Turkey’s title deed: Lausanne

The most important of the agreements in which Atatürk crowned his successes on the battlefield at the diplomatic table is Lausanne (July 24, 1923). It was signed a few months before the proclamation of the Republic. It is Turkey’s title deed; its registration as an independent, sovereign, and equal state. It was brought to life after eight months of tough negotiations. The negotiations were broken off once and frequently reached the point of collapse. The first round of negotiations, which began in November 1922, was interrupted due to the stance of Britain and France regarding Western Thrace, the Straits, Mosul, Ottoman Debts, and the capitulations, and the Turkish Delegation returned home. The most difficult bargaining took place on the issues of capitulations, the Straits, and Mosul-Kirkuk. There was also great pressure on Turkey regarding minorities, but after long discussions, the Turkish thesis was accepted. It is also necessary not to forget the 140 million gold Ottoman debt that was placed before us while going to Lausanne.

Although some today say “Lausanne is a defeat” and glorify the Treaty of Sèvres—which did not even grant Turkey the right to conduct archaeological excavations on its own soil—no agreement signed during that period, except for Lausanne, is in effect. This is because Lausanne is realistic. Even though British Prime Minister Lloyd George had said 3 years before Lausanne, “The Turks are a cancer of humanity and they must be driven out of Anatolia,” Britain signed Lausanne. The British historian Arnold Toynbee, author of the Blue Book, which is known as the propaganda book that formed the basis for the so-called genocide allegations, said, “Turkish nationalist demands on almost every subject were accepted by the allies at Lausanne. There is no example of this in world history.” Joseph Grew, the first US Ambassador to Turkey and its representative at Lausanne, who attended the conference as an observer, noted, “Ismet Pasha won a great victory at Lausanne,” and described Inönü as follows: “Inönü is a complete warrior. A fighter like Napoleon, the best diplomat of his time. The head of the British delegation, Lord Curzon, was tired of his unyielding stance and insistence on independence. The Turkish delegation, on the other hand, always acted honestly and professionally.”

ISMET PASHA’S RESISTANCE

The American journalist Clarence Kirchman Streit, who followed the Lausanne negotiations, wrote the following about Inönü: “The National Pact is ingrained in him. He received no training in diplomacy or politics. Despite spending his whole life in the army, he is not a militarist. He prefers to reach the result through peaceful means. However, even if his interlocutors bluff or use sweet talk, it does not work against this man.” British Prime Minister Lloyd George, who was forced to resign after the Turkish victory in 1922 and who said, “Human history may produce a genius every few centuries. Look at our misfortune that this genius emerged from Turkey. And against us, too. What could be done against the genius of Mustafa Kemal?” described Lausanne as: “A miserable, cowardly, and disgraceful surrender from the perspective of Britain and its allies.”

The British Foreign Office, which in 1918 instructed the British commander who signed the Armistice of Mudros to “use ambiguous words so that we can interpret them as we see fit in the future,” was stunned this time. It noted, “Lausanne made the Turks sovereign in their own country.” Because they were not facing a commander like Rauf Bey (Orbay), who thought, as in Mudros, “The armistice was signed between two equal states, they gave me their word that they would not land occupation forces in Istanbul. They will not occupy our lands. Especially, they will never allow Greece to do such a thing,” only to see occupations begin before the ink on his words had dried. There was a stubborn, negotiating soldier-diplomat like Ismet Pasha. Lord Curzon himself admitted: “From Mudanya to Lausanne is a defeat.” Yet, the same Lord Curzon had written a few years earlier, on January 4, 1920: “The Turks must be driven out of Europe. As American Senator Lodge said, Istanbul must be completely cleansed of the Turks. The Turks, who are a seed of plague, the creator of wars, and a curse to their neighbors, must be wiped out of Europe.”

The Turkish delegation had prepared for the negotiations down to the finest detail. Atatürk asked the delegation to fight for full independence in every field, and in the 14-point instruction he gave to the delegation, he said, “If the Armenian homeland is brought to the agenda, leave the table immediately.” On the first day of the conference, after the British Foreign Secretary and chief delegate Lord Curzon made his opening speech, Ismet Pasha emphasized that he would also make a speech and insisted on it. Despite the objections of the British and the fact that it was not in the protocol, Ismet Pasha also made an opening speech at the podium. This was a first for that period. It had not been seen in peace conferences in Europe until that day. In this way, Ismet Pasha emphasized that there were two sides at the conference and showed from the very first day that he would adopt a stance completely different from that of the Ottoman diplomats. This attitude continued regarding the seating arrangement in the conference hall, and Ismet Pasha, like the British, sat at the head of the table.

THE BEWILDERMENT OF THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE

In the negotiations, the British had other advantages besides their imperial mindset, background, political weight, and diplomatic experience. They had cracked the codes of the telegraph communication the Turkish side established with Ankara. Therefore, they believed the conference would end in a few weeks. They saw their diplomats as bridge players who knew the other side’s hand in the negotiations. Moreover, thanks to the British intelligence network, Lord Curzon was aware of the discussions held in secret sessions in the parliament in Ankara and the harsh criticisms directed at Ismet Pasha. The British were so arrogant that, for example, when Ismet Pasha called their bluff on the Mosul issue and said, “If you wish, let us hold a plebiscite in Mosul, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniyah,” the British, knowing that the overwhelming majority of Kurds in the region would choose Turkey, replied, “The Kurds are ignorant, they cannot read or write, they will eat the ballots at the ballot box.” They did not stop there. On April 23, after the second round of negotiations began in Lausanne, they bombed Mosul and its surroundings.

Ismet Pasha, who left the table at the end of the first round of negotiations in Lausanne, said, “We did not accept being captives.” Marshal Fevzi Çakmak began work on mobilization. It is no coincidence that Ismet Pasha was the chief delegate of the Turkish delegation. Prime Minister Rauf Orbay wanted to go to Lausanne as the chief delegate, especially because of his signature on the Armistice of Mudros, to erase that stain. Kâzım Karabekir Pasha, who signed the Treaty of Gümrü, also thought about going to Lausanne. However, Ismet Inönü, who wrote in his memoirs, “Going to Lausanne was not even on my mind,” went to Lausanne as the Commander of the Western Front, a commander of the victorious army that had defeated the enemy, and a successful diplomat of the Mudanya Armistice. With the resignation of Yusuf Kemal Tengirşenk, Ismet Pasha was made Minister of Foreign Affairs and chief delegate. The republic had not yet been proclaimed. Istanbul was under occupation. Ismet Pasha, the tough negotiator in the den of wolves, was realistic enough to say, “Unless there was a vital obstacle, we were obliged to make peace. If there was no peace, there was a possibility of losing what we had gained on the front until then.”

Lausanne was signed under these conditions. That is why it is solid and valid.