This is how the terrorist leader is handling the 'second Qandil' too!...

Do you know Sinjar in Iraq, or as the PKK calls it, Shengal? Because it is located at the junction connecting northern Iraq with northern Syria, weapons, terrorists, and all kinds of logistical support for the PKK/YPG/PYD in Syria were funneled through here from Qandil. That is why everyone, starting with Erdoğan, described Sinjar as a "second Qandil".

Nowadays, within the scope of the "terror-free Turkey, terror-free region" project, it is being explained that the 2,500 PKK terrorists in Sinjar will lay down their arms, and once this happens, Turkey will hand over the Bashiqa/Zilkan base to the Iraqi central government.

First, let us recall how Sinjar fell into the hands of the PKK and what the roles of Ankara, the US, and the Barzanis were during this process.

From ISIS to PKK

When ISIS, which turned out to have been established by the US and was mobilized almost simultaneously in Syria and Iraq, captured Sinjar in August 2014 following Mosul, the PKK began to settle there, using these attacks as a pretext. In addition to the terrorists it brought from Syria and Qandil, it armed the Yazidi children it abducted to form the so-called "Sinjar Defense Units (YBŞ)" and declared a so-called "canton".

Another characteristic of Sinjar, located right next to Mosul, was that the Barzanis considered it, just like Kirkuk, Salah ad-Din, Diyala, and Mosul, as "usurped Kurdish lands outside the Kurdish region".

As part of the International Coalition forces' operation to liberate Iraqi territory from ISIS, Barzani's peshmerga entered Sinjar in November 2015. Our media presented this development as a "successful military operation by peshmerga forces" and took pride in the fact that the peshmerga had been trained by Turkish Special Forces. While the Prime Minister of the time, Ahmet Davutoğlu, called Barzani to congratulate him, it was announced that "the success in the operation in question belonged exclusively to the peshmerga forces".

However, it was claimed that the YBŞ, founded by the PKK, also participated in the operation. The Barzani camp denied this claim, but figures from the HDP of that time, Selahattin Demirtaş, Talabani's PUK, and certain names from the US all argued that "the PYD and PKK, together with the peshmerga", had liberated Sinjar. It was even emphasized that this was the "second success against ISIS after Kobani" for the West.

In the end, the PKK entrenched itself in Sinjar. Despite all requests for it to "leave the region for the benefit of the people", the US instruction to "withdraw", and the deployment of units affiliated with the Iraqi central government there in October 2017, it did not leave.

Erdoğan and government officials stated many times, "We will not allow Sinjar to become a second Qandil," but it had already become a second Qandil in plain sight.

By 2017, Erdoğan drew the following roadmap for the period after the Euphrates Shield operation carried out in northern Syria:

"There will be second and third stages of this roadmap that are not being spoken of or named. The event is not an operation proceeding only on the Syrian dimension. This event has an Iraqi dimension. There is the well-known Tal Afar and Sinjar situation in Iraq. We have kinsmen there. The situation in Sinjar is much worse. Because there are efforts to create a second Qandil in Sinjar. In these efforts to create a second Qandil, there are about 2,500 PKK members there."

Before the 2018 elections, Erdoğan spoke several times about "striking Sinjar, Qandil, and Mahmur", but nothing changed. The PKK's YBŞ is still there with its 2,500 terrorists!..

Coming to the present day; we first heard from Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaydi two weeks ago, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly meeting in New York, that the PKK would be removed from Sinjar, or more accurately, that they would surrender their weapons to the Iraqi central government, and in return, Turkey would leave the Bashiqa/Zilkan base. Stating that these groups conditioned their laying down of arms on the withdrawal of Turkish soldiers as well as US forces from Iraq, as part of the US pressure to bring pro-Iranian Shiite militias under state control, al-Zaydi said that Ankara had conveyed that withdrawal was dependent on the complete liquidation of PKK camps and armed presence, and that negotiations with Ankara were continuing.

Before the ink on this statement al-Zaydi made to the New York Times had dried; following the Erdoğan-al-Zaydi meeting, the Presidential Communications Directorate reported that the two leaders "agreed on the full establishment of state authority in Sinjar and ending the presence of banned foreign armed elements", while Erdoğan said, "The authority of the Iraqi government will now prevail in the Sinjar region, where the PKK has been settled for a long time... We also discussed the issue of transferring Bashiqa. We no longer want to talk about terror issues with our neighbor Iraq, but rather about the Development Road, increasing our mutual trade volume, stability, peace, and prosperity. The process is progressing positively. We have gained good momentum. Hopefully, the result will also be good."

This development or agreement was presented on one hand as "2,500 PKK members joining the Iraqi army", and on the other, it was emphasized that the process was moving towards a "terror-free Turkey, terror-free Syria, terror-free Iraq, terror-free Iran", in other words, a "terror-free region".

AKP spokesperson Ömer Çelik, following the MYK meeting the other day, while commenting on the dissolution of the Syrian PKK's SDF as "one of the gains of the terror-free Turkey process", noted that the YBŞ in Sinjar "surrendering its weapons to the central Iraqi administration would be the second gain".

What Did the Terrorist Leader Say About Sinjar?

It is known to all of us that the SDF is not dissolving itself but becoming a partner to the state, and what the terrorist leader-Qandil-DEM wants for the "solution" in Turkey, but let us also look at the YBŞ business in Sinjar.

At the beginning of the month, the Sinjar/Shengal People's Council, affiliated with the PKK, held a meeting. The terrorist leader in Imralı, who sent a message to this meeting, stated that the YBŞ should remain in Sinjar and continue to serve in the region even if the organization joins the Iraqi army, saying, "We will protect the Yazidis in an armed manner against the possibility of attacks. That is, even if everything is fine here, we will put more of our weight there and protect them. The state must also understand this... The Yazidis must definitely have their own self-defense forces."

Anything else?

As if it did not mean the same thing, he claimed that the Yazidis wanted "local democracy", not an "autonomous region", and ordered that "Turkey should not oppose a possible agreement between the Yazidis and Baghdad".

Moreover, while stating that a model should be developed for Sinjar that he described as a "Turkish model", he explained the meaning of this as follows:

"For Shengal, a model like the Turkish model should be developed. For this reason, I removed the PKK obstacle. The PKK is no longer an obstacle to the solution of problems. That is, the PKK has completed its term and played its role. However, if one does not act according to this reality, this process will also be paralyzed... The YBŞ should take its place within the Iraqi army. According to what is told, Iraq has accepted this. If this happens, it is good."

Interestingly, apart from one writer in the pro-government media, no one saw or heard these instructions from the terrorist leader.

That writer only quoted the part, "The PKK has completed its term and played its role... The YBŞ should also take its place within the Iraqi army", and commented, "From this, we understand that the messages given by Imralı and the state are progressing within the scope of a terror-free region, with some nuances."

Is the terrorist leader organizing that place from Imralı; the YBŞ maintaining its existence, serving in Sinjar even if it joins the Iraqi army, and wanting "local democracy" for the Yazidis, a "nuance" or progress toward a "terror-free region"?!

And what about him saying "a model like the Turkish model should be developed"?

As the saying goes, "I am telling you, my daughter, so that you, my daughter-in-law, may understand"; could it be that the project of making the terrorist organization a partner to the state, first in Syria and now in Sinjar, is being shown to Turkey as a "model"!..

Müyesser YILDIZ

October 9, 2026