Where do opponents of Lausanne and supporters of Sèvres meet?

As the Turkish nation, every July we celebrate and commemorate the Treaty of Lausanne, the founding treaty of the Republic of Türkiye. In August, however, we remember the Treaty of Sèvres—the exact opposite of Lausanne, which the heroes of the National Forces (Kuvayı Milliye) tore up and cast aside with swords and bayonets on the fronts of the War of Independence—and we ponder once again the endless schemes of imperialism against our country. 

This is why history is read and learned for this purpose. This is the importance of transforming historical knowledge into historical consciousness. Knowing what we did in the past, how we did it, and why we could not do certain things is the fundamental condition for understanding the present more accurately and predicting the future with high precision. 

National holidays should also be viewed through this lens. In one respect, we experience the pride of being a nation and grasp the importance of being one and being together; in another, we see every holiday as an opportunity to conduct a national reckoning and to account for ourselves to history and our ancestors. 

The opposition to Lausanne, the opposition to Atatürk and the Republic, the adoption of so-called genocide claims, and the support for Sèvres by the PKK terrorist organization and its political extension, the DEM Party and its circles, are well known. They reject Lausanne, accuse the Republic of assimilation and genocide against the Kurds, and embrace Sèvres under the pretext that it granted freedom to peoples. This stance is a result of collaboration with imperialism; we are not surprised. 

This year, Lausanne is being celebrated under more intense debate than ever before. We are aware of the statements made by the US Ambassador to Ankara, the President's remarks regarding Turkish-Kurdish-Arab unity, and the MHP Chairman's comments regarding one of the two vice presidents being Kurdish and the other Alevi. 

İSMET PASHA FROM THE GENERATION OF SOLDIER-DIPLOMATS

Let us refresh our memory; the Lausanne negotiations were very arduous. Because before them, there was the Armistice of Mudros of October 30, 1918, and the Treaty of Sèvres of August 10, 1920. Sèvres, while liquidating the Ottoman Empire and bestowing a small piece of land in Anatolia upon the Turkish nation, condemned the Turks to a life without freedom, independence, or sovereignty—a life of dishonor. It is a document of captivity and humiliation. Therefore, Lausanne witnessed not just the reckoning of the Great War (World War I) and the War of Independence, but in reality, the reckoning of centuries. Indeed, Ali Naci Karacan, who was on the delegation, summarized the speech made by İsmet Pasha, the head delegate of the Turkish delegation, as follows: “This is not a speech; it is an indictment reflecting the suffering endured by Turkey”. 

It must be stated that the British delegation at Lausanne had in mind to make the Turks accept a slightly softened version of Sèvres. The Armistice of Mudros was in their memories, as were the Wilson Principles. The 12th article of the 14-point Wilson Principles states: “The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development; and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees”. 

In other words, the 12th article was preparing the infrastructure for the establishment of an Armenian state and a Kurdish state in Anatolia. The principles announced by the then-US President Woodrow Wilson in Congress on January 8, 1918, greatly excited and gave hope to certain circles in the Ottoman Empire. So much so that an association called the Wilson Principles Society was founded in Istanbul on December 4, 1918. There were familiar names on the association's board of directors, such as Halide Edip Adıvar, Refik Halid Karay, Ali Kemal, and Hüseyin Avni Bey... Among the prominent members of the society were well-known journalists of the period, such as Ahmet Emin, Necmettin Sadık, Yunus Nadi, and Celal Nuri... On December 5, 1918, the society wrote a letter to US President Wilson, requesting to enter under a US mandate. 

WHAT WAS THE GOAL OF THE US AND BRITAIN?

Both US President Wilson, who was present at Lausanne as an observer, and the famous British statesman Lloyd George were determined to wipe the Turks off the map. In Sèvres, there was an Ottoman Empire squeezed into Central Anatolia with no sovereignty whatsoever. The Caliphate and the Sultanate were at the mercy of imperialism, and there was no sovereignty over the Straits. Bursa, Edirne, and Istanbul—the three capitals of the Ottoman Empire—were occupied. 

İsmet Pasha, one of the distinguished representatives of the generation of soldier-diplomats who proved this quality as a representative of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) during the Mudanya Armistice (October 11, 1922) negotiations before Lausanne, described the unjust, unlawful, and shameless attacks of British imperialism and its puppet, proxy force Greece, and continued as follows at Lausanne: 

“It is impossible to justify in any way either these attacks or the destruction carried out with the deliberate intention of ruining and demolishing the most prosperous parts of Turkish territory without any military necessity. I would also like to remind you that even at this very moment, more than a million innocent Turks are wandering the plains and plateaus of Anatolia homeless and hungry”. 

While Venizelos, the head of the Greek delegation, changed colors at these words, there was not a sound in the hall. 

İsmet Pasha was also a tough negotiator against the British. He lashed out at Lord Curzon, who told him, “You defeated Greece, not England. Do not forget this,” as follows: 

“No. We did not just defeat the Greeks. We defeated your allies, the French, in the south. We defeated the Armenians they armed. We drove your allies, the Italians, out of Anatolia. We defeated the Eastern Armenians and Pontic gangs you armed. We defeated the rebels you incited together with the Istanbul administration. We defeated the Kuvayı İnzibatiye (Caliphate Army) you supported with weapons and money. Finally, we defeated your puppet, the Greek army, and drove them into the sea. We defeated Mudros. We defeated Sèvres. We defeated the Tripartite Agreement. You were behind all of these. Their strings, their rudders, their buttons were all in your hands. We defeated you, above all. The reason for your irritability, your panic, and your constant intrigue is this. You are trying to cover this up and compensate for your loss. We will defeat you here as well”. (Turgut Özakman, Cumhuriyet Mucizesi, Volume 1, Bilgi Yay). 

Indeed, the famous British Prime Minister Winston Churchill wrote in his memoirs: “The Treaty of Lausanne did the exact opposite of what was intended to be done with the Treaty of Sèvres. The great powers that wanted to impose their own peace terms on the Turks and destroy the Turkish nation were forced to bow down to the Turks at Lausanne”.

As acknowledged not only by British diplomats but also by the foreign service officers representing the US as observers at Lausanne, Lausanne is an indisputable diplomatic victory for the Turks. For the British, it is a great defeat. Other European imperialists besides the British also accepted the Turkish nation at Lausanne. One nation, one state, one homeland, one flag were made accepted by the imperialists known as the 'Great Powers' (düvel-i muazzama) at Lausanne. İsmet Pasha did not accept any minorities other than non-Muslim citizens. 

LONG AND ARDUOUS NEGOTIATIONS

The Lausanne Conference lasted longer than expected. After 2.5 months of discussions in the first round, the British head delegate and Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon said “enough is enough” and presented a proposal package to İsmet Pasha. İsmet Pasha rejected it. The conference broke up. After a 2.5-month interruption, it convened for a second time. The second round of talks lasted 3 months. 

İsmet Pasha, a tough negotiator, was stubborn; there were times he stated a point 15 times. As is common among artillery officers, he also had some hearing loss. He turned this situation to his own advantage. He simply did not hear words or proposals that did not suit him. He acted with the awareness, responsibility, and comfort of having Atatürk's strong support behind him. Since Atatürk's 3-page, 14-point instruction manual given to the Turkish delegation stated that if the issues of capitulations and an Armenian homeland were brought to the agenda, they should be absolutely rejected and never negotiated, İsmet Pasha was determined. He still had the smell of gunpowder from the fronts on him, and the will of the great leader Gazi Mustafa Kemal behind him. 

As a result, Lausanne, signed on July 24, 1923, was ratified by the TBMM on August 23, 1923. Subsequently, the occupying forces left Istanbul on October 2, 1923. On October 6, 1923, the Turkish Army under the command of General Şükrü Naili Gökberk (who is also the father of our famous philosopher Macit Gökberk) entered Istanbul. The occupation of Istanbul lasted approximately 5 years (November 13, 1918 – October 6, 1923).

WHAT IS THE GOAL OF LAUSANNE OPPONENTS?

For many years, certain circles in Turkey have claimed that there were secret clauses in Lausanne and that these clauses would be revealed on the 100th anniversary of the treaty. It is a lie. It should not be forgotten that even someone like Dr. Rıza Nur, who was both one of Atatürk's fiercest opponents and a delegate to Lausanne, and whose memoirs these circles rely on, did not mention these secret clauses. 

It is wrong for those who govern Turkey to criticize Lausanne and Montreux. It is a great mistake to say that the islands were lost at Lausanne, to characterize Lausanne as a defeat rather than a victory, to emphasize that the West showed us Sèvres and made us settle for Lausanne, and to express that Lausanne and Montreux should be updated or reviewed. 

Why, you ask? For the following reasons. 

First, if this demand comes from those who govern the country, Turkey's adversaries will be the most pleased. Because this is not seen as a mental exercise or an academic debate, but as a major rift opened on the internal front, and by the government itself. The country that most wants Lausanne and Montreux to be changed or relaxed is the USA. 

Second, opening an international treaty to debate is very dangerous. You must clearly state which articles you are unhappy with and why, and you must convince all the countries that have signed the treaty, the parties to the state, all of them at once, of your own justification. For this, it is not enough for you to be very strong, very powerful, and very right. Other countries must also believe in your strength, power, and justification. And this is not enough. It is also essential that regional and global balances are favorable. Because international treaties bind only the countries that are parties to that agreement. But at the same time, they also fall into the close interest area of third parties. Lausanne, the title deed of the Republic of Turkey, is such a treaty. We must cherish it. 

Third, those who attack Lausanne primarily bring up the loss of the islands. It is ignorant. Because it was the Ottoman Empire, not the Republic, that lost the Dodecanese and the Aegean Islands. Italy occupied the Dodecanese in 1912. The Aegean Islands were occupied by Greece during the Balkan Wars. Therefore, the Ankara Government did not have very strong trump cards to take these islands back at Lausanne. 

Why didn't they? For the following reasons. 

First, in the National Pact (Misak-ı Milli) Declaration (also known as Ahd-ı Milli), which was accepted by the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies on January 28, 1920, after the Armistice of Mudros signed on October 30, 1918, there is Mosul, there is Kirkuk. There are no islands. 

Second, the reason why those who accepted the National Pact did not include the islands in the National Pact is that the National Pact included the places where the Ottoman Armies were located on the date the armed phase of the First World War ended with the armistice, accepting them as the homeland. When the armistice was signed, the Dodecanese were under Italian occupation and the Aegean Islands were under Greek occupation. They were not included in the National Pact.     

Third, after the Balkan War, with the Treaty of Athens signed between the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Greece on November 14, 1913, the Sublime Porte (Babıâli) had already written off the Aegean Islands. The Treaty of Athens stipulated that the great powers of the period would decide the future of the Aegean Islands. Moreover, at that time, the Ottoman Empire did not have the strength to struggle not only with the great powers but even with Greece for the Aegean Islands. It was not in a position to risk a new war. It should be remembered; the Ottoman Empire could not prevent the occupation of its former capital, Edirne, during the Balkan War. It is impossible for a state in this situation, especially a state with a very weak naval power, to stand up to the great powers and try to take back the Aegean Islands. Indeed, as expected, the great powers announced in a note given to the Ottoman Empire on February 14, 1914, that they had given the Aegean Islands to Greece, which had military presence on the islands. The Treaty of Athens left Imbros Island (i.e., Gökçeada), Bozcaada, and Kastellorizo (Meis) to the Ottoman Empire. It is delusional to expect the Ottoman Empire to fight for the islands that were lost before the Great War, which would start a few months later on July 28, 1914. When the National Pact was declared, the islands had been lost for 4.5 years.  

Fourth, the island lost during the Lausanne negotiations is Kastellorizo (Meis). It was left to Greece. İsmet Pasha was heavily criticized for this. While defending himself, he stated that he had made a “heavy sacrifice”. He said he wanted to prevent the negotiations from stalling because of Kastellorizo. The issue we were most sensitive, most jealous, and most uncompromising about at Lausanne was the abolition of the capitulations; the Turkish delegation focused on this. 

Fifth, from a military perspective, in terms of the balance of power, the diplomatic climate, and economic strength, it is very difficult to be insistent on Mosul, Kirkuk, the islands, and Thessaloniki during the Lausanne negotiations. There is no answer to the questions of with what capabilities in the military context, with what alliance relations in the diplomatic sense, and with what resources on the economic plane we would be insistent. 

In conclusion, every treaty is a product of the conditions, balance of power, objective circumstances, and alliances of its own era. The measure of its success is its realism, its permanence, and its validity. The fact that Lausanne is the only treaty from that period that remains today is proof of this success.