The Greater Middle East Project and Neo-Ottomanism

It has become abundantly clear that Israel is the party that has gained the most in Syria, while Iran is the one that has lost the most. Something else has also become clear: when foreign policy is conducted for the needs of domestic politics, sooner or later it pushes the limits of scale—in other words, its capacity.

Let us provide a concrete example. The power that the PYD-YPG, the Syrian offshoot of the PKK terrorist organization, has attained in Syria with the open support of the US and Israel, the privileges it has acquired, the concessions it has extracted, and finally its demand for a federal model for Syria at the conference in Qamishli, have deeply worried those who were optimistic about Syria's future. Yet, after the Ba'ath regime in Syria collapsed and Assad fled to Russia, there were those who had such dreams...

Those who spoke of expanding Turkey through neo-Ottoman policies, of growing by uniting with the Kurds of Iraq and Syria, of increasing our population as a Turkish-Kurdish-Arab state, and of consolidating our influence in the Middle East are now facing the bitter and ruthless realities of foreign policy once again.

Yet, according to these circles, the incomplete and unfulfilled National Pact (Misak-ı Milli) was coming to life. Ottoman lands were becoming Turkey's.

Let us recall that Ahmet Davutoğlu, the author of the Strategic Depth thesis and book, and a former foreign minister and prime minister, was also pursuing a proactive foreign policy in his own way, criticizing the foreign policy of the Atatürk era for being passive, inward-looking, and timid, and claiming that it had severed our ties with the Islamic world and the Middle East. According to Davutoğlu, Turkey was going to contribute to the global order by leading sub-regional orders. He used such flowery words, but in reality, Davutoğlu was proposing to be a subcontractor for imperialism or to act like a sub-imperialist. Again, according to him, just like the British Commonwealth, Turkey could establish a community of nations by leading at least some of the states that broke away from the Ottoman Empire. Also according to Davutoğlu, we were becoming the owner, spokesperson, and leader of the newly shaping Middle East. Not a bird was flying in the region without our knowledge. We knew the region like the back of our hand. We had historical responsibilities toward the region.

This discourse, of course, also overlapped with the rhetoric that viewed the Treaty of Lausanne as a defeat and belittled the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits. It fueled the conquest dreams of neo-Ottoman circles. It envisioned ending terrorism and separatism with a resurgent Ottoman identity and a consciousness of the Ummah. Moreover, this discourse appealed to everyone, to every segment. Nationalists were promised that we would integrate with the Turkmens in Iraq and Syria. To the Kurdish nationalists, it was said that we are growing with the Kurds of Iraq and Syria and meeting under a single roof. To the Ottomanists and Islamists, the good news was given that we were regaining the lands of the Ottoman era. To the Westernists, Atlanticists, NATO supporters, and liberals, it was said that the requirements of the Greater Middle East Project—also known as the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative—were being fulfilled, that Turkey would bring democracy to the region, and that after Iraq, autonomy would be granted to the Kurds in Syria as well.

In the region where three continents (Asia, Europe, Africa) meet, Turkey was both meeting the need for cheap labor and producing security on behalf of the West. Furthermore, our country was also becoming enriched with energy resources. It was, of course, also reaching new markets.

Such an illusion, such a political climate, and such a perception were formed that it is difficult to explain. Because while the paving of the way for the de facto division of Syria naturally makes the US, Israel, and the PKK terrorist organization and its offshoots happy, there is also a large segment that is pleased with this situation and sees itself as nationalist, conservative, religious, and neo-Ottoman.

As I conclude this article, let us remember that Henri Barkey, one of the CIA's senior Turkey experts, whom we also remember from the July 15 FETÖ coup attempt, said years ago: "After northern Iraq, Turkey must get used to a Kurdish autonomous presence in northern Syria."