Can the 'reasonable opposition' take a little more interest in its own history? Unlikely!

Books are being published that are not discussed enough, and perhaps are not even considered worth knowing about, yet they are truly important. However, when we look at the past in the light of today and blend the two periods together, it is clear that we will not encounter any surprises at all. If we open our eyes, of course.

One of these books is “Zincirli Hürriyet” (Chained Freedom)(*), published last year.

In this collection, which researcher-author Okan İrtem published with his colleagues and which does not share conventional views on our recent history surrounding May 27, and even challenges them quite a bit, some well-researched and well-matured emphases by İrtem stand out.

One is his assessments regarding the 1950s. We can re-examine these by looking at the despotism practice of today's III. Abdülhamid regime. We have things to say by extending the findings to the present, but first, a quote:

“The first part of this decade, divided in two by the economic crisis, seemed to have been sliced off like a piece and given to the DP (Democrat Party). On the political stage, there was only room for discussions on the 'multi-party regime', 'elections', or 'democracy'. Throughout the period in question, an economic program or the Constitutional Court were luxuries; 'multi-party regime' and 'democracy' were needs that prevailed over every other discussion. (...)

Other discussions considered luxuries remained devoid of stage lights throughout the first half of the 1950s. But when the second half of the 1950s arrived, the period when the economic crisis showed its effect, conditions had changed. This time, all other discussions considered luxuries became needs. The stage now belonged to the economic plan, the bicameral parliament, the Constitutional Court, and the 'right of proof'. (...)

Contrary to general opinion, there was an inverse relationship between the CHP's (Republican People's Party) acquisition of a political party identity and the decrease in its representative power in Parliament, and the increase in its political effectiveness. As it moved away from the Assembly, its political goals and demand for power strengthened. As the DP took rapid steps on the path to executive dominance, İnönü's criticisms of the DP and DP politics also developed and hardened. The result would be the CHP's acquisition of a political party identity and its strengthening.” (p. 80)

The careful reader will be able to reconstruct the connections and similarities between the “adventures” of the 1950s and the period between 2003-2026 in this book. Indeed, when we look at today, we can say that the current opposition, which we frequently refer to with the concept of “reasonable opposition”, is carrying the confusion it experienced in the past into the present by exaggerating it, because it is not really aware of the past.

There may be those who consider this assessment exaggerated. Then they must explain this quarter-century of AKP reactionism. In any case, we must make sense of the current desperation of those who claim to be aware.

The AKP is the DP, AP (Justice Party), ANAP (Motherland Party), etc., of new conditions... Its masters never hid that they were the heirs of the DP, and one of their most important supports for destroying the republican regime was the Celal Bayar-Adnan Menderes policy. It is easy to see this in the practices of a government approaching a quarter of a century.

But how are we to make sense of the CHP-New Party desperation?

Why could drowning the agenda in truly profound discussions that contain a wind to change that agenda, and bringing hope to the people, not be achieved in this period of nearly a quarter-century? When viewed today, the AKP government, in the face of a fragmented “reasonable opposition”, is still experiencing that first five-year comfortable slice that Okan İrtem sliced. The country and our people are in pieces, but there is no possibility of a different government on the horizon. The CHP of the 'Butlancılar' (those who rely on the ballot box) and the 'New Party' of their opponents cannot imagine a social organization different from the AKP anyway. In the end, the AKP manages to maintain a comfort reminiscent of the first half of the 1950s for a quarter of a century.

Waiting for the ballot box and elections, remaining closed off to the religious sensitivities of the nation, not prioritizing secularism, public ownership, and planning, not declaring that they will ban religious sects, etc., can justify why the CHP and its relatives cannot open real discussions. Could the fact that the problems that have driven like a wedge into the lives of society and the working classes have not been put on the table be something that the “reasonable opposition”, that NATO-aligned opposition constantly tested by the Palace, does not want?

Could the 'Butlancılar' and their opponents not be wanting such a thing themselves?

It seems so.

It is true that everything is very different from 70 years ago. However, the balance of classes in Turkey, the shadow left by the left that was able to dominate the streets during the 1960-1980 period, the terrible defeat experienced after 1980, the erasure of socialism from Europe, and in the meantime, the erasure of the October Revolution of 1917, the midwife of 1923, from history with all its consequences, could have made it easier for us to perceive these differences.

Do the 'Butlancılar' and their adversaries have the power to draw lessons from their own history? The answer is unfortunately very clear: They do not even feel such a need. They are waiting for a government gift to fall from the ballot box that is understood to be not much different from the AKP.

But the more painful part is elsewhere: The socialist left, which could be the representative of the working classes, is unable to concern itself with either the past or the future. (We exclude, of course, the communists who do not view Turkey as an anomaly and who evaluate the established socialism as a historical justification despite its collapse.) When they throw a few “discussions considered luxuries by everyone” onto the agenda or the table, that is, they think they are getting ahead in the power game with gimmicks that cannot move the real nerve endings of the people.

So much for them.

What is painful is that the segments claiming to be the socialist left are also, with a few exceptions, the toy, or even the monkey, of this process.

The point is this: Okay, everything and all conditions have changed, but when you look at the general scene, we are in the second half of the 1950s. But the government is still, as İrtem points out, repeating the comfort that the DP experienced in the first half of the 50s. Despite the crisis...

Perhaps a first step could be taken by presenting a progressive/republican/planner emergency government program that has broken away from 80 years of reactionary tendencies to this scene, by organizing for this, and most importantly, by realizing appropriate media organizations for this.

Question: Can't Republicans announce the first five-year plan of their own government accompanied by an alternative government (“shadow cabinet”)? Can't they embark on a sortie by saying, “Here are the government members of our left-wing government and what we will do while reconstructing the republic on a socialist basis”?

Yet there is such a party. Even parties... There are such Republicans... There is such an accumulation of intellectuals... Our people, who are being disciplined by hunger, led by the resisting miners, are also there. Okay, except for the “reasonable opposition” bureaucrats...

We are not living in the 1950s. Because we are in a much worse situation than those years. Because we cannot detect the energy to produce a social alternative in universities and state bureaucracy. Because the people are silent despite the crisis. And the “reasonable opposition” is adept at stealing the show.

What should be done?

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(*) Işıl Çakan İbrahimoğlu / Okan İrtem / Deniz Hakyemez / Barış Zeren, Zincirli Hürriyet – Sağın Gölgesinde 27 Mayıs (Chained Freedom – May 27 in the Shadow of the Right), Tekin Yayınevi, Istanbul 2025.