Blue Homeland and the Maritime Jurisdiction Law

Bringing such a law to the agenda today is a late but strategically extremely important step. Because the issue is no longer just about maritime law.

When the Blue Homeland concept emerged in June 2006, Turkey was experiencing one of the most critical periods of regression and containment in its maritime geopolitical history. However, the roots of this process did not just go back to the 2000s, but much further, specifically to the continental shelf crises that began in the Aegean Sea in the 1970s. In fact, the struggle for maritime jurisdiction that Turkey is experiencing today is not a problem that emerged suddenly. Throughout the history of the Republic, Turkey acted with a land-centered security understanding for a long time, and the seas were often considered secondary strategic areas. During the Cold War, the security reflex in Turkey, which was positioned against the Soviet threat on NATO's southern flank, was largely shaped around land defense. The seas, on the other hand, were mostly handled from the perspective of transportation, fishing, and coastal security. However, the world was changing; energy transportation, submarine natural resources, maritime trade routes, data cables, submarine energy infrastructure, and the security of the straits were moving the seas back to the center of great power competition. While maritime transport formed the backbone of the globalizing economy, submarine energy and data lines were becoming the new geopolitical veins of states. Although Turkey is surrounded by seas on three sides, it could not sufficiently read this transformation at a strategic level for many years.

1976 CONTINENTAL SHELF CRISIS

The period when Turkey experienced its first major break regarding maritime jurisdiction in the Aegean was the 1970s. Following the oil crisis in 1973, interest in the hydrocarbon potential in the Aegean Sea increased rapidly. The two countries faced each other seriously for the first time when Greece began unilateral initiatives regarding the continental shelf without considering Turkey's rights in the Aegean. For Turkey, the issue was not just an oil exploration license. The problem of which coast, which island, and which geographical formation would produce to what extent maritime jurisdiction in the Aegean had emerged. This crisis showed that the Aegean was no longer just a political problem between two NATO allies, but had turned directly into a matter of geopolitical sovereignty. The crisis escalated after the activities of Turkey's research vessel Hora (Sismik-1) in 1976, and the issue was brought to the international agenda. The Bern Agreement, signed in the same year and which has frozen the problem to this day, was actually one of the first important documents of Turkey's will to manage the continental shelf problem in the Aegean on a legal and political basis. The essence of the Bern Agreement was that the parties should refrain from unilateral steps in the continental shelf areas in the Aegean and be invited to try to resolve the issue through negotiation. This agreement was very important for Turkey. Because it functioned as a political brake mechanism that prevented Greece from creating a fait accompli in the Aegean. However, in the following years, the Athens administration moved away from the spirit of this agreement and continued its policies aimed at creating a de facto situation in the Aegean. A significant portion of the crises experienced today is actually a continuation of the continental shelf dispute that began in 1976 and was never fully resolved. For this reason, the problems experienced in the Aegean should be read not only through current crises but within a strategic continuity of nearly half a century.

1982 UN CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (UNCLOS) AND THE CONTINENTAL SHELF

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) created a new global legal framework that further deepened these problems. This convention went beyond classical maritime law and placed concepts such as the continental shelf, exclusive economic zone, contiguous zone, high seas regime, and deep-sea mining at the center of the international system. States were no longer just starting to consider their territorial waters, but also energy resources on the seabed, fishing rights, biological resources, and submarine economic areas as areas of strategic sovereignty. However, the capacity to produce maritime jurisdiction granted to islands, in particular, created vital problems for Turkey. Because the Aegean Sea is not an ordinary geography. It is a semi-enclosed, special sea fragmented by hundreds of islands, islets, and rocks. If this system is applied as interpreted by Greece, the Anatolian coasts will suffer a loss of maritime jurisdiction just a few kilometers offshore, and Turkey will be squeezed into its own coasts in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. For this reason, Turkey did not become a party to UNCLOS. However, the issue was not just about not being a party to the convention. Turkey developed a position as a persistent objector state that systematically objects to certain articles. In particular, Articles 3 (breadth of territorial waters), 33 (contiguous zone), and 121 (regime of islands, continental shelf) of the convention contained serious problems for Ankara. Turkey has been a persistent objector to these articles from the beginning. Furthermore, since 1958, Turkey has opposed the issue of islands producing a continental shelf—especially the automatic production of a continental shelf by islands in front of a continental state—and bases its position on pre-1958 customary law. Because giving more influence to small islands and rocks of a few square kilometers in the Aegean than to hundreds of kilometers of Anatolian coastline does not correspond to the realities of geography. Turkey's approach is not just a political thesis, but the product of long-term state practice based on geography, security, and geopolitical reality. For this reason, Ankara's approach to UNCLOS is not periodic but strategic. Turkey's objection stems essentially from the special geographical structure of the Aegean. Because the mechanical island law understanding to be applied in the Aegean could lead to results that effectively prevent the continental state's access to the sea.

GREECE'S 12-MILE THREAT

Greece's vision of turning the Aegean and the Mediterranean into a Greek sovereign area was compatible with the 1982 UNCLOS. While the convention negotiations were still ongoing, Greece began to bring up its right to 12 miles as per Article 3 of the convention starting from the autumn of 1981. After UNCLOS entered into force in 1994, the crisis became more visible. Greece's preparation to extend its territorial waters in the Aegean to 12 miles created a major strategic alarm for Turkey. In June 1995, Turkey responded to this action with a parliamentary decision, and the Council of Ministers was authorized to take all kinds of measures to prevent this decision by Greece. Because even today, under the current 6-mile regime, approximately half of the Aegean is under Greek control. The 12-mile application has the potential to effectively turn the Aegean into a Greek internal sea. With this decision, Turkey declared for the first time clearly that it would not accept a fait accompli in the Aegean and could use military force if necessary. This decision was not just a military reflex, but a sign of Turkey's transition to a new era in maritime geopolitics. Because for the first time, Ankara began to evaluate maritime jurisdiction areas directly as a matter of national sovereignty, security, and geopolitical living space. (Although the Speaker of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in 2005 stated in front of the press to the Greek Parliament Speaker that this decision should be lifted, no action has been taken by AKP governments to take a step back to this day.)

KARDAK CRISIS

At the end of 1995 and the beginning of 1996, the Kardak crisis erupted. The Kardak crisis is often described as a limited sovereignty crisis that took place around only two rocks. However, Kardak was the manifestation of a much larger problem in the Aegean. Because the issue was not just Kardak. The issue of numerous islands, islets, and rocks whose sovereignty was not clearly transferred by the Treaties of Lausanne and Paris had come to the agenda. This problem area, later called EGAYDAAK (Islands, Islets, and Rocks Whose Sovereignty Was Not Transferred to Greece by Agreements) in public opinion, brought the issue of geographical formations with disputed sovereignty in the Aegean to Turkey's security agenda. The total area of those among the 153 islands, islets, and rocks that could create territorial waters controls 6% of the Aegean Sea. In other words, the maritime areas of these assets are more valuable than the lands themselves. After Kardak, Turkey strongly brought to the agenda for the first time that there was not only a continental shelf or territorial waters problem in the Aegean, but also the issue of islands and rocks whose sovereignty was not transferred by treaties. Thus, the crisis headings in the Aegean expanded. Territorial waters, continental shelf, airspace, FIR line, demilitarized islands, and islands-islets-rocks with disputed ownership became a large, interconnected geopolitical equation.

This process also led to the transformation of Turkey's military and diplomatic reflexes in the Aegean. Because the Kardak crisis showed that the issue in the Aegean could not be managed only with legal texts. De facto state practice, naval power, constant presence, and deterrence were also determining factors. For this reason, after Kardak, the visibility and operational activities of the Turkish Naval Forces in the Aegean moved to a different dimension. With the effect of the 1999 Gölcük earthquake, there were changes in the Force and command structure. Turkey no longer acted in the Aegean with only a defensive reflex, but with an active strategy that made its sovereign rights visible on the field.

EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN PROBLEM

In the early 2000s, developments in the Eastern Mediterranean further increased the pressure on Turkey. The fact that the TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) declared an EEZ unilaterally in 2003 based on the agreement it made with Egypt was not just an energy issue. This initiative was the first major link in the strategy to exclude Turkey from the Eastern Mediterranean. Subsequently, the Seville Map was put into circulation in European Union circles. With the Republic of Cyprus becoming an EU member in the spring of 2004, the EU extended maritime jurisdiction areas in a maximalist way from the Atlantic Ocean to the borders of Syria, Egypt, and Israel. This map was extremely dangerous for Turkey. Because it paved the way for Greece to close the entire Aegean Sea, to collapse into a large area it did not deserve in the Mediterranean due to Meis (Kastellorizo), and for the Republic of Cyprus, as an island state, to have maritime jurisdiction areas of a size it did not deserve against the continental state of Turkey. Furthermore, the rights of the TRNC on the seabed were also being effectively usurped. Turkey's area of operation in the Eastern Mediterranean was being squeezed around the Gulf of Antalya. The map was not just an academic study. Over time, it was attempted to be made one of the political references of the EU and created an infrastructure for the maximalist theses of the Republic of Cyprus and Greece.

ANNAN PLAN SCANDAL

In the same period, the Annan Plan process took place on April 24, 2004. Our compatriots on the island, unfortunately, said yes to the plan with Ankara's encouragement and EU propaganda. If the Greek side had said yes to the plan, Turkey would have lost the TRNC, its most important geopolitical support in the Eastern Mediterranean. For this reason, the Blue Homeland was not just a concept of maritime jurisdiction. It was also a strategic line of resistance against the liquidation of the TRNC, the encirclement of Turkey from the sea, and the narrowing of Anatolia's maritime depth. This was the reason why the concept of "Homeland" was specifically chosen. Because the issue had ceased to be just a matter of energy, fishing, or transportation. The seas had become a direct area of sovereignty. For the first time, Turkey began to look at its seas as vital strategic areas, just like its land borders.

WHY IS THE LAW NECESSARY?

The emergence of the concept of maritime jurisdiction and especially the doctrine of the continental shelf is directly related to the great technological and geopolitical transformation experienced after World War II. Until the end of the 19th century, the seas were largely seen as an area of transportation, trade, and military movement. The states' understanding of sovereignty was mainly based on a narrow territorial waters approach extending from the coast as far as the range of a cannon. The high seas were accepted within the scope of the "mare liberum," or free sea, understanding. However, in the post-war period, with the rapid increase in energy demand, the development of offshore oil technology, and the understanding of the economic value of resources on the seabed, the seabed suddenly became the new field of great power competition. The breaking point of this transformation was the Truman Proclamation issued by US President Harry S. Truman on September 28, 1945. Truman issued two separate presidential proclamations. One of them declared American jurisdiction and control over the continental shelf resources off the US coasts. The other was aimed at protecting fishing resources in the high seas. The Truman Proclamation is accepted as the beginning of the modern continental shelf doctrine. The Truman Proclamation was the legal result of this technological revolution. For the first time, the US claimed exclusive rights over natural resources on the seabed from the coast. Thus, the classical approach that the high seas are completely free began to break. The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf became the first major international legal text of this process. The convention defined the continental shelf as the area of sovereign rights of the coastal state over the seabed and subsoil resources.

Truman's approach soon created a domino effect. Latin American countries, especially states like Chile, Peru, and Ecuador, began to put forward claims of 200 nautical miles of maritime jurisdiction. Subsequently, other coastal states also turned to declaring sovereign rights over the continental shelf and marine resources.

The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) added the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) alongside the continental shelf. The world population was increasing, and fishing and the protection of fish stocks were becoming extremely important. The EEZ gave the coastal state not only the seabed but also the volume of water along with the living and non-living resources within it. After 1982, many countries enacted their maritime jurisdiction laws. In the US, an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) was declared by presidential decree in 1983 during the Reagan era. Thus, the US regulated its maritime jurisdiction areas with its own national law without being a party to UNCLOS. Similarly, Brazil made a legal regulation covering very large maritime areas with its "Blue Amazon" approach in 1992. China also placed its "Nine-Dash Line" approach in the South China Sea on a legal basis in the same period. Russia, on the other hand, enacted its own maritime jurisdiction law in 1998. Based on this, major maritime states strove to build maritime sovereignty through national legislation as much as international law.

In reality, the fact that Turkey is discussing such a law at a late date like 2026 is a serious institutional delay. It is a major delay that Turkey, which has a maritime jurisdiction area of nearly half a million square kilometers and 8,883 km of coastline, does not have a law that regulates maritime jurisdiction in its domestic law.

Instead of a law that will form the basis for state practice outside the territorial waters of Turkey, which is not a signatory to UNCLOS, there is scattered legislation (Council of Ministers decisions, continental shelf coordinate declarations, NAVTEX applications, fishing regulations, and fragmented applications spread across the jurisdiction of different institutions). The existence of a holistic law that gathers these under a single strategic roof will have a force-multiplier effect on our sovereignty practices in our maritime jurisdiction areas, which are at the forefront of our geopolitical areas of interest. This situation will prevent the opposing front from turning its own theses into EU law, energy licensing, national legislation, and international corporate networks. For example, the Republic of Cyprus is distributing license areas to international energy companies, Greece is activating EU institutions, forming energy consortiums, and creating its own legal ecosystem in the Eastern Mediterranean despite Turkey. In other words, this legislation, which will be enacted as domestic law, will provide consolidation in our areas of sovereignty.

CONCLUSION

The need for the regulation, which is referred to as the "Blue Homeland Law" in public opinion today, is actually the product of a strategic struggle of nearly half a century. Because the issue is not just today's Eastern Mediterranean tension. It is the result of long-term geopolitical pressure extending from the 1976 continental shelf crisis to the Bern Agreement, from the 1995 TBMM decision to the Kardak crisis, from the EGAYDAAK problem to the Seville Map. Turkey must now manage its maritime jurisdiction areas not with fragmented legislation, but with a single strategic state mind.

Sovereignty is not formed only by defending theses in international law or using the Blue Homeland slogan everywhere. It is necessary to issue licenses, impose taxes, supervise foreign activities, subject scientific research to a permit system, regulate fishing, create security zones, and apply sanctions when necessary. In other words, domestic law regulation forms the legal infrastructure of de facto sovereignty at sea. Behind the struggles experienced today from the South China Sea to the Arctic, there are not only navies but also maritime sovereignty strategies supported by domestic law. This is what China is doing in the South China Sea, this is what the US is doing in Alaska and the Pacific, and this is what Russia's Arctic policy is. Turkey must now act with the same strategic consciousness.

As a result, bringing such a law to the agenda today is a late but strategically extremely important step. Because the issue is no longer just about maritime law. This issue is a matter of Turkey's geopolitical independence, energy security, freedom of movement in the Aegean, the future of the TRNC, the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the protection of sovereign rights in the seas. Just as the Blue Homeland concept represented a mental awakening, the Maritime Jurisdiction Law will be the legal and strategic institutionalization of this awakening.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TURKEY

With this law, the Eastern Mediterranean EEZ should be declared; the 153 islands, islets, and rocks in the status of EGAYDAAK, which will form the basis for future maritime jurisdiction sharing in the Aegean, should be declared by name; special fishing zones containing these islands, islets, and rocks should be declared in the Aegean. Furthermore, with the approval of this law, seismic and drilling activities should be started in the areas facing our region of the license areas numbered 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7 declared in 2007 by the rogue state Republic of Cyprus, which violates our continental shelf in the Eastern Mediterranean; the timing of this should be planned for September as a demarche to the declaration of the Istanbul-resident Greek priest Bartholomew in September that "The Halki Seminary Will Be Opened," which extremely disturbs the public.