CHP questions government on TUSAŞ: Did the terrorist obtain information about TUSAŞ?
Security vulnerabilities continue to be debated following the terrorist attack on the TUSAŞ facilities in Ankara's Kahramankazan district on October 23, which left 5 people martyred. CHP Istanbul MP Yüksel Mansur Kılınç has submitted a parliamentary question for Minister of Interior Ali Yerlikaya to answer.
In the terrorist attack on the central campus of Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAŞ) in Ankara's Kahramankazan district on October 23, 2024, 5 people were killed and 22 were injured.
As security vulnerabilities began to be debated following this act by the PKK, which claimed responsibility for the attack, Republican People's Party (CHP) Istanbul MP and CHP spokesperson for the Parliamentary Security and Intelligence Commission, Yüksel Mansur Kılınç, submitted a parliamentary question regarding the matter.
In his motion, Kılınç raised allegations that inspectors from the General Directorate of Security's Private Security Supervision Department had audited the private security services at the TUSAŞ facilities shortly before the attack.
In his motion, Kılınç asked, "Are the allegations true that a report was prepared during the audit stating that there was insufficient personnel to ensure the security of TUSAŞ?" and demanded an explanation from Minister of Interior Ali Yerlikaya on the subject.
The questions posed by CHP MP Yüksel Mansur Kılınç to Minister of Interior Ali Yerlikaya are as follows:
- Although a similar terrorist attack took place in Ankara approximately one year ago, why could the terrorists not be prevented from entering through the Syrian border and attacking TUSAŞ, which is of critical importance for security in the capital, Ankara, with heavy weapons? Were there security vulnerabilities in the occurrence of the attack, and if so, what were these security vulnerabilities?
- The terrorists came to the TUSAŞ campus by taxi one day before the attack to conduct reconnaissance, murdered our taxi driver citizen the next day and hid him in the trunk of the vehicle, passed through the gendarmerie checkpoint by taxi with long-barreled heavy weapons, arrived at the TUSAŞ campus, and carried out the attack. Why could these activities of the terrorists not be detected in advance? How were the terrorists able to pass through the gendarmerie checkpoint in this way?
- Is it true that information about TUSAŞ was obtained from digital materials seized from a PKK terrorist captured by security forces in Şırnak province shortly before the attack?
- Since the identities of the terrorists were determined and announced shortly after the attack, it is understood that information about the terrorists was in the records of security institutions. Despite this, how were the terrorists able to pass through security points until they arrived in Ankara from the Syrian border and while they were planning the attack in Ankara?
- When was the protection duty at the security point located approximately 1.5 kilometers away from the TUSAŞ campus taken over from the gendarmerie and transferred to TUSAŞ's private security unit? What is the justification for this change?
- Why is the security of a critically important institution like TUSAŞ, which develops Atak and Gökbey helicopters, Kaan, Hürkuş, and Hürjet aircraft, and the ANKA unmanned aerial vehicle, and where thousands of people work, provided only by private security guards? Since what date has the security of the TUSAŞ campus been provided by private security guards?
- When did the inspectors of the General Directorate of Security's Private Security Supervision Department last audit the private security protection at TUSAŞ? What findings were obtained in the audit?
- Are the allegations true that the inspectors of the General Directorate of Security's Private Security Supervision Department audited the private security protection at TUSAŞ in the first week of October 2024, shortly before the terrorist attack on TUSAŞ, and that the report prepared by the inspectors of the General Directorate of Security's Private Security Supervision Department stated that there were significant vulnerabilities in terms of private security protection at TUSAŞ and that there was an insufficiency in the number of personnel required to ensure the security of TUSAŞ? If true, why were urgent measures not taken to eliminate the security vulnerabilities identified at TUSAŞ?
- After the TUSAŞ attack, has an investigation or inquiry been launched into those who had negligence in the formation of security vulnerabilities at TUSAŞ and the occurrence of the attack? If launched, what results have been reached in the investigation?
- During the terrorist attack on TUSAŞ, who obtained the security camera footage of the moment of the attack and leaked it to the media? Has an investigation or inquiry been conducted on this matter? If so, what findings were obtained?
News Source : 12punto
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