The limits of US power, the stance of Russia and China

After the Cold War ended in 1991 and the Greater Middle East Project (later renamed the GMEP, or Greater Middle East and North Africa Project) was put into circulation in the 2000s, the US frequently used the following concepts: Preemptive strike. Controllable instability. Hybrid warfare. Asymmetric warfare. Liberating occupation. Humanitarian imperialism...

Thus, US imperialism produced justifications to occupy countries it could not collapse through psychological warfare, perception management, social engineering, dark war methods, and fifth-column activities. It listed excuses. It claimed that its attacks and occupations were for the good of the people of those countries. It said it was bringing human rights, democracy, and freedom to the countries it occupied. While occupying its target countries, it had another excuse, of course: the global war on terror. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, the US used the conjuncture in a way it considered very effective and efficient. Concrete examples of this were the occupations of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003.

The US no longer talks about human rights, democracy, or freedom when attacking and occupying. US President Trump feels no need to hide imperialist barbarism, piracy, banditry, or arrogance. He says directly that he has his eye on oil. He underscores that he does not care about international law. Indeed, he did this in Venezuela. Therefore, one should never forget the phrase commonly used in the US: “It is the oil, stupid.”

SOFT POWER AND HARD POWER

The days when the US deployed its soft power (culture, media, science, academia, art, sports, education, music, cinema, fashion, lifestyle, etc.) to establish hegemony, aimed primarily at manufacturing consent in the target country, and wanted to maintain its leadership in this way are long gone. There are several reasons for this.

First, there is erosion in the US's ability to manufacture consent and in its soft power elements, just as there is in its economic and political power. Second, soft power elements and tools are not as attractive as they used to be and do not carry as much weight. Third, a president who does not value soft power sits in the White House.

There is more. Just as the US is not the old US, the world is not the old world. Anti-Americanism is very high globally. No one believes the lies in the US's vocabulary about a “global fight against terror” or its words about democracy and freedom. The days of Pax Americana are over. The approach of “what is good for the US is good for the world,” which those who govern the US tried to ground in political, ideological, moral, and religious terms according to their own imperialist interests, had already collapsed years ago. This is one of the reasons why Trump, after saying during his presidential campaign that he would end wars, withdraw troops from the Middle East, and not send US soldiers to other countries, then attacked Venezuela and engaged in piracy.

Furthermore, Trump is also thinking about the 2026 midterm elections. He is aware of the polarization in American society, the weakening domestic front, the wealth-poverty gap, the country's massive foreign debt, and the high foreign trade deficit.

The US certainly has other dilemmas as well. For example, it could not drive a wedge between China and Russia. For example, it could not prevent the move away from the US dollar in foreign trade. It could not prevent many countries from trading in their national currencies. For example, it did not get the result it expected from the trade wars it started against China.

TWO-AND-A-HALF WARS ARE A THING OF THE PAST

For the US, the theory of two-and-a-half wars (fighting in two countries, being an occupier, and maintaining smaller-scale military forces in one country while activating other elements to change the regime) is a thing of the past. In the regions it selects as targets, it is increasingly involving regional allies, terrorist organizations, and non-state actors.

The US wants to establish an order in the Middle East under Israeli guidance. It is putting Israel at the forefront more than ever before. In Palestine and Lebanon, Israel has largely achieved what it wanted through genocides. In Syria, Israel is currently much more effective than in the past. Damascus has also accepted its occupation of the Golan Heights. Israel enters Syrian territory, plants flags, interferes in the country's internal affairs, and bombs military facilities. Israel's influence in northern Iraq over the Barzanis is also known. Since Iran is much tougher than Syria, the US is also actively supporting Israel in Iran. It encourages and incites opposition movements and street protests. The US is pleased with the Kurdish autonomous administration in northern Iraq and the Barzani leadership. Furthermore, by supporting the PKK-PYD-YPG-SDG terrorist organization, the US exerts pressure on Turkey and Syria.

Against China, which it sees as its main major adversary, the US is deploying various regional countries, large and small, from Japan to Australia, to the front line in order to encircle the country from its immediate vicinity. It is forming alliances for this purpose. For example, QUAD (US, Japan, India, Australia) and AUKUS (Australia, UK, US) are such alliances. The US is effectively organizing little NATOs, alliances that are siblings to NATO.

Global South countries, those that have been trying to distance themselves from the US in recent years and are turning toward developing relations with China and Russia, are naturally wary of US banditry. Middle and small-scale states, in a way that is very understandable for them, expect China and Russia to be more active against the US. These expectations did not find a response in Libya or Syria. They did not find one in Venezuela either. If the US were to attack Iran once again, it is highly unlikely that this expectation would find a response in Iran.

CONFESSIONS IN THE US STRATEGY DOCUMENT

There were important confessions in the national security strategy document that the US announced in December 2025. In essence, it was saying that it is no longer the sole great power in the world, that there are other great powers, and that it is the greatest. It stated that it would focus on the American continent and implement the Monroe Doctrine (known for the slogan "America is for the Americans"). It emphasized that it did not care about the European Union at all, and in fact, did not like it. It admitted that it could not be effective everywhere in the world at the same time. Because it could not afford to compete with China all over the world, from Central Asia to Africa, from the Middle East to Latin America, it stated that it would focus on the western hemisphere, the new world, its own continent. On January 3, 2026, Trump attacked Venezuela, kidnapped Maduro and his wife, and, in his own words, implemented the Monroe Doctrine with banditry, piracy, barbarism, and thuggery.

The fact that Venezuela, the country with the richest oil reserves in the world, was selling 80 percent of the oil it produced to China had been drawing the US's reaction for a long time. The US both seized Venezuela's oil and precious minerals and exerted pressure on an important oil supplier of its biggest rival, China. It gained control, to some extent, over China's oil imports. Indeed, after his act of piracy, Trump said in essence, “China shouldn't worry, oil sales to it will continue.”

WILL WORLD WAR III BREAK OUT?

Under these conditions, the following questions come to many people's minds: Will the US and China go to war? Will World War III break out?

Even if there is a very sharp, multi-dimensional, and comprehensive competition between the US and China, the two countries will not enter into a direct hot conflict. Moreover, there are several reasons why they do not.

First, the two countries have very close cooperation in commercial and economic terms. There is a large volume of trade between them. There are mutual investments. Second, both countries know that there would be no winner in such a war and that it would be very devastating for the conflicting parties. Third, both countries possess nuclear weapons, which greatly reduces the possibility of direct conflict.

Moreover, there are already proxy wars between the US and China. There is technological competition, economic competition, scientific competition, and commercial competition. There is competition for influence in different countries. There is competition in cyberspace, in the virtual realm, in the number of patents, in software, in information technologies, and in the field of artificial intelligence, and it is very sharp.

THE COLD WAR ERA AND TODAY

Another dilemma for the US is this: It is fighting a more complex, multi-dimensional, and challenging struggle against China than it fought against the USSR during the Cold War. The USSR collapsed in 1991 without firing a single shot. The Warsaw Pact also collapsed in the same year. The US, NATO, and capitalism declared victory. Today, China is different. It has learned the necessary lessons from the USSR experience. It is challenging the US not ideologically, but primarily economically, technologically, and industrially.

While comparing today's competition with the competition during the Cold War, let us refresh our memories.

First, during the Cold War, ideologies, alliances, and the countries leading the alliances were clear. The world and Europe were divided accordingly. The Berlin Wall was the symbol of the division. Today, there are no ideological camps in the world. Alliance relations are different. There are contradictions within alliances. There is permeability between alliances. There are different tensions between alliances. Explaining the world is not as simple or easy as it was during the Cold War years. Neither politically, ideologically, nor geographically can a distinction similar to that of the Cold War era be made today.

Second, from the beginning of the Cold War, the US was very powerful. In the years following World War II, it produced half of the world's total output. In the 1960s, it produced 40 percent of the world's output. Today, its share in the world economy has fallen below 25 percent, to 22 percent. In calculations made based on purchasing power parity, China has become the world's largest economy. In many sectors, in many areas of production, and in investments made in many regions, the US has fallen behind China. The US knows this. This is one of the reasons for its anger. Because it cannot prevent it.

Third, in addition to NATO, which is a Cold War institution, the US has very strong influence in organizations such as the EU, the World Bank, and the IMF. Today, the EU's influence is very weak. Against structures like the IMF and the World Bank, alternative institutions led by China have emerged. Furthermore, structures like the SCO, BRICS, and the Belt and Road Initiative are important. All of these are structures that have been established and developed despite the US.

Fourth, during the Cold War, the US benefited from the tension between the USSR and China, especially between 1960 and 1989. Today, however, Russia-China relations are strong. Despite all its wishes, the US could not drive a wedge between the two countries. The US could not bring India into line against China to the extent it wanted. Even if India experiences significant problems with China, it is a country too large to fully fall into the US's wake.

Fifth, it appears that the US-China competition will last longer than the Cold War.

Sixth, while US President Trump says America first and promises to make America great again, he attaches importance not to the construction of hegemony based on soft power and the manufacturing of consent, but to hard power and economic-political pressures. He sees investment in soft power as a waste of money and time. This preference draws reactions in Europe. In the coming period, the problems Europe experiences with the US may become more pronounced. If the US tries to acquire Greenland, which is the territory of Denmark, a member of NATO and the EU, by any means, the contradiction between the US and Europe will increase even further.

In conclusion, in a period when the world is transitioning to a multipolar order, in an environment where the US gives priority to its own continent, the tension will continue to increase. Mexico, Colombia, Cuba, Panama, Iran, Greenland, and Canada are in the US's crosshairs. Against US aggression, reactions will also rise in different countries and in different dimensions. Interest in regional alliances will increase.