voters no longer wanted to carry the label of "secret lover of the solution process" that had been attached to their party for years. Entering the same picture once again could have shaken the CHP both ideologically and sociologically.

Naturally, this created great disappointment among the DEM members.

They did not even feel the need to hide it; for example, DEM Co-Chair Tuncer Bakırhan said, "This country will give the necessary answer with its vote to those who do not rush to extinguish this fire." The other Co-Chair, Tülay Hatimoğulları, declared, "We express with sadness that the codes created by the century-old policy of denial and annihilation are being revived again and again." Sırrı Sakık said that the CHP had caused great sadness and disappointment.

But Pervin Buldan delivered the knockout blow. She went on her social media and addressed the People's Alliance with a post saying, "The main opposition party is the DEM Party. Period," with a message meaning, "This business no longer works with the CHP; it's best to just shut it down. We will be the Main Opposition instead of the CHP."

Clearly, they were shocked. They saw the CHP also treating Öcalan as an interlocutor as having critical importance for the process.

For the DEM Party, the real loss is not that they did not go to Imralı; it is that the CHP pulled itself out of their common political ground. Let us underline this with a thick pen.

On the other hand, their capacity to keep the opposition at the desired consistency has diminished. The "we determine it" influence they had over the CHP has been broken. The permeability between the bases has weakened. They have fallen behind in the leadership race within the opposition.

If we look at the other side of the equation...

A strategic breathing space has emerged for the CHP. The pressure from the base has eased. The voters received an answer, one way or another, to the question, "Where does the party stand?" The ambiguity has been removed. It did not lose its own axis to the DEM Party; it chose to determine the leadership of the opposition not at the table, but through its own political reflexes.

The essence of the matter is this: For the first time in a long time, the CHP refused to enter a line determined by the DEM Party.

However, what happens next is much more important.

We do not yet know what the coming days will bring. It is difficult to say for now whether Özgür Özel will lead this tactical battle he won toward a political victory or whether he will sound the retreat under the pressure of the ethnicist-sectarian faction within the party.

We will all see that together, but more importantly, the government and its collaborators have seen that the opposition citizens of my country can influence the CHP's political positioning whenever they want, and they have realized that they will not be able to shape politics from now on just with short passes in a narrow space, let us conclude our article by saying this.