ÖZAL AND THE PROVINCIAL SYSTEM

Turgut Özal, who initially rejected the provincial system and called it a "fabrication," announced it in 1989.

"As the number of provinces exceeds 100, large metropolitan provinces will become 'major provinces.' There are 16 provinces in Turkey with this characteristic. Those 16 provinces will be connected with the surrounding provinces. This might be the beginning of a move toward a PROVINCIAL SYSTEM."

Shortly after this statement, Özal became President. In 1990, the Ministry of Interior prepared a report.

The report proposed that Turkey be divided into 13, 15, or 18 provinces. It was based on increasing the number of provinces to 120 and having Governors elected by the public.

However, Özal passed away before this project could be implemented.

What is remarkable is that two US-guided politicians (Evren and Özal) converged on the same project.

THE PKK'S ALLIANCE WITH ISLAM AND NEO-OTTOMANISM, AND KEMALISM AS THE ANTICHRIST REGIME

Can a Marxist-Leninist organization form an alliance with Neo-Ottomanism, which is structured along the axis of Islamism?

It happened, and it continues to happen...

On July 19, 1994, Milliyet Newspaper ran the following headline: 'A DARK ALLIANCE FROM APO'

A two-day meeting titled "The Kurdistan Question and the Islamic Solution" was held in Berlin, Germany. The meeting was organized by the "Kurdistan Islamic Movement," a subsidiary of the PKK. There were also members of parliament who attended the meeting, such as Abdülmelik Fırat, Altan Tan, and Nizamettin Toğuç. While many organizations took part in the meeting, the European Milli Görüş Organization also sent an observer.

Abdullah Öcalan sent a message to the meeting in his own voice. The message was as follows;

"Kemalism, as many respected religious scholars have also stated, is an Antichrist (Deccal) regime. Muslims who cooperate with it are hypocrites, or even infidels."

In his speech, he frequently praised "true Islam" and the concept of the ummah, which he called "Islamic Internationalism." He called on true believers to engage in a joint struggle with the PKK or, at the very least, not to oppose the PKK.

He continued his speech as follows;

"The openness brought by the PKK is definitely Islamic. Today, there is only a difference in terminology between PKK fighters and Islamic mujahideen. Otherwise, the essence of both is the same.

The struggle we are waging today is as important as the struggle during the time when Islam emerged.

As a result of our struggle, a form close to the Age of Bliss (Asr-ı Saadet) that all Muslims long for may emerge. Solving the Kurdish question in the Middle East means 'making Kurdistan the cradle of Islamic internationalism.'

The Kurdish question is the most burning Islamic issue. We are the movement closest to Islam. We are ambitious in the realization of Islam. We are sure that Islamic salvation will be realized within this framework." (Ruşen Çakır; Milliyet Newspaper, 19/7/1994).

Öcalan's reference to the Age of Bliss (Asr-ı Saadet) is not coincidental. The Age of Bliss brings to mind the "Medina Charter, where every ethnic, religious, or local group was governed according to its own law." This model is consistent with the current Öcalan Doctrine (Democratic Confederalism). Concepts such as the Ottoman-style Provincial System and Islamic Internationalism carry the clues of the model that has been constructed since those days.

WHAT DO THEY WANT TODAY?

30 years have passed since this call. Could the Separatist Kurdish Movement have changed its views? Or is it continuing its strategy of expansion by using religion?

The writings of Kurdish researchers on these topics also provide the answers to these questions.

It is stated that "With neo-liberal globalization, societies have begun to open up, different identities and cultures have begun to encounter one another, and religious identities have strengthened... The Kurdish issue also intersects with religious identity."

The author states that the Kurdish movement is turning toward the construction of an alternative religious hegemony against the AKP and the State, and is exhibiting political pragmatism.

It is also noted that the Kurdish movement's adoption of certain elements of Islam into its discourse was simultaneous with the years when the Political Islamist movement began to grow in Turkey.

According to the author; "The subject of religion and belief offers the Kurdish movement opportunities not only to mobilize its own masses but also to secure the consent of other social segments outside."

In other words, through religion and belief, the Kurdish movement is able to reach both Kurds and non-Kurdish segments, and "provides an opportunity to find more supporters."

According to the author, in this situation, "it becomes inevitable to offer a new organizational approach, and a repertoire of action and discourse."

"The Kurdish movement reached a new Islamic interpretation and understanding after 1990. With the paradigm shift after 2000, the spectrum of this understanding widened, and the movement succeeded in reinterpreting the Islamic religion and constructing it as an important instrument of political struggle. Furthermore, it has reinforced its claim to ensure the representation of autochthonous/indigenous belief identities living in the Kurdistan geography, such as Alevis, Yazidis, and Syriacs." (Erkan Karabay; "Religion and Politics in the Kurdish Movement - The Course of the Post-2000 Transformation", 2020, Kürd Araştırmaları)

The article is important for understanding the reasons for the PKK-Islam alliance.

With a different assessment, time will show that the Marxist-Leninist ideological infrastructure at the foundation of the PKK was created according to the conditions of the time, that there is no obstacle to cooperating with religion, imperialism, the Armenian terrorist organization ASALA, and all kinds of separatist movements and ideologies while moving toward its goal of a Greater Kurdistan, and that it is not bound by any ethical values. The PKK, an actor in brutal terrorist acts ranging from drug trafficking to human smuggling, undoubtedly continues to determine its direction according to the spirit of the times as a puppet of imperialism.

It is also possible to see that Öcalan and the PKK have severed their ties with Marxist-Leninist ideology in the so-called doctrine titled "Democratic Confederalism" written by Öcalan.

Öcalan makes an explicit rejection with the lines: "Marx's theory of value is a disaster. It has no radical opposition. It kept capitalism alive for two more centuries. It has no religious or political solution. This theory was Eurocentric. It left non-European peoples unarmed. It left all the peoples of the world unarmed. It strengthened capitalism." Because Öcalan is greater than both Marx and Lenin, and the "New Paradigm" will be the work of Öcalan's great genius(!) revived in Imralı.

Now let us return to the chronological narrative and go to the Turkey of the 2000s.

THE 2000s: RECEP TAYYİP ERDOĞAN'S LONGING FOR AN OTTOMAN-STYLE PROVINCIAL SYSTEM

Starting from the 1990s, the model envisioned for Turkey by a group of US-based writers and agents was Islamist federations.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, since his time as RP Provincial Chairman, has evaluated the provincial system as a part of Ottomanism, and in an interview with him in 1994, he said the following:

"Theses like 'Turkey belongs to the Turks' are wrong."

When asked about the Kurds wanting to live separately, he replied; "In this case, perhaps something similar to the Ottoman provincial system could be done."

"I think of Turkey within the 'State Plan of Islam.' The supreme determinant is the principles of Islam," he answered.

In a speech he gave on CNN and Kanal D in 2013, he also defended the provincial system, and after emphasizing that "in strong countries, the provincial system brings much faster development and competition in democracy, and that this is a sign of strengthening," he made the following historic statement:

"When we look at the Ottoman Empire, in that strong Ottoman Empire, for example, there is the very interesting Lazistan province. There is the Kurdistan province. We go down to the south, there are provincial systems in the same way. Why? The Ottoman Empire was strong and it gave these to those places without hesitation."

Since the presenter did not dare to ask, "What happened when the Ottoman Empire weakened?", the subject remains at this point...

The reason for Erdoğan's passion for provinces is very clear; Ottomanism...

However, his view of the Kurdish issue is tied to different focuses.