A salute to the struggle and self-criticism on the anniversary of March 19: 'Improving methodology is valuing the struggle'

News: Cenk Başboğaoğlu -12punto

CHP's Presidential Candidate Ekrem İmamoğlu, who has been on the agenda with demands for a political ban and the cancellation of his diploma, was detained on the morning of March 19, 2025. 

Today also marks the anniversary of the day citizens took their reaction against this decision to the streets. Deniz Altay Avcı, Deputy Chair of the CHP Beşiktaş District Youth Branch, evaluated the anatomy and criticism of the March 19 resistance on 12punto. 

'A POLITICAL COUP'

Emphasizing that the March 19 operation was a coup, Avcı commented, "The mildest thing one can clearly and plainly say is that this is a political coup. A coup is not only carried out by soldiers with weapons in their hands. A coup is, of course, an expression that can be used for anyone who uses various state apparatuses as they wish to protect the established order. Therefore, one should not refrain from calling this process a political coup. I think this is not done enough. I think the event is approached from too many technical perspectives. This is already being done consciously in government channels to gain time and confuse the public mind. However, even in media that we can describe as opposition media, even if they want to explain the legal dimension of the cases and that the accusations are baseless, too much emphasis is placed on the technical aspects of the accusations. While issues such as whether it complies with legal practices, etc., have been discussed extensively for months, the anatomy of the struggle and the structure of the government attempting the coup are not analyzed enough." Regarding the content of the coup, he said, "It is worth emphasizing; the operations carried out, this political coup, is a coup carried out entirely for political motives. There is a very simple dynamic, a very simple mathematical formulation at play. Tayyip Erdoğan is a politician who looks at politics not through perspectives like gains, welfare, or social benefit, but through formulas that will ensure he wins and 'rational' approaches; he does whatever is in his interest, whatever he needs to do to win. We can actually call it one of the solid examples of populism when looking at the world. Therefore, it should be read from here."

On the other hand, Avcı described the process leading to March 19 and the political formula as follows: "Leading up to this process, Tayyip Erdoğan was defeated by Ekrem İmamoğlu four times: first in Beylikdüzü, then in Istanbul twice in 2019, and later in 2024. And each of these defeats cost him more politically than the previous one. The defeats Tayyip Erdoğan suffered against Ekrem İmamoğlu have reached such a dimension that İmamoğlu has also defeated Erdoğan in terms of the approval he receives from the public. This situation of finding resonance left Erdoğan and his cronies so desperate and showed so clearly that they would pay the price for their inability to produce politics that they dared to carry out this coup. When a very simple projection is made, it was obvious that Ekrem İmamoğlu would defeat Tayyip Erdoğan in an election held at any time and under any conjuncture, no matter how unfair the conditions. However, even if the elections themselves were not taken away, the right of the nation to choose who they would elect was taken away. But on the other hand, if you agree to enter a race, you also accept the rules of that race. Yes, there is competitive authoritarianism in Turkey. In fact, it is now moving towards non-competitive authoritarianism. But if you, as a political party, are willing to enter this election, it means you are also willing to accept these rules. Ekrem İmamoğlu also appeared with the claim, 'I will defeat you even within this system you have established.' And he kept his word every time. Because Tayyip Erdoğan knew he would keep his next word, he blocked Ekrem İmamoğlu's path using the last method he had left, using the judiciary—which even the term 'politicized' is too mild for, and as our Chairman put it, a 'guillotined' judiciary." Regarding İmamoğlu's difference, he noted, "He also knew that just blocking Ekrem İmamoğlu would not be enough. Because Ekrem İmamoğlu actually did a job in Istanbul that went far beyond being a personality cult. He always chose his team from competent people. Because he practiced the 'art of delegation,' which is one of the fundamental common traits of all good managers, they did not settle for just taking Ekrem İmamoğlu. They actually launched a collective attack by including the names of everyone who had a greater or lesser share in Ekrem İmamoğlu's success story in Istanbul in this slanderous document. Because it is also known that if we only take Ekrem İmamoğlu, the team that wrote this success story for Ekrem İmamoğlu will gather around another candidate and write a similar story again. Because, as I said, since they approach politics from a formulaic and rational perspective, they do not have ideological concerns, societal expectations, cost of living, etc., so we are talking about a structure that can act in a very pragmatic way, looking at it 'rationally' in quotation marks, unlike the Republican People's Party. And we are actually talking about a structure that has no other option because they no longer receive approval from the public."

'IT HAS NO INTELLECTUAL BASIS'

Continuing his words regarding the government's team mentality, Avcı said, "The structure in front of us has no intellectual basis, no historical story, and no success story they can put forward other than the elections they won. Therefore, losing an election means 'being politically dead' for the AKP and Tayyip Erdoğan. For example, such a situation is not observed in the CHP, but it is observed in the AKP, and it is actually something contrary to the nature of politics. You set out with a claim to power, and winning elections provides consolidation for your organization, etc. However, the true success of a political organization is measured by how it can renew itself in line with the criticisms that come after the elections it loses. In a real organizational structure, this is always the case. Whether it is a company or an association, the same thing applies. It is measured by how it adapts to changing conditions and how it finds solutions to its failures. But Tayyip Erdoğan and his team do not have such a talent, and they never did. Because they knew how to win, even if only on paper, by using various pragmatic methods. Therefore, they do not know what to do when they lose; they have no such plan." Regarding the meaning of March 19, he said, "They attempted such a thing, they dared to do it because they could no longer afford this. That is the political meaning, and that is the only meaning of March 19. In fact, we are currently watching the struggles of a group and the person at its head who is experiencing the final days of their power, whose fear of losing has overtaken their rational reflexes. Because they haven't had a story to tell for a very long time. I mean, we saw this before the 2019 elections, and we saw it in the 2018 presidential elections. We are talking about a government here that has no story to tell."

At the same time, Avcı said, "However, for a very long time, there was an organization within the CHP that was insufficient in terms of organizational capacity and the success of convincing the masses that it could govern the country. Of course, this did not stem from a lack of historical knowledge of the CHP or from the lack of all the laborers or officials in positions of authority from the lowest to the highest level within the party. There have always been first-rate cadres within the CHP who are more than capable of governing Turkey. They exist today as well. But these cadres were not always in 'power.' When these two realities coincide on the timeline, victory is inevitable. Because we are talking about a party that has such a rich historical narrative, a party that was founded through war, founded through struggle, and raised a state and an empire from its ashes as a democratic republic again. There is no deficiency here. This means that when the necessary cadres come to power, they can easily make the right decisions by feeding on this accumulation, and in fact, this is what we saw in the 2024 local elections."

'THERE IS A SICK GOVERNMENT'

Strengthening his criticisms with previous election experiences, Avcı used the following words: "We often hear approaches like 'The government's voters did not go to the polls; this success was the government's failure rather than the CHP's success' for the 2023 elections. Okay, but the reason for the government's voters not to go to the polls, to punish the management team, especially Tayyip Erdoğan, and to give them a message did not emerge in the 2024 elections. Didn't this public have a reason to punish the AKP and hold the AKP accountable in the 2023 elections? Didn't they have it in 2018, 2019? Or in the 2017 referendum, in the 2015 elections, both in June and November? They did, they always did. But there is a very clear line here. This public still believes that elections represent their own will in some way and seeks an exit in the elections. No matter what, there is such a reality. So why was it attempted to be taken from the hands of this public through a political coup in the March 19 process after the 2024 elections? Because for the first time, that will manifested in a direction that the AKP and Tayyip Erdoğan did not want. Of course, it can be argued that this is not the first time. We all know the discussions in the 2017 referendum. But I think we shouldn't make too many retrospective arguments. If we talk about the 2024 elections, we are facing an old, tired, and sick government that cannot digest this election result, that is like a patient constantly suffering from indigestion, not knowing what to do, and unable to get rid of that feeling in its body. March 19 is actually the manifestation of this."

IS IT TURNING INTO NOSTALGIA?

Regarding the allegations that the CHP, while inviting citizens to Saraçhane on the first anniversary of March 19, has turned the day of resistance into a nostalgic atmosphere detached from its meaning, Avcı said, "I don't think there is such a strategic goal weakness in the party in terms of the sincerity of the struggle and the course of the struggle. Our party's goal has been clear from day one: 'We want our candidate by our side, the ballot box in front of us.' I don't think the goal set or the determination in the struggle are missing or wrong. Because these factors might be a reason for nostalgia. But there is a second possibility. That is that such an impression has been formed due to problems in implementation, that is, in organization. I am on the side of the latter. I think the main reason for this is actually a bit about communication strategies. Because what we call the Spirit of March 19 is a spirit born from the meeting of the historical image of students in Beyazıt breaking that police barricade with the other historical image of party groups on Vatan Street breaking the police barricade, and the two groups meeting in Saraçhane. In other words, the Spirit of March 19 symbolizes the social consensus reaching a higher level than ever before. Because usually, topics like this are always discussed within leftist organizations. These are often justified, too. Serious criticisms are made about the CHP's methods of action, the way or amount of going to the field... The CHP is actually accused of staying within the system a bit. It was a point where all these criticisms were resolved with a social consensus in a sense. Because those masses, who are interested in politics one way or another, or even if they are not interested at all, whose lives are ruined by politics, finally realized this there: We will march, as the base, we will march. The political opposition, the CHP, which we can call the institutional opposition, is already coming to where we are marching." On the other hand, Avcı said, "We are talking about a change in understanding here. The Spirit of March 19 was the result of realizing this change in understanding, albeit a bit late. However, it is possible to say that it has decreased a year later. If you remember, in the beginning, the youth and the crowd gathered in Saraçhane in the days of March 19 and after had a number of demands. This could be about putting pressure on the belt rather than standing in the rally area, it could be about boycotting certain companies, or it could be demands for an academic boycott and a general strike. These demands were not only heard by the party management. At the same time, reasonable counterparts for these demands were found, and in line with this, the will of the crowd was mobilized and implemented. Actually, a democratic process was working when we looked at it. Of course, there were manipulations in this, there were mistakes made by the party, there were some mistakes made by the crowd. But the practice there was actually the very thing we call democracy. There is a mass. That mass speaks out against an injustice. Everyone agrees on speaking out against injustice and that this is an injustice, a political coup. There are different ideas on how to fight this. The main organ to execute these ideas is the CHP. The main organ, the CHP, does not say 'I decide.' It listens to the suggestion coming from the crowd and took some steps to mobilize and implement it. So there was actually an interaction there. There was representation. I think this representation has decreased a bit. Because we started to see a 'practice of action' that became periodic and normalized. This was somewhat inevitable when considering that we have left a one-year process behind."

SO HOW SHOULD COMMUNICATION BE?

Making evaluations on how communication methods could be used better in this process, Avcı said, "After the Maltepe rally where the indictments started to be written, after switching to that weekly, dual rally system where we call it a province in Anatolia and a district in Istanbul, I observed serious deficiencies in the party in terms of communication policies. I think the reason for this is not so much the normalization of the nature of the actions taken, but rather that they could not be explained, and that the information flow from this crowd to the headquarters or party management was not evaluated as much as it was on the first day of the actions, and on the other hand—of course, since we are talking about a young crowd and a crowd with different expectations here—the decrease in excitement brought by the periodic nature of the actions, the fact that the information flow I mentioned was not like those first days, and that dynamism and representation decreasing a bit, combined to inevitably bring this back to a party struggle, or at least I think we could not prevent it from looking like that. Our party had a communication account. The CHP communication account was very efficient during the boycott time and for a short time after that. A communication policy was being followed there that really made an impact and could reach not only the segments included in the CHP base but also other segments of society. Later, the periodic nature of these posts might be inevitable, just like the periodic nature of the actions, but the decrease in the excitement it created and the drop in interaction despite these posts becoming periodic and regular were things that were quite avoidable. I think it could have been easily avoided by changing and developing the policies and the content produced here according to the information coming from below if approached professionally. You look there, there were days when no posts were made. It is observed that posts that have become regular like a dictionary and are part of an agenda that the government can also determine make up a large part of the entire repertoire."

In addition to the communication problem he mentioned, Avcı said, "Social media is the only medium used by the majority of this young crowd I mentioned, and of course, since this crowd is the engine that created this spirit, they should be taken into account first. Also, social media is the only remaining medium today where RTÜK does not hang like a 'Sword of Damocles' over it, leaving aside arbitrary cyber patrols and BTK practices outside the legislation. Because even in channels we would call opposition, some seeds of self-censorship can be planted through various practices carried out through RTÜK. Because the speakers or presenters talking there can actually expose themselves to this self-censorship through RTÜK. Therefore, the closure of Ekrem İmamoğlu's social media account is not a coincidence. This was a process with no tangible legal basis. That is a separate issue, but we are already aware that we are fighting with these rules." Regarding what can be done, he said, "The Chairman's statements were very useful for reigniting the spirit of the first day. Unfortunately, these statements cannot be made visible enough. Because just as you take important points from a one-and-a-half-hour speech by Özgür Özel at a group meeting, for example, and turn them into social media posts and share them from the CHP account, thinking that someone watching it on TBMM TV or another channel cannot perceive things, in the same way, rallies, press statements made after leaving the meetings in Silivri, these kinds of things that can be considered long, and in this period when the attention span has dropped so much in the young generation, they need to be shortened, turned into bullet points, and made easier to consume. This is a must. I don't think this is being done enough. And the reason why this cannot be done is that I think these channels are managed by people who may not have enough knowledge about the usage strategies of new media and social media, especially the attention span of young people. On one hand, there is this, but on the other hand, there is this: Of course, it is not a job that will be done only with social media. We also need to rethink, seriously rethink, the methods of action. Because this is how it is. Everything that becomes periodic becomes ordinary. This is an inevitable thing. But if its becoming periodic is inevitable, then we should focus more on how this can be explained better with the communication channels we have left."

'WE NEED TO CHANGE SOME THINGS'

Criticizing the CHP in terms of new media, Avcı asked, "For example, why is there no editing at all? Or why are there no illustration videos?" and continued, "There is a YouTube channel that Murat Ongun has recently activated. There is a channel where Murat Ongun prepares the choreography and text content in his cell, and then these are turned into videos by a team outside, turned into illustration videos, and published. And there, he himself often touches on the topics we touched on in this interview and more. People who watch those short, concise videos will understand what I mean. If a person can write and produce these striking videos, which touch on such correct points and can catch the agenda so tightly, and even make references to future dates in some points, in a notebook in prison, then teams with all the possibilities of technology and the party's possibilities should be able to achieve much better than these in the comfort and ease of the headquarters, I think. If they cannot achieve it and there is no improvement in this direction, it means we need to change some things. Actually, the issue is that simple."

On the other hand, Avcı said, "If you are expecting something other than doing the same things and not getting similar results, your methodology is clearly wrong. We interpret it inevitably as you don't understand this business very well or you don't want to do it in a much more effective way. Therefore, I think the party's fundamental problem is a communication problem. Here, I want to underline once again that we are aware of this censorship applied to media channels, journalists being taken into custody, all of these. However, we should never have the time or the desire to hide behind these excuses. We must be able to produce solutions suitable for the rules of the game we are playing in real-time. We are a party with the power to do this. We are a team with the talent and ability to do this. We are truly a very big family, and I don't think there is anything that such a big family, which has such a big, justified, and rich story, cannot achieve if they really want to and give tasks to the right people. And I am sure that if President Ekrem were outside, he would give a similar answer if something was told to him about not being able to use communication tools enough by showing the blockade on the media as an excuse. If we cannot achieve something, there is only one correct interpretation we can make: It means we are not working hard enough, and it means we are not following the correct methodologies that are mandatory to break the oppressive environment we are in. Therefore, if there is a solution, if a solution is to be found to get out of this blockade, that solution itself is the Republican People's Party. I don't think there is any result that the Republican People's Party cannot get by looking at its own children, and I think the social spirit can be brought back to the state of the first day in this way. Because improving methodology is valuing the struggle."

News Source: 12punto