Vahdeddin and the War of Independence

On May 15, Vahdeddin pointed to the cannons of the Allied warships in the Bosphorus from Yıldız Palace and said to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, “Pasha, you have served the state well until now; all of this has been recorded in a book… Forget all of that… The service you will perform now may be more important than all of them. Pasha, you can save the state!” These words have been interpreted by a segment of society in Turkey for many years as evidence that Vahdeddin personally sent Mustafa Kemal Pasha to Anatolia to organize the national struggle.

In reality, it is unclear exactly what he meant by these words, and the stance the Sultan took after the national struggle began and was completed points to the exact opposite. The only conclusion that can be drawn from these words is that Vahdeddin trusted Mustafa Kemal Pasha at that time.

The foundations of this trust were laid during the official visit Mustafa Kemal Pasha made to Germany with Vahdeddin in December 1917. The journey took place by train, and during the trip, Mustafa Kemal Pasha had the chance to have a one-on-one conversation with the future Sultan in the train car.

Vahdeddin was not someone who particularly enjoyed the military or state affairs. He had not expected to become Sultan throughout his life and only became the crown prince after the suicide of Crown Prince Yusuf İzzeddin Bey in 1916. With his rank being demoted from major general to brigadier general, he had grown cold toward the military and stopped wearing his uniform. Despite this, he approached Mustafa Kemal Pasha with deep respect in the train car and addressed him as the “savior of Istanbul.”

Mustafa Kemal Pasha, relying on Vahdeddin's interest in him, made some suggestions regarding the future. According to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Germany would lose the war, and Enver Pasha was dragging the country toward disaster by following Germany's lead. Mustafa Kemal Pasha suggested that when Vahdeddin became Sultan, he should remove Enver Pasha from the administration, seek paths to peace by taking the country out of Germany's influence, and insisted that he should actively command a unit upon returning to Istanbul, much like the princes of European countries. When Vahdeddin asked for advice on which unit he should lead, he suggested taking command of the 5th Army, which had its headquarters in Istanbul and was responsible for the defense of the Dardanelles, and appointing him as the army's chief of staff. Vahdeddin ended the discussion by stating that he would think about this matter when he returned to Istanbul.

Vahdeddin did not take Mustafa Kemal Pasha very seriously during this conversation, and the impression Mustafa Kemal Pasha left on him was not positive. Upon returning to Istanbul, he did not make any attempt to take an active role in the war as an army commander. However, with the signing of the Armistice of Mudros on October 30, 1918, all of the predictions Mustafa Kemal Pasha had made during their conversation in the train car had come true.

Relying on this, Atatürk thought he could gain Vahdeddin's support to face the disaster awaiting the country, and when he arrived in Istanbul on November 13, 1918, his first task was to meet with Vahdeddin to consult on the current situation. His goal was to gain Vahdeddin's backing to form a government led by himself and manage the resistance from Istanbul. However, he would realize that trusting Vahdeddin was a mistake during their three meetings on November 15, November 29, and December 20.

Vahdeddin's ideas were in a direction quite different from those of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. The war had been lost despite the presence of Germany, which possessed the world's most powerful army, and he saw no glimmer of hope against the Allied powers without Germany's support. What was done was done, and from that moment on, the only way to minimize the damage was to bow to the victors. He had become convinced that resisting would result in further loss of territory and sovereignty. Mustafa Kemal Pasha took his subsequent steps based on this reality and never again disclosed his plans to Vahdeddin and those around him.

Although Mustafa Kemal Pasha could not secure Vahdeddin's support, he had managed to gain his trust as an officer against the military's interference in politics (Vahdeddin thought that Atatürk would not engage in any action against him or participate in a conspiracy, unlike the Unionist officers who had deposed Abdul Hamid II), and this was enough.

After it became clear that the idea of conducting the independence struggle from Istanbul was a delusion, Mustafa Kemal Pasha began to prepare the plans and infrastructure for the resistance he would lead in Anatolia during his time in Istanbul. During this process, he contacted many officers who would stand by his side in the future and prominent nationalists in Anatolia. Since many patriots shared similar ideas with Mustafa Kemal Pasha, he would obtain the support he sought in a short time, and all that remained was to wait for an official appointment that would make the subordination of military units in Anatolia to him unconditional. To hide his intentions, Mustafa Kemal Pasha never requested an assignment in Anatolia and waited for this request to come from the government.

The opportunity he sought came unexpectedly from enemy ranks. The British, who were extremely paranoid about the spread of Bolshevism, had received baseless intelligence that Bolshevism had spread to Anatolia and that Soviet-style revolutionary commissions were being established in the interior regions of Anatolia. On April 21, the British demanded that the Ottoman administration immediately investigate this intelligence and, if it proved true, have it dispersed by the Ottoman Army (as they were also war-weary and did not have the forces to conduct operations in Anatolia at that time). Upon the recommendation of Minister of the Interior Mehmet Ali (Gerede) Bey for this task, Grand Vizier (Prime Minister) Damat Ferit Pasha approved the appointment, and Mustafa Kemal Pasha was appointed as the Inspector of the 9th Army on April 30. Since his duties included collecting the army's weapons and ensuring order in the region—which were not among the British demands of April 21—his powers were quite broad.

Before departing for Samsun, Mustafa Kemal Pasha went to Grand Vizier Damat Ferit Pasha's house for dinner on May 13, and on May 15, he appeared before the Sultan for the last time to speak with him privately.

As conveyed by Sina Akşin, Vahdeddin uttered these words during this meeting: “Pasha, you have served the state well until now; all of this has been recorded in a book… Forget all of that… The service you will perform now may be more important than all of them. Pasha, you can save the state!”

According to Sina Akşin, these words of Vahdeddin do not point to a secret mission he gave to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, but on the contrary, to his actual duty. Indeed, on the morning of the same day, Greek soldiers had landed in İzmir. Greece's occupation of İzmir had occurred as a result of public order problems, and similar problems existed almost everywhere in Anatolia, especially in regions where non-Muslims lived. In this respect, the Greek occupation could create a domino effect, and the next potential target was Pontus, which had a significant Greek population and was located in Mustafa Kemal Pasha's area of duty. For Vahdeddin, who believed that resisting the occupiers would lead to much more trouble, the occupation of İzmir meant that his predictions were coming true, and only a talented and reliable commander like Mustafa Kemal Pasha could overcome the ever-increasing public order problems.

As conveyed by Andrew Mango, the declaration Vahdeddin published in Mecca in 1923 after leaving Istanbul for the Hejaz in 1922 confirms this narrative. In this declaration, Vahdeddin states that he sent Mustafa Kemal Pasha to Anatolia to resolve public order problems. Nowhere in the declaration does he mention giving Mustafa Kemal Pasha a mission to start a national struggle; instead, he criticizes Mustafa Kemal Pasha (and Rauf Orbay) in harsh language, stating that public order problems increased even further after Mustafa Kemal Pasha went to Anatolia and that this put him in a very difficult position against the Allied powers.

Furthermore, the fact that Mustafa Kemal Pasha experienced financial difficulties for a long time after landing in Samsun and was able to carry out his travels in Anatolia only with the financial aid of the notables in the regions he visited refutes the claims that Vahdeddin gave Mustafa Kemal Pasha large amounts of money or gold, and on the contrary, shows that Mustafa Kemal Pasha did not have state support behind him.

Vahdeddin remained distant from the idea of armed resistance from the very beginning and did not deny the policy he followed after the War of Independence. As early as December 1918, Mustafa Kemal Pasha concluded that Vahdeddin would not be convinced, and during the days he was planning his passage to Anatolia from Istanbul, he made a tremendous effort to ensure that Vahdeddin and those around him did not learn his true intentions, believing that if his intentions were revealed, the independence struggle he planned would end before it even began. The fact that Vahdeddin took a stance against the national struggle from the very beginning reveals that Mustafa Kemal Pasha was extremely justified in his concerns.