How did imperialism tear Yugoslavia apart?

US imperialism, having taken one of its two strategic allies, Israel, along with it (the other being the UK), is attempting to reshape the Middle East. The priorities of the US and Israel include the liquidation of nation-states in the region, regime change and even border adjustments in Iran—which is next in line after Iraq and Syria—and ensuring full US control over energy resources and routes. Among these priorities are also the rolling back of Chinese and Russian influence in the region, the establishment of a Kurdish state as a garrison and puppet state, and addressing the security concerns of Saudi Arabia.

As the US and its European partners advance their imperialist goals, they are also making full use of identity politics. To both divide Middle Eastern countries from within and incite them against one another, they are provoking and aggravating remnants of the Middle Ages and vestiges of feudalism, including affiliations, allegiances, and sensitivities. The goal is to first persuade these countries to adopt federalism through feudalism, and then to divide and fragment them.

In this context, the events that took place in Yugoslavia in the last decade of the previous century offer important lessons regarding the consequences of ethnic, religious, and sectarian slaughter. Let us recall that Yugoslavia—which interpreted socialism in its own unique way, considered regional and global balances, was not a member of the Warsaw Pact, took significant steps in the fields of economy and industry, drew attention with its successes in sports and arts, and held a respected place in the Non-Aligned Movement—was torn apart in a bloody manner. Today, there are 7 states in place of Yugoslavia: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia, and Kosovo.

Yugoslavia, which literally means the Land of the South Slavs, was established after World War II under the leadership of Tito, who was referred to as a marshal due to his military successes during the war, despite not being a professional soldier. Tito was a patriot who defended his homeland against the occupying Nazis, a successful commander, a formidable organizer, a staunch socialist, and a successful and charismatic statesman. Tito, whose father was Croatian and mother was Slovenian, believed in independence, self-management, federalism, and a socialist market economy. He did not hesitate to fall out with USSR leader Stalin. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consisted of 6 federal states and 2 autonomous regions: Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Montenegro, and Croatia were the federal states; Vojvodina and Kosovo were the autonomous regions. Tito's leadership and charisma meant a great deal to his country. With the death of Josip Broz Tito on May 4, 1980, Yugoslavia entered a period of crisis. With the encroachment of imperialism, the process of disintegration began.

WHY WAS YUGOSLAVIA CHOSEN AS A TARGET?

Yugoslavia held a unique and important position in the Balkans, not only geographically but also politically and diplomatically. It had an effective administration. It was socialist, yet not under the influence of the USSR. It had an independent line. It stood out with its industrial infrastructure and skilled human resources.

Alongside these, it also had significant problems. There were many ethnic, religious, and cultural differences. Corruption was widespread in the bureaucracy. Rising nationalist movements were drawing attention. There were deep differences in economic development among the federal republics that made up Yugoslavia. Serbia, which held the majority of the population and military power, and Slovenia and Croatia, which were economically developed, thought differently about the future of the country. The collapse of the Eastern Bloc in 1989 and the USSR in 1991 left Yugoslavia isolated against the West.

The economic and political steps taken to end the socialist regime in Yugoslavia and extend the life of the federation, the adoption of a market economy, and the transition to a multi-party system did not yield the expected results. On the contrary, they accelerated the country's disintegration. Both socialism and the federal state collapsed at the same time. In this respect, its fate resembled that of the USSR. Different political movements in different federal republics did not cooperate to keep the country afloat. Ethnic and religious sensitivities strengthened under the guise of democracy and freedom imposed by the West. In every federal republic, separatist movements, organizations, and actors came to the fore with support from the US and Europe.

Yugoslavia's unique socialist model, based on a Yugoslav supra-identity, had been successful while Tito was alive. However, after Tito, it was seen that national issues and identity problems had not been resolved, and the conflicts between them had never disappeared. Another misfortune for the country was that the new world order, globalization, and imperialism brought identity politics to the fore and set their sights on Yugoslavia.

WHAT WAS TITO'S GREAT CONCERN?

According to Tito, the founding leader of Yugoslavia, the country—which housed numerous ethnic communities—represented an integrated political identity that was independent of and transcended ethnic differences. However, Tito was also aware of the games imperialism was playing on his country; in 1971, he said: "...They are calculating that everything will collapse once Tito is gone. Some are seriously expecting this. The internal enemy receives countless support from the outside. Great powers use every kind of devil that will serve their purpose."

In the first 35 years of the Cold War, Yugoslavia stood out as the country with the most liberal economy, the most libertarian political structure, and the highest level of ethnic and religious tolerance in the socialist world. Tito's three management principles were decisive in its prominence with these qualities: 1) Ensuring local freedoms through the concept of self-management. 2) Establishing ethnic harmony within a single-party administration through the concept of brotherhood and unity. 3) Serving world peace through the concept of non-alignment in foreign policy. With Tito's death in 1980, the country lost its most important unifying glue, and these three principles began to decay. The global economic crisis that was effective in the early 1980s also put the country in a difficult position. The differences in economic development between the federal republics had become clearly apparent. (1)

It was better understood after his death that Tito was much more than a founding leader or a national hero for Yugoslavia; he was an actor who enabled coexistence. It was seen that the efforts to institutionalize the commonalities and similarities between the different peoples, cultures, and religions that made up the federal republic were not as successful as hoped, and that the Yugoslav supra-identity that was sought to be carefully created could not be formed to the desired extent. The principle of "brotherhood and unity," which Tito never tired of repeating, was forgotten after his death. Indeed, 10 years after his death, the civil war had begun.

In the 1981 census, it was striking that in a country of 22.4 million people, only 5 percent of the population defined themselves as "Yugoslav." This 5 percent segment consisted mainly of civilian-military bureaucrats, party officials, and intellectuals. For 95 percent of the citizens, ethnic identity, historical memory, and national sentiments were the priority. The deterioration of the economy in the 1980s also fueled the reaction against the government and reinforced nationalist sentiments. The multicultural, multi-identity, multi-religious, multinational, and multi-ethnic structure, along with the economic development differences between the federal republics, provided the US and the European Union with an environment they could use, scratch, and provoke.

DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO DISINTEGRATION

Different interpretations have been made regarding the disintegration of Yugoslavia as a result of years of bloody civil wars.

Some experts state that the support of the US and the European Union for fascist actors in Yugoslavia divided the country. They say that Western imperialism could never stomach a strong and united Yugoslavia in the Balkans.

According to some experts, the main reason for the division is economic. Slovenia, with its wealth and strong industry, and Croatia, which had large tourism revenues and was in a better economic situation, saw other parts of the country as a burden. They moved closer to the European Union, especially Germany, and demanded independence.

Some experts argue that the collapse of the USSR put Yugoslavia, which had very strong trade with that country, into an economic bottleneck and brought about the division.

According to some experts, the element that united the peoples in Yugoslavia was communist ideology. With the collapse of communism, this bond disappeared, and the country was divided as a result of rising extreme nationalism.

According to other experts, the greatest responsibility for the disintegration of Yugoslavia lies with Serbian nationalism. Serbian nationalism dreamed of a "Greater Serbia." It ignored the multinational, multi-religious, multi-lingual, and multicultural structure of the country. It saw Serbs as the sovereign and primary element of the country, used the Serbian minorities in the federal republics, supported Serbian separatists there, and thought it could prevent the country's division by resorting to violence. With these attitudes, it caused nationalist movements in other republics to strengthen and ultimately led to the country's collapse.

A study conducted in 1980 revealed the economic difference between the federal republics. According to the study, when the minimum living index is accepted as 100 for the Yugoslav average, it was 122 in Slovenia and 130 in Croatia. In contrast, it was 87 in Serbia, 76 in Montenegro, 66 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 64 in Macedonia. (2). Regarding economic approaches to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the GNP per capita (in US dollars) in the federal republics and autonomous regions with 1990–1991 data also gives an idea: Slovenia (5,500 dollars), Croatia (3,400 dollars), Serbia (2,200 dollars), Montenegro (1,700 dollars), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1,600 dollars), Macedonia (1,400 dollars). Vojvodina (3,250 dollars), Kosovo (730 dollars). (3)

After Tito, Serbia, which was politically strong and constituted the largest population, tried to transform the federal state into a unitary state. Slovenia and Croatia, which were economically strong, tried to transform it into a loose confederation. The rich republics did not want to "carry" the poor republics and saw them as a burden. The first signs that they would break away from Yugoslavia with a demand for independence came from the two rich republics, Slovenia and Croatia. Serbia, based on the fact that Serbs lived in different federal states, was eager to interfere in the internal affairs of these federal states. This increased the reactions.

The religious and sectarian population structure of Yugoslavia was as follows: Orthodox Christians made up one-third of the population, coming in first in this respect. One-quarter of the population consisted of Catholics. 15 percent of the population was Muslim. Although there are some differences according to sources, the ethnic and religious distribution in the federal states and autonomous regions in Yugoslavia in 1981 was as follows:

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Muslims 39.1 percent, Serbs 32 percent, Croats 18.4 percent.

Croatia: Croats 75.1 percent, Serbs 11.5 percent.

Macedonia: Macedonians 67 percent, Albanians 19.6 percent.

Montenegro: Montenegrins 68.5 percent, Muslims 13.4 percent.

Serbia: Serbs 66.4 percent, Albanians 19.6 percent.

Slovenia: Slovenes 90.5 percent.

In Kosovo, Albanians made up 77.5 percent of the population. In Vojvodina, 55.8 percent of the population was Serbian and 21.7 percent was Hungarian. The largest minorities consisted of Albanians, Hungarians, Roma, Bulgarians, Romanians, Slovaks, and Turks. (4)

In Yugoslavia, which had a population of 23.5 million in 1990, Serbs constituted the largest population with 10 million people. Of these 10 million, 6 million lived in Serbia, 1.5 million in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 600,000 in Croatia.

THE FOOTBALL MATCH IN ZAGREB AND THE DISINTEGRATING COUNTRY

While Slovenia and Croatia, the two rich federal republics of Yugoslavia, complained about the centralized economic structure and saw the other republics as a burden, they were also saying that the system constantly favored Serbia. According to them, they were working and producing, but the Serbs, who were in the majority in the bureaucracy, trade, and banking, were reaping the benefits of the country.

Slovenia was very eager for independence. Because it was both the richest federal republic and had a relatively homogeneous population. It had already turned its face to the free market economy and integration with Europe. It trusted its developed economy. It was receiving support from Germany, which had historical ties and backed it. It was pursuing a nationalist policy that excluded and looked down on the poor and weak federal republics. Croatia also trusted its economic power. It was a federal republic where nationalism was effective.

Macedonia, the poorest federal republic of Yugoslavia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the most ethnically mixed federal republic, wanted the federation to continue its existence in the form of a loose confederation. Both were wary of a federation that did not include Slovenia and Croatia. In October 1990, Croatia and Slovenia proposed that the federation be transformed into a loose confederation. Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina supported the thesis of a federation of sovereign states. Serbia and Montenegro, on the other hand, demanded a centralized federal system. (5)

Primarily due to the complexity of its ethnic, religious, and cultural structure, Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was the country that least wanted the federation to dissolve and desired a loose federation, had other reasons for opposing the disintegration: the weakness of its economy and its military vulnerability.

The political and social tension, which was running quite high, was fully exposed by a football match played in Zagreb, the capital of Croatia. The events that took place before the Dinamo Zagreb – Red Star match at Maksimir Stadium on May 13, 1990, the kick Croatian footballer Zvonimir Boban threw at a policeman, the injured police officers, and the fighting fans showed that living together was no longer possible. The process of division had been ignited by a football match played between Croatian and Serbian teams.

Shortly after this incident, on July 2, 1990, the national assembly of Slovenia, and then the national assembly of Croatia, took the decision for independence. On June 25, 1991, the two republics, which could not reach an agreement with the Serbs in the federation administration, officially declared their independence. On June 27, the federal army, under the control of the Serbs, intervened in Slovenia and Croatia. Slovenia was ready for war, as it had been secretly investing in its defense and taking the necessary steps for two years. It was the federal army that was not sufficiently prepared. Slovenia won the war. On the 10th day of the war, the federal army had to ask for a ceasefire. In Croatia, the federal army seized a quarter of the country, and the war ended in January 1992.

As a result, Yugoslavia disintegrated in 1992. In the disintegrating lands of the country, conflicts, and especially genocides and massacres against Muslim Bosniaks, took place. Even if they disintegrated, deep disagreements and crises of confidence came to the fore between the states that would live as neighbors in the same region. The winner was US and European imperialism.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Oral Sander, Political History 1918-1994, İmge Kitabevi, Ankara, 1994, p: 493- 494.

2. Tanıl Bora, The Hunting Ground of the New World Order, Birikim Yayınları, Istanbul, 1994, p: 55.

3. Murat Taşar, Burhan Metin, Altay Ünaltay, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Introduction to the Postmodern Middle Ages, Birleşik Yayıncılık, Istanbul, 1996, p: 109.

4. Mehmet Atay, “A Brief Look at Political-Military Developments Affecting and Changing Balkan Geopolitics”, Avrasya Dosyası, Spring-Summer 1998, volume: 4, p: 112 – 113.

5. Emin Gürses, Nationalist Movements and the International System, Bağlam Yayınları, Istanbul, 1998, p: 185.