The Republic and Citizenship

We are celebrating the 100th anniversary of our Republic. We are far ahead compared to the day we were founded. However, we cannot say that we have fully kept the promise we made to our great leader Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, that we have reached the goal he set, or that we are walking on his path without tiring.

In the 100th year of our Republic, wars and internal conflicts are occurring intensely around our country. In our country, there is also an intense agenda regarding new constitutional debates, democracy, the rule of law, judicial independence, the expansion of freedoms, the economy, the cost of living, inflation, production, investment, and unemployment.

So, in the 100th year of our Republic, does everyone understand the same thing when democracy is mentioned? Is it possible to define and discuss democracy while excluding its social, political, and class dimensions? Is ensuring equality on paper and before the law sufficient for a democratic regime? What are the essentials of democracy? It is worth discussing these.

Let us discuss.

We know that in our country, the War of Independence gave birth to the Republic, and the Republic gave birth to democracy. In other words, democracy in Turkey is the child of the Republic. It came with the Republican Revolution. It owes its existence to the Republic.

We also know that democracies come with revolution. They find ground at historical breaking points, after bloody civil wars, and following struggles for independence. However, if the consciousness of citizenship is not rooted, if the necessary institutionalization has not been achieved, if the separation of powers is not established, if the rule of law—which is the sine qua non of democracy—is not in question, if universities are silent, if intellectuals are quiet, and if the media is under pressure, then one cannot speak of democracy there.

All that is done is limited to going to the ballot box and casting a vote.

Because in democracies, legitimacy is very important, it is vital. A legality detached from legitimacy, compliance with laws not based on legitimacy, and an understanding of democracy based solely on ballot box majorities that does not include justice, equality, and freedom are unhealthy.

Moreover, such an understanding does not include pluralism. It prioritizes majoritarianism. And that can end in the tyranny of the majority. There are many examples of this in history. So much so that even changing the regime of the country, transferring its independence, and giving up its sovereignty and integrity can be achieved through the ballot box. The ballot box majority is presented and shown as the national will. The approach of “the national will wants it this way” forms the basis of the tyranny of the majority and the ground for fascism emerging from the ballot box.

Democracy develops with the liquidation of feudalism. It strengthens by liquidating feudal relations, remnants of the Middle Ages, affiliations, allegiances, sensitivities, and identities.

As we put an end to sheikhdom, dervish orders, land lordship, and tribal, religious sect, and community relations, we consolidate the consciousness of citizenship.

Furthermore, the struggle against feudalism is also a struggle for independence, a struggle against imperialism, a struggle to overcome poverty, and a struggle for equality and freedom.

Knowing this very well, imperialist powers and capitalist centers, especially after the Cold War, with the globalization process and the New World Order, have encouraged people to cling to solidarity networks based on sub-identities in order to collapse nation-states and weaken the citizen identity.

Post-modern understanding has also advocated this. So much so that every subject and every problem has been primarily handled through the window of identity politics and has become understood within the scope of ethnic, religious, and sectarian identities, forms of expression, and organizations.

Nationalism, citizenship, and class consciousness have been replaced by hometown associations, tribal foundations, and religious sect and community relations. These have been marketed and applauded as “civil society organizations.” It has been claimed that democracy would rise upon these.

The highlighting and politicization of such identities have been characterized as the development of democracy, freedom, and human rights. In this process, the democratic struggle of organized classes that forms the essence of democracy—in other words, the struggle rising on the labor-capital contradiction—has lost its meaning. Since feudalism is as hostile to class consciousness as it is to citizenship consciousness, the importance of organized labor and the trade union movement has diminished.

Even if it is painful, we must accept this fact: Our 100-year-old Republic has not been able to liquidate feudalism. It has not been able to root out feudal relations, fatalism, dependency, and superstitions from society. The trio of poverty, ignorance, and bigotry has, of course, also served the interests of politicians who are in harmony with feudalism.

THE DIMENSION OF THE REPUBLIC AND FEUDAL RELATIONS

The Republic prioritizes development, especially holistic development, rather than just growth on an economic plane. It places production, property, and distribution relations at the center of political economy. It is jealous when it comes to the nation-state, sovereignty, enlightenment, equality, anti-imperialism, and independence. It is against the citizen being treated as a customer. It cannot tolerate poverty, inequality, and injustice in income distribution. It insists on the social state. It knows that without these being provided, people cannot act independently. Therefore, the struggle between the Republic and feudalism—which traps people in sub-identities, melts them within that environment and framework, renders them ineffective, enslaves them, and condemns them to a life where they do not seek their rights and are content with what is given—is a very tough struggle.

Those who advocate identity politics, with a generalizing and reductionist attitude, both define people by their ethnic, religious, and sectarian identities and use a divisive, exclusionary, othering, and racist language. Especially those who call themselves “liberal leftists” think this is progressivism. They ignore class politics and class contradiction. For example, when describing our citizens who vote for the HDP, they say “Kurdish voter.” However, when describing those who vote for the CHP, MHP, or IYI Party, they do not say “Turkish voter.” Just as they do not know that there are citizens among those who vote for the HDP who are not ethnically of Kurdish origin, they also do not know that there are many ethnically Kurdish-origin Turkish voters among those who vote for other parties.

Moreover, there are millions of citizens in Turkey whose mothers and fathers come from different ethnic origins and who have different sectarian and religious beliefs. How will these citizens be defined according to those who advocate identity politics? As “voter with a Kurdish mother and a Turkish father”? As “voter with a Sunni father and an Alevi mother”? As “voter with an Albanian mother and a Circassian father”?

It is clear that those who make this definition are practicing racism. Those who mistake ethnicism for leftism, sectarianism for revolutionism, and localism for communism—in short, those who are stuck in the swamp of identity politics—are serving imperialism.

EQUAL CITIZENSHIP IS ONE THING, THE EQUALITY OF CITIZENS IS ANOTHER

One of the mistakes frequently made in recent years is to confuse equal citizenship with the equality of citizens, to consider them one and the same. One must be careful and attentive in this regard.

Equal citizenship is briefly this: Within the constitutional structure, let another identity (or identities) besides the Turkish identity be recognized. Let the recognized second identity be equal to the Turkish identity. Let it attain constitutional status. Let it find a place in the Constitution. In practice, those who say equal citizenship suggest this: “You remain as a Turk. I will come next to you in the Constitution as a Kurd. If they want, let Circassians, Albanians, Bosniaks, Caucasians, Chechens, Laz, and Georgians come too.”

Those who advocate this approach do not see Turkishness as the overarching identity, the common identity, or the national identity; they see it as one of the ethnic groups in Turkey. Therefore, they oppose Turkish being the language of the state, as stated in the Constitution. They also reject Atatürk’s definition of the nation (“The people of Turkey who founded the Republic of Turkey are called the Turkish nation”) and his definition of the citizen (“How happy is the one who says I am a Turk”). The equality of citizens, on the other hand, is the equality of all citizens before the constitution and the laws. It is that no discrimination is made among citizens based on race, religion, sect, lineage, region, or origin. Equal citizenship prioritizes identity politics. It paves the way for separatism. The equality of citizens is democratic, populist, and defends national integrity and social cohesion.

Respecting different ethnic and sectarian affiliations and sub-identities, advocating for their freedom to learn, speak, teach, and transmit their language, culture, and traditions, and seeing this as a natural right and handling it within the scope of personal freedom is one thing.

Seeing this as a privilege, defining it within the scope of group identity, and advocating for its politicization is another. No one objects to sub-identities being seen within the scope of personal rights and freedoms. But their being brought to the fore as a group identity, their politicization, and their demanding privileges or engaging in separatism cannot be allowed.

In short, the Republic takes citizens as the basis, takes citizens as the interlocutor, and recognizes citizens. It makes the contract with citizens. Not with ethnic structures, religious clusters, feudal groups, or regional identities.